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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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## CONTENTS

16 November 1990

### NEAR EAST

#### REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Presence of Female Soldiers Reportedly Causes Problems [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH 2 Nov]	1
---	---

#### ALGERIA

Minister of Defense on Military, Political Issues [EL MOUDJAHID 12 Sep]	1
---	---

#### EGYPT

Interior Minister on Elections, Iraq, Fundamentalists [AL-MUSAWWAR 5 Oct]	12
Security Court Chief Views Islamic Politics, Violence [Beirut AL-SHIRA' 3 Sep]	25
Editors Offer Analysis of Assembly Speaker Murder	29
Terrorism as Intimidation [AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 17 Oct]	29
Assassination Theories [AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 17 Oct]	31

#### IRAQ

Disadvantages of Current Iraqi Policy Examined [Istanbul MILLIYET 21, 22 Sep]	31
New Book on Kuwait's 'Restoration' Reviewed [THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER 17 Sep]	33

#### ISRAEL

Oil Suppliers Getting Scarcer [HA'ARETZ 6 Sep]	34
Arens' Performance at Defense Assessed [AL HAMISHMAR 10 Sep]	35
Cabinet's Performance Appraised [HA'ARETZ 11 Sep]	36
Deputy Ministers Described as Real Power [HA'ARETZ 14 Sep]	37
Israeli Expert Examines Implications of 'Awn's Fall [AL HAMISHMAR 19 Oct]	38
Strategist Refutes Defense, Economic Worries [DAVAR 14 Sep]	40
1,000 Days of Intifadah Termed 'Wasted Opportunity' [AL HAMISHMAR 7 Sep]	43
Country Urged To Join New World Order [AL HAMISHMAR 7 Sep]	44
Leader of Temple Mount Faithful Profiled [THE JERUSALEM POST 19 Oct]	45
New Windshield Protection on Market [DAVAR 14 Sep]	46
Move From Manufacturing to Services Urged [THE JERUSALEM POST 12 Oct]	47

#### SAUDI ARABIA

Debate Over Role of Women Discussed [ARAB NEWS 25 Oct]	49
--	----

#### TUNISIA

Minister Claims \$391 Million Loss From Iraqi Invasion [London AL-MAJALLAH 26 Sep]	49
DUP Leader Describes Role of Islamists [Beirut AL-SHIRA' 3 Sep]	50

#### REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Opposition Leader Discusses Gulf Crisis, Saudi Tensions [London AL-MAJALLAH 10 Oct]	52
Party Addresses Issue of Returning Workers [AL-THAWRAH 17 Sep]	55
Editorial Discusses Nation's Role in Crisis [AL-THAWRAH 15 Sep]	56

## SOUTH ASIA

### INDIA

Punjab Presidential Rule Extended, Singh Speaks [THE HINDU 6 Oct] .....	58
Decisions on National Security Council Told [THE HINDU 8 Oct] .....	59
UK National Elected Naga National Council Chief [THE HINDU 26 Sep] .....	59
Communal Riots in Uttar Pradesh Town Described [THE HINDU 7 Oct] .....	59
Congress-I Returnees Say PRC Wants Rajiv Follow-Up Visit [THE TIMES OF INDIA 12 Sep] ..	60
Papers Report on Visit of Seychelles President Rene .....	61
24 Sep Talks [THE HINDU 25 Sep] .....	61
25 Sep Banquet [THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Sep] .....	61
Kashmir Corps Commander Briefs Correspondents [THE TIMES OF INDIA 21 Sep] .....	62
Communists, Socialists on Support to Government [THE STATESMAN 19 Sep] .....	63
Chief Justice of India Dies in London [THE HINDU 26 Sep] .....	64
Correspondent Reports Indian Efforts in Iraq [THE HINDU 28 Sep] .....	64
Analyst Discusses Problems in Janata Dal [THE HINDU 5 Oct] .....	65
Correspondent on BJP Study Camp Results [THE TIMES OF INDIA 18 Sep] .....	66
Anthropological Survey Study of Backward Classes [THE TIMES OF INDIA 1 Oct] .....	66

### IRAN

Future Fishing Accord With Seychelles Discussed [Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION 10 Oct] .....	67
Commentary Alleges Khalkhali, Duzdüzani Lack Piety [RESALAT 1 Oct] .....	68

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Presence of Female Soldiers Reportedly Causes Problems

91P40037A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
7 Oct 90 p 10

[Text] In the desert, among the sands and the boredom, a complex problem is developing, the solution for which is eluding American military commanders.

The female soldiers are among a number of male soldiers, which is continually leading to intimate relations, which prevents the soldiers in carrying out their military duties.

Captain Cynthia Mosley says: "Orders forbid mingling, but they are not binding when the male and female soldiers sleep together in one tent, thus we have been compelled to have them sleep with their clothes on. Those who disobey orders and engage in intimate conduct are transferred to other units."

Sergeant Steve Carney, of the 24th Support Battalion: "We have tried to impose strict controls on our soldiers, but we have 74 females among 380 males in our unit, and it is difficult to keep things under control when two lovers are attached to the same unit.

Then there is Private Sue Ardiles, 24, who says that the male soldiers do not follow orders and are unable to control their desires toward their female comrades. The order that frightened the American military authorities was that some soldiers might neglect their military duties on account of their feelings for female soldiers.

Private Michelle Como, 20, says that she is more than threatened, "the young men are always around, and they won't leave me alone."

The majority of American female soldiers confirm the problems that they have during contacts with the Saudis who are not accustomed to the sight of women in military surroundings, and Captain Mosley protested because the Saudi driver of a military vehicle refused to take orders from her. She said that this situation has affected her but that the soldiers must get used to it because they will be here for a long time.

## ALGERIA

### Minister of Defense on Military, Political Issues

91AA0058A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French  
12 Sep 90 pp 4-7

[Interview with Major General Khaled Nezzar, minister of national defense; date and place not given]

[Text] For the first time since 1965, the ministry of defense has a seat on the council of ministers. Also for the first time, an Algerian newspaper talks about the

ANP [People's National Army] in its trying moments, a subject previously considered taboo. In yet another first, Major General Khaled Nezzar, appointed minister in July, granted the interview below in which he dissects this senior public body with remarkable candor.

From a people in arms to the people's army, the minister retraces the path of this institution deeply rooted in Algeria's modern history and that aspires to ensure, defend, and guarantee the independence of Algerian sovereignty. "National defense is everyone's business," Maj. Gen. Khaled Nezzar declares in response to the first question, underscoring the republican character he intends to impart to the role of national defense. It is a notion that evolves with the evolving political, economic, and social realities of the country as they undergo a redefinition imposed by the reforms that are sweeping the country's doctrinal landscape.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Algerian public opinion has reacted favorably to the president's decision to appoint a minister of national defense. The move is indicative of a willingness both to expand without limitation the democratic process initiated by the Constitution of 23 February [1989] and to infuse our national institutions with an enduring republican spirit. What is your view of this, Mr. Minister?

[Nezzar] As you say, the appointment of a minister of national defense is, of course, a move in step with the democratic process. But to us, it also represents a "normalization" of the military institution and it is certain to result in better integration and association with the other ministerial departments and national institutions such as the APN [National People's Assembly]. Moreover, the appointment lifts the taboo associated with the Army up to now. Defense is everyone's problem and, by the way, one of our chief concerns is to make that basic principle a reality.

[EL MOUDJAHID] For obvious historical reasons, the Army in Algeria, as in many other Third World countries, has played a considerable political role. Will it continue to do so and in what new capacity will this senior public body enter into national life? In that context, what is the significance of an army back in its barracks? Should its departure from a direct political role be viewed as a response to popular will, like the demand to which the president agree on the departure of ANP officers from the party leadership of the FLN [National Liberation Front]?

[Nezzar] If you are referring to 19 June, it is true that the ANP played a major role in that period of our history. Since then, it has not held power as many like to think; it has been more or less associated, as were many other national organizations (UGTA [Algerian Trade Union Federation], UNPA [Algerian Farmers' Union], mass organizations, managerial conferences, etc.). Now it is true that several political leaders came from the ANP, but they also came from the ALN [National Liberation

Army]. Algeria's leaders were not solely from the Army. There were others, in the end, from other sectors.

Will the Army continue to play a role and in what new capacity will it enter into national life? In answer to that question, it should be made clear that the ANP will continue to play the role it has been playing—that is, its rightful role as set out in the Constitution. The ANP prohibits itself from interfering in any way in the functions that devolve to the other public authorities—as the laws provide, by the way.

If, however, it happens that the public authorities obtain a legal provision to involve the ANP in tasks of national interest, the ANP will have no choice but to comply in accordance with the conditions and procedures that will be specified.

The Army back in its barracks? In the desert, you might even add. At this time, four-fifths of the ANP is deployed in rural areas either for missions of a military interest or nature or for very difficult construction work in the south in connection with the National Service. But were the military authorities ever known to take the place of the civil authorities? That was not even done during the state of emergency in October 1988. It can therefore be said that an army back in its barracks, as you put it, is nothing new to the ANP.

That was a slogan used even before independence was declared. Indeed, as of the cease-fire, the political leaders who were not steeped in the ALN's purpose, not having lived it, advocated that the maquisards [members of the Resistance] reassemble in the barracks as of independence, on the pretext that it would promote public order. The idea was rejected back then and today we categorically reject this pejorative phrase because it also conveys an imported concept foreign to our military history.

If the ANP has spawned and fostered the rise of prestigious revolutionary leaders (and the ANP is proud of it), it has never given birth to a Caesar. If such a danger is present in Algeria, take a look at other political quarters that regard the ANP as an obstacle to democracy. That would explain to some extent the denigrating statements they have permitted themselves on foreign broadcasts and at times, regrettably, in the domestic press.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The press, both at home and abroad, has reported reluctance on the part of the military hierarchy toward the political reforms advocated in the nation. What is the true story on that, Mr. Minister?

[Nezzar] It is true that in recent months we have read or listened to so-called ANP experts declare that the ANP is opposed to—or as you put it, reluctant toward—the political reforms under way. That is another myth that must be laid to rest.

How could an army such as the ANP—shaped by the values that inspired its predecessor, the ALN, and made up of veterans from the war of liberation as well as

Algerians educated in independent Algeria's universities and other establishments—not share the same aspirations as the people of which it is a representative cross section? That would be a contradiction, postulated only by those with a grossly exaggerated image of military institutions or disingenuously.

For the sake of the truth, I must underscore that the ANP has never tried to block the rise of democracy, on the contrary. That should come as no surprise, by the way. The ANP draws its inspiration from the ideals of November [1954] and sees democracy and individual freedoms as the cornerstones of the edifice of the Algerian state and nation as envisioned by the founding fathers of the Revolution. If any doubt remains about the ANP's attitude toward political reforms, I would refer you to the declaration made by the ANP on this subject at the sixth FLN congress and to the withdrawal of military members from the central committee immediately after the Constitution of 1989 was promulgated.

[EL MOUDJAHID] But the Council of the Revolution did govern the country from 1965 to 1977, without a Parliament and without a Constitution. Do you call that democracy?

[Nezzar] It was, as you said, the Council of Revolution, meaning that we had a revolutionary government and not a constitutional one.

[EL MOUDJAHID] At what precise moment in history was the ALN structurally transformed into the ANP? Some historians and former officers in the National Liberation Army believe that the foundations, or if you prefer, the bases of the ANP already existed in embryonic form during the national war of liberation—to be more precise, as of the creation of a general staff in 1959 when the border army was formed. What is your opinion?

[Nezzar] The announcement that the ALN would become the ANP was made in the first few days of independence with a view to placing the ALN's formations under a central authority in order to put an end to what was known as "wilayism" [regionalism] at that time.

As to whether the ANP existed in embryonic form within the ALN, more precisely since 1959, it is both true and false.

True in that the ALN had unique authority, as the general staff had responsibility over all the ALN's armed formations and that was in keeping with the Revolution that sought to free the country and restore the Algerian state. Restoration required that future institutions of the independent state be set up. The army was one of the first of these institutions.

False if you believe that the ALN's border units were simply waiting for independence in order to form a reserve force that would serve political ambitions.

You can say many things about that era. I lived it. I believe, in fact, that we were led at one point to reappraise the military problems we faced. The French had shut down the borders using massive means known to all. Barriers had been erected in the east and in the west with the purpose of asphyxiating the ALN, which had only limited means. What did we have at the borders, in reality? There was the eastern base and the western base.

In the east, the base was made up of three military zones, plus a certain number of what I would call formations rather than units that had come from the interior primarily in search of supplies and that were blocked at one point because the French expanded their barrier in time as events developed. It was a defensive array with a great deal of field organization, fortified points, and weaponry.

Faced with this new military situation, we had to make changes. The units of the eastern base and the formations that were prepared to penetrate the interior had to be organized, and the refugees present there had to be mobilized. In Zones 5 and 6 of Wilaya 1 as well.

We realized that in order to respond to this new situation, people would have to be trained and to accomplish that, we put to work the officers who had received training in the Middle East and those who had deserted the French Army. They were the ones who took on all training responsibilities.

The result? The "border army." First of all, I want to state that the quote border army unquote is a misnomer. I say in quotes because at that time, the French wanted to set the internal army apart from the "external" army. Unfortunately, certain officials fell into that trap. To this day, it is still called the "border army." But the fact remains that it was thanks to the border army that we succeeded in mobilizing large portions of the French Army, thereby alleviating the pressure on the interior. That was, by the way, what the general staff had intended.

It was a phase that made it possible to keep the revolution going. We knew at the time that the solution was political and not military. In fact, we were in a position to move into a new phase of armed struggle. Remember that MiG-15s piloted by Algerians landed at our airports at the time of independence.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The platform that emerged at Sumam [1956 conference] made clear that the political element should take precedence over the military element and the internal over the external. How did we arrive at the reverse outcome in 1962?

[Nezzar] As I see it, the problems arose before the last meeting of the CNRA, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution. There were differing views, but it came time to make an appearance in Algeria as a unified body before the people who had just fought a revolution and had suffered. The ALN of that time had played a unitary role.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Mr. Minister, in your opinion, didn't the transfer for reasons of war of political prerogatives that fell to the FLN engender mechanisms of governance that could be called undemocratic, eventually resulting in [the riots of] October 1988?

[Nezzar] I can only give you my personal opinion in the matter.

I think many people believed that when the war ended, so had the dangers to the state and the nation. They were mistaken. Indeed, the country experienced grave threats to national cohesion and internal security in the early days of independence.

I think that historically, it is impossible to move immediately from a revolutionary phase into a classic democratic phase. In order to consolidate the objectives of the struggle for liberation, it was necessary to centralize power. Third World countries are not the only countries to have experienced this phase of power centralization. Other countries now seen as longstanding democracies were forced to ensure the authority of a central state by resorting to governing mechanisms that could today be described as undemocratic. Thus, this centralizing phase was necessary in order to bring about and build conditions favorable to a democratic government. And that is what was done. Of course, it was accompanied by parasitic actions or aspects that were more or less predictable. But it was thanks to this phase of stability that the development programs were carried out and that we are now witnessing the development of a democratic system. October [1988] is not the consequence of that. To me, October was a protest against the parasitic aspects of this mode of governance which, in a period of economic crisis, served as a convenient explanation of the difficulties of the times.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Wasn't it more of a protest against the entire system, Mr. Minister?

[Nezzar] Nevertheless it was. The establishment of a multiparty system and democracy gives the answer to your question.

As to the discrediting of this country's achievements, which we are hearing or reading in various places, do not expect the ANP to join in. The ANP believes that appreciable achievements were made thanks to the mobilization of Algerians. These achievements must be further enhanced, a task that can be facilitated given a mode of governance more appropriate to Algeria's stage of sociocultural and socioeconomic development.

[EL MOUDJAHID] With your permission Mr. Minister, let us look back on a time that was painful for all of us: the state of emergency, torture, and repression. How would you comment on that? Could that situation ever occur again, in your opinion?

[Nezzar] Before I go into the subject of the state of emergency and the way it was administered, I believe it is time to clarify some very important concepts.

It seems to me that the disturbances of October [1988] were the consequence of two distinct and divergent efforts led by different groups.

The first was an attempt to block the economic—and yes, the political—reforms that had been announced by recourse to strikes and street demonstrations.

The ultimate goal was the return to orthodox practices in order to ensure that individuals would retain their places and it had been prepared in advance.

The second was an unplanned effort that compounded the first, building on the strikes and street demonstrations.

Its perpetrators were out to attack the symbols of the state through violence, rioting, and destruction.

Taking advantage of the circumstances, certain forces capitalized on what had already been started in an attempt to attack the institutions of the state through subversion and insurrection.

Given the dangers present, given the magnitude of the disturbances, a state of emergency was declared in Algiers and a military command was named to re-establish public order and safety.

As to how the state of emergency was administered by the military authority, although it was not prepared for this type of mission, the Army responded to the order and shouldered its duty to spare the country and the state from any spread of the disturbances that might have led to a state of anarchy and civil war.

Never had a member of the Algerian military imagined that he would one day find himself fighting fellow Algerians; never had a member of the Algerian military thought that he himself would be the object of aggression organized by other Algerians.

That was the second surprise and a great disillusionment. But, one thing must be pointed out and until now, it has not been pointed out: The military authority was content solely to re-establish law and order and safety in the streets without resorting to restrictive measures other than the curfew and the ban on gatherings and demonstrations.

The military authority did not engage in censorship. The foreign press was not shut out.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The domestic press, however, was censored.

[Nezzar] In honesty, the domestic press was absent.

[EL MOUDJAHID] How do you explain that?

[Nezzar] Censorship had previously existed. But for our part, we did not undertake any action for or against at the time of the events. We were much more concerned with the situation in the streets. We were not prepared for that type of situation.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Didn't the massive turnout of the foreign press and the absence of the domestic press alarm you?

[Nezzar] Yes. But just after the events, we—the military—called in the press and tried to explain the situation. We even spoke to the press about casualties. We gave the journalists a list of the casualties. I remember our telling them not to publish anything without first checking the facts at the scene.

Nothing was done. The information went unpublished. There was no monitoring of communications, no systematic roundups or searches.

[EL MOUDJAHID] There were hundreds of arrests, not only in the streets during the demonstrations, but also at night in people's homes.

[Nezzar] I think that the arrests in this case were, I would not say normal, but it was a matter of obtaining information. We were faced with what appeared to be an insurrectional movement.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Did you think about protecting our cultural heritage?

[Nezzar] The security forces intervened with a view to protecting threatened points, attending to the most urgent matters first. It is true that we shuddered at the danger to our cultural heritage, but regrettably, the National Center for Historic Study and Research was sacked anyway.

On the subject of the ANP's intervention, I want to make it clear that aside from the shooting at Bab-El-Oued (I will come back to that later), there was no order to open fire nor were shots fired except in the case of extreme necessity to defend and protect vehicles or equipment from attempted arson or theft by demonstrators organized into commando-like units wearing balaclavas and armed with Molotov cocktails and machetes.

Do you know of any army in the world that would allow its units to be captured and disarmed without making use of their weapons?

Furthermore, warning shots were fired into the air to disperse the hostile demonstrators.

It is true that it created a very anxious atmosphere. It is possible, even probable, that stray bullets caused casualties among those standing on balconies.

To address the subject of repression that you raised, it was—and still is—inconceivable for the Army to abandon the cities of this country to fire and destruction and its citizens to the threat of anarchy and insecurity.

The Army believes it performed its duty. It did so as best as it could, but with a great deal of pain and difficulty.

Those responsible for this are surely not the young victims who hurled themselves against the ANP's tanks, in whose memory we again bow our heads.

Morally, the real culprits are those who organized the disturbances and the attempts either to destabilize the state or to strangle the reforms and economic and political liberalization.

As to the shooting at Bab-El-Oued, it is important that clarifications be made on the subject of this tragic event.

As you will remember, it was 10 October and a speech by the president had been announced for that evening. Nothing to speak of had occurred in the two preceding days and the situation was almost returning to normal. The curfew remained in effect and the strict ban on gatherings and demonstrations was still in force. Against this backdrop, a large number of people assembled in front of the Belcourt mosque intending to march across the city to Bab-El-Oued despite the ban. Religious figures made appeals for calm and for the group to disperse, which were only partially heeded.

Other religious leaders persisted in leading the demonstration to Bab-El-Oued, claiming the authorities had given authorization. I immediately let it be known in the most categorical terms that that was not the case.

The march took place without incident up to Bab-El-Oued, the destination. Not a single soldier opened fire on the marchers the entire length of their route. What caused the shooting at Bab-El-Oued? There was provocation and several witnesses and clues have proved that. Uncontrolled firing resulted, causing a panic with the tragic consequences you are aware of.

I emphasize that the provocation that triggered the shooting on Rais Hamidou Square across from the DGSN [Directorate General of National Security] occurred in the final stage of the march. The march had not been obstructed at any point along the entire route; orders had been given to let the marchers pass despite the ban. If the organizers of the march claim to have obtained authorization from the authorities, that is untrue. This was a case of acts of manipulation used to further the dark purposes of some, risking the lives of the demonstrators.

To sum up on the subject of these regrettable disturbances, it should be emphasized that the Army's intervention and the president's speech calling for calm and promising liberalization foiled the maneuvers and attempts to radicalize the system as well as the attempt to destabilize the state. Consequently, the political program of liberalization went into motion and indeed, we can say that the tragic side of the October events precipitated the reforms and perhaps ensured a broader scope to the reforms, which eventually gave us the Constitution of 1989. And the establishment of democracy cannot be dissociated from the goals of the November Revolution.

[EL MOUDJAHID] What about torture?

[Nezzar] Because of the responsibilities I held during the state of emergency, I am morally involved on that

subject. To withhold the answer would be an injustice to the victims and an evasion of Algerian public opinion. So let us face that obstacle and talk about it.

Personally, I was not informed of it until after the state of emergency was lifted and two or three days before the press reported it. To be exact, I was informed after a meeting of academics at the Pierre and Marie Curie University in Mustapha. The facts were privately recounted to me by a friend, relating what had been discussed during the meeting.

I admit that I was reluctant to believe the facts reported, but unfortunately, it later emerged that the sad evidence was indeed true.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Is it possible that you were less informed about the acts of torture than the academics and the journalists?

[Nezzar] That is not impossible in cases of clandestine violations, which was the case here.

[EL MOUDJAHID] In that confused state of affairs, didn't you expect excesses of this sort? Strict orders might have been issued.

[Nezzar] Once you have given clear, unequivocal, and specific instructions, you never stop to think that something like that could happen. Day in and day out during the October events, we repeated the same orders. The important thing was to avoid any bloodshed. It was an obsession. There were 200 combat vehicles and 10,000 men in Algiers.

Of course, we could always resort to saying, "It was not us; it was the others." But that would be childish, because whoever the others are, official organizations of the Algerian state are involved in this and the implication is just as shameful. To what I have said about this situation I will add that the cases of torture revealed during the October events are a blemish that must be erased. That is possible only if such things never happen again. I believe that we are on that road, first with the guarantees provided by the Constitution of 1989 and second with to access to freedom of the press.

Third, the independence of the justice system is a final factor. It is a matter of how the officials of the offending corps will exercise their prerogatives. For them, seeking to perform their job effectively should never lead to violations of the law or to infringements of an individual's inalienable rights. Before concluding on this subject, I would like to add that I continue to believe and assert that during the events of October, torture never took on the dimensions of an institutionalized and widespread problem as some in the media have charged. The cases revealed were the result of isolated instances of irresponsible behavior, but that does not diminish in the least the seriousness of the facts and the urgent need to proscribe these abject practices.

[EL MOUDJAHID] What has become of those guilty of torture?



[Nezzar] I believe there is a law granting amnesty. Penal measures alone are not a guarantee.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Still on the subject of October [1988], the aspect that most surprised and even stupefied public opinion at home and abroad was the use of weapons of war. What were the reasons for that?

[Nezzar] To our way of thinking, it is inconceivable that military units would administer a state of emergency brought on by serious riots endangering law and order and security without bringing out the necessary military equipment. When you deal with the army, you are dealing with equipment and weapons of war.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the units were for the most part directly drawn from the defensive deployment that has been in place in the western part of the country since 1975.

When a soldier or policeman is exposed to a hostile crowd, he is less inclined to be aggressive if he knows that he is safe inside his vehicle with his customary unit at his side as he deters the demonstrators.

But if your question refers to the type of ammunition used, it must be pointed out that live bullets were not fired by the Army except to counter an immediate and direct threat against the soldiers or very sensitive points.

Tear gas commonly in use by security forces was used in efforts to disperse crowds.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Not to be discourteous, Mr. Minister, your answer concerning the hidden forces that triggered or inspired the October disturbances is strangely reminiscent of the recent period of propagandistic language. Our readers will not be much more knowledgeable with that.

[Nezzar] In the absence of any conclusions on this subject and in view of the amnesty law, it is difficult to be more precise on that question. Be aware that the hidden forces in question have never revealed who they are. Furthermore, did you notice any demonstrators chanting slogans or carrying banners calling for freedom of the press and of opinion, free elections, the separation of powers, the right of association, or a multiparty system? I did not.

Draw your own conclusions. Were the political aims of the manipulators in tune with the economic and political reforms or at odds with them?

There is no doubt that the demonstrators, in their spontaneous enthusiasm, expressed objection to the parasitic aspects of the system but the instigators at the start and those who later capitalized on their work were careful not to reveal to the demonstrators their true political objectives and have them bandied about. For a reason: They would have been moving against the tide of popular enthusiasm.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Since October [1988], there have been many changes in the ANP's top ranks. Are we to think that the events had something to do with certain retirements?

[Nezzar] Absolutely not. They were not precipitated by the events of October. Age has always been the reason for which people are retired. That is standard in all armies. As a generation reaches old age, another replaces it. Hundreds of people retire every year and there is no mention of it. When a general retires, it is talked about, but even generals must retire at one point or another. I myself will have to retire. That is the way it works. It may be the fact that it is occurring at a time of nationwide changes and upheavals that some are drawing their own conclusions and speculating. But I can assure you that it is nothing of the sort.

Retirement is a right, not a sanction.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Mr. Minister, is there a national military doctrine reflecting the changes that are taking place in the country? In this specific case, would doctrine be determined by the general outline of the country's domestic and foreign policy or would it tend more to be linked to the nature and type of weaponry in the ANP's possession, an increasingly sophisticated weaponry?

[Nezzar] The changes occurring in the country do not have a direct impact on the doctrine for the employment of military forces. However, the changes occurring elsewhere in the world are not without impact on defense policy. Indeed it is to be feared, as the buildup of forces in the gulf goes to prove, that the end of the cold war will bring a reawakening or rekindling of military interventionism. In the face of this danger therefore, countries such as Algeria must be willing to increase their efforts in the area of national defense preparedness. National defense is not limited to the defense of physical borders or territory; it also extends to the attributes of sovereignty, meaning the freedom to undertake legitimate action and independence of political decisionmaking.

Does Algeria have a military doctrine per se? Yes, it is inspired by the concept of defense outlined in the Constitution of 1989; it is structured around the ANP; and it calls on all forces in the nation, placing equal emphasis on materiel and on the human and moral factor. Even though Algeria is a country that advocates peace and peaceful means to the settlement of disputes, it must continue to be willing to make sacrifices for its capacity to defend itself through large formations capable of sweeping rapidly over the various points in our territory.

In addition, the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) leads us to seek a complementary relationship [with the other member countries] that could eventually result in—why not?—a common defense policy as a response to the supposed "right to intervene," which has been brandished in recent years. But that does not conflict with the goal of being strong at home. That is a basic rule of strategy.

[EL MOUDJAHID] It is thought, Mr. Minister, that by professionalizing the military functions to a high degree, a career army will eventually result. If that is the case, what becomes of the notion of popular defense and the national military traditions, which are characterized by the massive investment of the country and of its men?

[Nezzar] If, when you say professionalizing to a high degree, you mean qualification and professional competence, my answer is 'yes.' The ANP is resolutely headed down that path and there is no other path to take. But a professionally competent and qualified army is not some sort of professional order cut off from the rest of the nation, with the exclusive vocation of ensuring the country's defense. A qualified and competent army is open to citizens who will contribute to national defense given appropriate training and for the necessary duration of time. In short, an army of professionals—yes, but not exclusively so.

As for the popular defense, it cannot fade away and it does not preclude an effective battle corps. The popular defense is both a base for the battle corps and a substantial reinforcement of our capacity to put up resistance, drawing largely from the contribution of the National Service in the ANP's component. [as published] [It] responds to that which precedes and prepares for general mobilization conditions.

[EL MOUDJAHID] You have talked about the military, but what about the reorganization of the security forces?

[Nezzar] The answer has already been given. They must seek to be effective through structures and missions and they must do so with total respect for the laws of the country.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The police forces within the Army have also had a repressive mission. Even the new political framework and the new missions of the Army as set out in the Constitution, it seems evident to us that these services no longer have any reason to exist and should be redirected to other tasks such as the defense and security of Algerian soil, counterespionage, etc. What is your view of this?

[Nezzar] The tasks you have just enumerated are in fact the vocation of these services. It is also a question of restructuring.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Mr. Minister, in your response you mentioned the ANP's deployment of a defensive array in the west since the start of the crisis in the Western Sahara. This crisis seems to be on the road to a settlement by referendum under United Nations auspices. Do you think that the time has come to withdraw or at least reduce the deployment?

[Nezzar] In 1975, as you know, there was an abrupt surge in tension on our western borders and, naturally, it fell to the ANP to face this situation. Thus, for nearly 15 years, the majority of the ANP's personnel and equipment has been positioned along the length of our western border,

from the sea to the edge of the Sahara, living in the harshest of climatic conditions and under the most difficult social constraints. At the same time, they experience the same problems in their family lives as the majority of Algerians, whether it be the family's housing or the schooling of their children.

I mention these details because there is a tendency to forget that for 15 years, the ANP has endured great suffering so that the Algerian people may continue to live in total security. That enables you to gauge the irresponsibility of those who, in triggering the demonstrations of October 1988, caused the military command to withdraw troops from the deployment that kept our borders tightly sealed.

Thank God the situation changed and a dynamic of peace has taken hold in the region. The ANP fully supports it. Indeed, we firmly believe in the Constitution of a united Maghreb which, as we see it, is the only solution enabling the group's member countries to prosper in a complementary relationship to one another. That is what it will take to enable our countries to bring themselves out of underdevelopment.

It is our very sincere hope that the stakes will be understood by all and that each party is resolutely committed to respecting the rules of the game and to facilitating a return to peace by guaranteeing a free referendum.

Only under these conditions will the ANP be able to withdraw its defensive deployment and allow our personnel to return to normal life. I must add that a fair number of conscripts serving in that deployment have been admitted into the Army, which shows that the "Army-people" relationship is a reality: That is precisely what National Service is all about.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Let us return briefly, if you will, to the National Service. Can you give your point of view on a controversial question: Should it be 18 months of service, as is currently the case, or the six months some are calling for?

[Nezzar] The military command would very much like to relieve young people of the constraints on them. But there are imperatives of national defense, security, and sovereignty that limit what we can do. The duration of National Service is directly related to the level of technological development our forces have reached.

You can understand that in the age of the laser and other technologies, it is not possible to give young recruits superficial instruction only to send them home before they are able to put their knowledge to work in their units. At stake is the effectiveness of the armed forces to ensure the country's defense as well as the safety of the conscript himself should he be mobilized in response to a need.

Some have thought a considerable reduction in the legal duration of National Service could be contemplated. It

seems that the various advocates were mistaken in their understanding of the matter. The many citizens who have served in our combat units know how much effort and ability to assimilate are required in order to master certain types of equipment.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how we could eventually opt for a career army, which would be deprived of its popular roots. A question that could be asked is whether in the back of their minds, the advocates of such ideas are not aiming to replace the ANP with a militia.

I therefore ask all those in favor of a shortened length of service to think more carefully about it. I firmly believe them to be patriots first and foremost, whose goal is not to destroy an instrument of protection and security. It is true that a number of citizens have served and still serve under an adapted format in their organizations of origin, which deprives them of a thorough knowledge of the demands of service in the armed forces as known to their colleagues who have served or are serving in combat formations. We extend to both groups the tribute they deserve.

On that basis, the idea of shortening National Service from 18 to six months appears to be governed by partisan or electoral motivations to say the least, more than by the objective defense and national security considerations.

Finally, you are aware that under the 1989 Constitution, its duties no longer include participating in national development. Those aspects are to be taken over by the ministries concerned as part of the economic reforms being enacted. It is nonetheless understood that the Army will offer assistance by assigning its specialized units as needed and whenever possible. But given the curtailment of the Army's role in national development, the possibility of designing an adapted format of National Service is being studied—without, however, altering the legal length of service which is, I repeat, 18 months.

[EL MOUDJAHID] It is often said that managers are underutilized in the duties they are assigned in the National Service. Is that true?

[Nezzar] If an engineer with a given specialty considers himself underutilized when he serves as a section or platoon leader in the combat formations, he is confusing the Army with a framework for the practical application of the many socioprofessional specialties, which it is not. Having said that, we have always made an effort to consider the skills that the individual brings with him into the Army when we assign duties.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The modernization of the ANP will necessarily lead to a restructuring of the armed forces. If it is not a military secret, could you give us the broad outline of this organization?

[Nezzar] Starting with the crisis in the Western Sahara and the consequent risk of conflict at our border, the

ANP began a program to modernize its forces. Indeed, units were systematically motorized and mechanized beginning in 1976-1977. We can therefore say that the modernization of the ANP began at that time with the introduction of mobile means of combat.

A second phase followed in the 1980's. It was necessary to equip the battle corps with improved weapons and the array of accompanying equipment necessary for setup, maintenance and training. That was done for all three components: land, sea, and air.

But modernization was not confined to materiel. Just as much attention and effort were devoted to the organizational element and the training and instruction element. The ANP's general staff was formed in 1984 and beginning that year as well, the commands of forces were established with their own organic structures and a better defined division of missions and tasks, particularly in the functions of organization, preparation, employment, and finally, management and administration.

In 1986, after a decade of effort and practical experience, we had the idea of capitalizing on practical lessons from the field and the quality of human resources whose basic level had noticeably improved. The ANP began a restructuring that is essentially based on large entities capable of conducting combined operational actions thanks to increased firing capacities and movement abilities. All of this through more appropriate chains of command and communications. Of course, it is all being done with all due precautions given the importance of the problem. The institution of divisional type units in the land forces is an example. By the way, the national press and television spoke about this during the June 1990 maneuvers.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The ANP is in a paradoxical situation, it seems to us. On the one hand, it is a part of the disarmament policy that aims to transform the countries of the south into regions of peace and cooperation; on the other hand, the countries of the south continue to be regions of conflict, disputes, and tension, creating a permanent demand in our Army for modern weapons, which pushes military spending higher. Is the ANP as much a drain on the budget as people believe it to be?

[Nezzar] There is no paradox involving the ANP. There is a paradox in international relations, but it exists in appearance only. Indeed, everyone is advocating peace and everyone wants to be able to avoid committing themselves to an unaffordable armament policy. But that has no chance of being the case except in the absence of any threat and in a climate of mutual trust. Trust, whether we like it or not, is based on a material factor—one's own forces—and a moral factor—the trustworthiness of the other's commitments. That shows how fleeting and unpredictable the second factor is.

You might ask, does that mean we are condemned to live with an arms race? Not necessarily, if everyone gives their firm and honest pledge in cooperation agreements

and—why not?—in common defense agreements, particularly in the case of the Maghreb. Because the return to military interventionism is not something of the future, it is already here as the events in the Arab gulf region clearly show.

Is the ANP a drain on the budget? To various degrees, all armies are. The ANP's expenditures for equipment represent 1.5 to 2 percent of total GDP and its operating costs stand at 1.5 to 2 percent or only 3 to 4 percent all told (including the national gendarmerie and National Service public works units), all in spite of the exigencies of rural living for our units during the crisis in the west.

[EL MOUDJAHID] If it is not a military secret, could you tell us what percentage of the national debt is military debt?

[Nezzar] Because it is a problem that touches on the notion of sovereignty, to us there is no military debt distinct from the national debt. If such a debt exists, it can only be as a breakdown for the purposes of the state's accounting.

It is true that the national debt covers the procurement of defense equipment purchased from a customary supplier country on credit, which is done precisely to preserve our country's available cash reserves for other uses.

This effort has produced a true instrument of defense. Henceforth it will be necessary to see to areas other than armament, such as the construction of barracks and housing for personnel.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Does the People's National Army make use of the country's industrial potential?

[Nezzar] The ANP obtains its supplies from the country's industrial sector whenever they can be supplied locally. Better still, joint studies on the production of materials and equipment have been made, resulting in domestic production, namely in the mechanical and transportation industry.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Is there a military industry?

[Nezzar] We do not have a military industry. It consumes a great deal. The current needs of the ANP do not require a military industry. Outside of the two recently opened factories, there are no production units. But we do have maintenance units where our equipment is overhauled and upgraded.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The rule-of-law state guarantees the autonomy and the independence of the justice system. In your opinion Mr. Minister, what would be the relationship between the military justice system and the justice system plain and simple? Could military justice be termed a 'special' justice system—not to say 'endowed with special powers'?

[Nezzar] 'Rule-of-law state.' Now there's an ubiquitous phrase these days. As though we had been living in a

lawless state prior to the Constitution of 1989. But that was not the case. The state's activity has always been governed by laws or orders. It is true that prior to the Constitution of 1989, certain individual liberties and rights were accompanied by restrictions or held subordinate to the interests of the revolution. That appreciably curtailed the scope of action by the courts charged with deciding the law. These restrictions were lifted when the judicial branch was made autonomous. What about the military justice system? Is it a special justice or one endowed with special powers, as you put it?

The military justice system is neither. However the military courts do not fall within the order of ordinary law courts. Instead, they are governed by separate laws and that has led them to be thought of as courts with special powers. We are talking about courts, not justice systems as incorrectly stated in your question.

But let us make it clear that the military courts have jurisdiction in cases of special offenses of a military nature or certain special offenses of a military nature and certain offenses committed under unusual circumstances as defined by law.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Under the Constitution of 23 February 1989, to our knowledge there are no specific laws dealing with either the ANP or national defense. In the spirit of reform, as we see it, there is a need to formalize the armed forces' new role, the status and role of the security services, and the redirecting of their role and perhaps to modify military regulations so that soldiers and officers may refuse to obey illegal or unconstitutional orders (hazardous ventures, military putsches, etc.) What is your view of this?

[Nezzar] That is not a problem involving the Constitution of 23 February 1989 in particular. Algeria's battery of laws includes rigorous provisions designed to protect the institutions of the state against the possible acts you mentioned.

However, it would be mistaken to believe that the threat of being hanged or shot is a sufficient deterrent to the dangerous acts you referred to.

I think that the military ethic, more than penal measures, serves to guard against situations such as those.

At least as far as the ANP is concerned, its loyalty to the state is rooted in its faithfulness to its oath, which manifests itself in a strong sense of duty, a spirit of discipline characterized by exemplary dedication and abnegation, and a patriotic conscience, which helps to overcome the vicissitudes and the occasional humiliations of military life.

As for supplemental laws authorizing the refusal to execute illegal orders, I think that there is no need to add other provisions to those already existing and there being no need, to do so could weaken the specific requirements for discipline the military environment. By the way, the

problem does not concern the ANP alone. Other armies live with it without lapses of seditious activities.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The ANP played a prominent role in building the nation. Should we now expect the ANP to play merely the conventional army role of defending the nation or will it take part in tasks of a public interest?

What is your conception of relations between the army as a state institution and civilian society?

[Nezzar] For the time being, the ANP is still the ANP, meaning that its very name has significance as to its role in the service of the nation.

Will the ANP be confined to the ghetto of the barracks? I would say 'no' if by that you mean that it would abstain from playing a part in the tasks of nation building and development. It is certain, however, that it must participate in an appropriate and more clearly circumscribed manner.

For example, a great deal is being heard about the development of the south. I would merely like to point out that the ANP did not wait until 1990 to carry out large public works projects in the south with the goal of facilitating the development of those regions, which represent to the country a strategic future that must be viewed as a whole.

As to the ANP's relations with what you call the civilian society, personally I would prefer to speak about its relations with the national community and the country's institutions. The relations between them must be close and substantial whether through official channels or the ANP's human component.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Does the ANP plan to authorize and organize an internal debate of ideas and the free exchange of differing opinions? If so, what would become of the political commissariat?

[Nezzar] Does the ANP plan to authorize the free exchange of ideas and opinions internally? No, because the ANP is not a forum for that purpose. There are more appropriate organizations and associations. But that does not mean that the Army will be closed to the topics and issues that are of interest or concern to Algerians. The rules governing military life are clear and specific. The personal opinions of the individual are respected but opinions of a private nature, even when they relate to a subject of general interest, are not allowed to predominate or to interfere in the performance of duty.

The directorate of the political commissariat has recently been made a directorate of communication, information, and orientation with responsibility for both internal and external affairs.

[EL MOUDJAHID] The upcoming legislative elections represent a major political event in Algeria. Does the Army intend to play a role in them?

[Nezzar] Even though the upcoming legislative elections represent, as you say, a political event of prime importance for Algeria, it is not the Army's responsibility or option to take part in them, neither in the preparatory phase nor in the actual voting.

The ANP has an apolitical calling, meaning that as an institution, it refrains from all political activity or action tending to favor or oppose any political party or movement.

However, the ANP, like any professional order, is not without a political or social conscience or ideal. Its ideal remains faithful to the ideal of November: Islam as the state religion, the republican nature of the state, etc.

The ANP hopes that the elections will unfold calmly and peacefully without any infringement of citizens' inalienable rights. Should the opposite occur, the ANP will be prepared to respond to all eventualities and halt any organized excesses threatening the national unity forged throughout our history and consolidated since the November 1954 Revolution. The defense of the nation, which the Constitution entrusts to the ANP, implies that the ANP must be in a position to counter any dangers posed internally or externally.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Within certain political parties, it is being recommended that the ANP be given a role in the next elections as a better guarantee of lawful conditions as voters go to the polls. What do you think of that idea?

[Nezzar] To say the least, that is a very thorny subject. The Army would rather not expose itself to the recriminations that would inevitably be made and would prefer to leave it up to the institutions and agencies customarily involved to carry out their respective roles fully and well, including the representatives of the political parties.

However, if a consensus develops around that idea, if the electoral laws permit it, and if the government so decides, we would take on the task with a maximum of scruples to enable the people to express their will freely and in lawful conditions. But that is an extreme and on principle it is better to avoid it.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Mr. Minister, what is your conception of your relations with the head of government and with the head of state, the head of state being responsible for defining national defense policy?

[Nezzar] First, the relations you speak of are for the head of state to decide. For my part, there is no ambiguity whatsoever. The head of state, as National Defense chief and supreme commander of the armies, defines defense policy and rules on programs that embody that policy.

The head of government supervises the implementation of the defense policy and coordinates the activities of the ministerial departments concerned. The minister of national defense, for his part, is responsible for fine tuning measures of a military nature or related to national defense and sees to it that the forces have what they need in order to fulfill their mission.

[EL MOUDJAHID] As the minister of national defense, do you see yourself as a member of the government first, or as the representative of the military hierarchy?

[Nezzar] The answer is simple: I am a minister and I am a general on active duty.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Could you be more specific?

[Nezzar] You are probably thinking of those who wonder why not have a civilian minister, is that right?

I do not know what you want me to say. I am on active duty; I am the highest ranking officer; and I became a minister. The same approach is followed in quite a few countries. But in the future I say, why not appoint a civilian? Let us let democracy take hold.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Mr. Minister, what is your impression of the ability of existing political movements to mobilize public opinion behind distinctive political platforms?

[Nezzar] It is my duty to exercise discretion, which forbids me from associating myself with partisan politics. I will respect that obligation, but on a purely private basis and without my remarks reflecting on the officers and personnel of the ANP, I can give you my impressions on that subject.

To me, the multiparty system was inevitable because inside the FLN itself, there are different movements and divergent—if not opposing—political positions. It might have come about sooner, perhaps later.

In all likelihood, things are going to decant, regroupings will occur, and other leaders may enter the ring. But I will limit myself to the three main movements because I cannot judge those that were not put to the test in the recent elections.

#### **The National Liberation Front**

You can understand that having lived through the period of the war of liberation, I am attached to the principles, ideals, virtues, and the spirit of 1 November.

Let us not dwell on the errors once they have been sanctioned and rectified and those who committed them have passed. Only those who never attempt anything never make mistakes. But history will remember the sacrifices made by the men who served our Revolution. I am convinced that the torch has been passed to the upcoming generations and that the FLN, at its greatest, will come out the better from the trials it has faced and will regain its place in our society. That is within its reach, thanks to the genuine convictions of the majority of its activists of all generations who, I hope, will quickly take up the challenge confronting the FLN.

#### **The Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]**

It is a national reality. I respect it as a political party just as I respect the other parties, because I have vowed to scrupulously respect the institutions of our country.

It seems to me, however, that it would gain by condemning and fighting against any excesses and any extremist attitudes on the grounds that they divide the nation. Moreover, an ambiguous treatment of certain basic questions does not foster objective judgment.

Having said that, it is my personal opinion as a Muslim that associations of a religious nature are better able to serve Islam by educating and guiding the masses from a disinterested position.

#### **The Democrats**

In our context, the democrats are the ferment needed for Algeria's newly born democracy to grow. But in order to play this role, they will have to rid themselves of certain concepts unfamiliar to our society. I believe that each political party has among its members sincere democrats who are both steeped in the values of our Muslim, Arab-Berber civilization and are forward looking.

[EL MOUDJAHID] Why distinguish between democrats and the FLN and FIS?

[Nezzar] We have absolutely no intention of insinuating such a thing. Those are merely the designations used by the press when it refers to these young political movements that are trying to become forums of democratic solidarity.

In conclusion, I sincerely believe that in all things there is a happy medium and that the wise concern themselves with seeking out that happy medium.

I hope that approach will be adopted by the various political parties during the campaign and in the upcoming legislative elections so as to permit the start of a dialogue and discussion of ideas. It is the only way to promote self-questioning on a permanent basis, to achieve a better understanding of the differences, which are our true national wealth, and to adopt a firmly future-oriented vision of society. I hope that the extremists, whatever their origin, will be neutralized in our society, that those who seem obsessed with uniformity will find reassurance, and that social peace will reign in our country. But in all serenity and without giving my remarks any hint of threat, I feel compelled to reiterate—and everyone should be aware it—that if grave events were to recur and imperil the unity of the nation, the ANP, which honors its responsibilities, would intervene without hesitation to reestablish order and unity and to safeguard the primacy of the law.

[EL MOUDJAHID] A personal question to conclude, Mr. Minister: Do you find time to read, watch television, listen to music....

[Nezzar] Frankly, not at all.

## EGYPT

**Interior Minister on Elections, Iraq,  
Fundamentalists**

91AA0029A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic  
5 Oct pp 20-23, 50-55

[Interview with Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa by Sayyid Zaki and Majdi al-Daqqaq in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] This is the second time that Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, our guest for this week's interview, has come to us at the al-Hilal publishing house.

We felt that there were essential, basic issues that Egypt's interior minister had to address in detail today, not tomorrow.

Over the course of four hours on a hot afternoon that we would consign to this year's summer, which is being prolonged by abnormal heat, we discussed issues that are currently pressing on Egypt's emotional life and conscience, and that will continue to be raised forcibly until the last day of this year, which has been filled with political tumult domestically and abroad.

He came to us after a long cabinet meeting, and he left our headquarters for successive work appointments continuing until 2:00 AM.

We first asked about the elections that will take place under the new Law on the Exercise of Political Rights, in the midst of nine political parties and a huge number of politicians who are seizing the initiative to run outside the framework of these parties.

The legitimacy of our question stems from an old apprehension toward the Interior Ministry's method regarding previous elections, and our question was posed in the light of the size of the doubts and concerns that should define the new minister's course of action regarding new elections.

The second issue revolved around the terrorism that is being exported to Egypt from abroad. Iraqi and Palestinian threats now exist. It was inevitable to ask the person with primary responsibility for Egypt's security about the extent of the plot and how to counteract it. We also asked him about the coffins arriving from Iraq and the protection of Egyptians in Kuwait or Iraq.

The third issue concerned the Egyptian domestic sphere: the accusing fingers being pointed at Egyptian security personnel regarding the liquidation of several leaders of extremist groups, and the challenges these groups are posing to each other that are on the verge of turning into a daily war. We also asked him about the prevention of several opposition leaders and journalists from traveling abroad, and whether unemployed returnees would threaten Egypt's stability.

Our questions touched on all the issues that currently preoccupy Egypt. Despite the severity and harshness of the questions, the interior minister faced them with openmindedness and responded to all of them without any sensitivity. When we finished asking our questions, he remained seated, waiting for more questions.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] There is now a new elections law, and there is organizing in the electoral districts. Nine parties are preparing to enter these elections and everyone is entering them in individual districts. There are accusations that the Interior Ministry always interferes, or is a basic element in interference, in elections. We would like to hear from you a comprehensive conceptualization of the election process.

[Musa] Regarding elections, the constitutional court ruled on the unconstitutionality of the law based on which the current People's Assembly was formed. Hence, there was an opinion on the need to issue a new law that decisively eliminates violations of the constitution. Much discussion has arisen around this issue. In this connection, I state—not to flatter the president, but to state the truth—that, based on my direct dealings with the president during the short period in which I have had responsibility for the functions of the Interior Ministry, the president is an earnest man who says nothing in which he does not believe.

Regarding the method of dissolving the assembly, there is a view that maintains, based on legal experts and legislators, that the decision of the constitutional court is sufficient.

Others assert that the people's opinion must be sought, because the people are the source of authority and the holder of the basic right.

In his initial statement regarding a referendum, the president said that the constitutional court had entertained this. The president gave priority to the court's ruling, and he prudently stated that we will hold a referendum, because, if a new assembly is formed without a referendum, someone could conceivably contest its constitutionality. The president reconciled the decision of the court, which it made in its capacity as the highest constitutional authority, with Article 136 of the constitution, which stipulates the need to hold a referendum in the event that the assembly is dissolved before its period is over.

As a result of the referendum, the people will have stated its opinion. If the decision is to dissolve the assembly, so it must be. The problem is not the Interior Ministry or others. The solution is putting the decision into effect. A new elections law will be promulgated based on the individual system [of independent candidates as opposed to party lists], because the existing system has become deficient. I first of all maintain, as I did in the cabinet and in different meetings, that the opposition has a much greater chance under the Lists Law than under the system of individual elections. I do not say this because we will falsify the elections.

The opposition parties used to collect votes in all of the districts to obtain the necessary eight percent needed to be permitted representation [in the People's Assembly]. Hence, the chances of the opposition and minority parties under the proportional lists system were much better than under the individual system. Although we do not deny that some of the parties have popular figures, I greatly doubt whether the opposition could achieve its current figure of 100 or more deputies. This is my view as a man who has experienced elections since 1957.

After that, the following laws will be issued by the president:

—The new People's Assembly Law

—The Law on the Exercise of Political Rights

—The Law on the Reorganization and Division of Districts

We are now preparing for the referendum process. When the new laws are issued, we will prepare ourselves for a new phase, namely the electoral process.

#### The Opposition's Share

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Before the electoral process, in describing your participation in the electoral process since 1957, you stated that the opposition would not have its [current] share [of representation] under the individual elections law. Why?

[Musa] Because, under the individual system, the concerned party is an individual, not a list backed by a party. What will happen "in my conception," is that the response will be greater because of individual interest, and second, because of party spirit, especially in the countryside, whether in lower or upper Egypt, where the response will be immense and the competition intense, because whoever heads a minority party list is assured that the party will gather votes from here and there. Whoever heads a list is guaranteed entry into the People's Assembly. Why should he make efforts to campaign and the like? Those at the bottom of the list will be the ones making the effort. Now, in order to succeed, you must do your own campaigning and push the people to go to the polls.

It is a generally recognized matter. My premise is that the majority percentage is in the numbers of the districts in the governorates, not in Cairo and Alexandria alone. The voter lives with the inhabitants of his governorate. The voters are predominantly workers and peasants whose interest is bound up with the government and the ruling party. We are also not saying this because we are preparing the way for something. No. In the countryside, we have customary ties to the voters. They need the agricultural association, the consumer association, the food supply association, and so on.

The individual is connected to this. It means nothing else. We believe in the multiplicity of ideas and democracy. We now have nine parties.

I see some parties saying they will boycott these elections, because they are without guarantees. That does not change matters one bit. We say: Elections—with the understanding that the Interior Minister is responsible for the electoral process—are under the supervision of the judiciary. The new law to be issued affirms this. I said that nothing is hindering [judicial supervision of the elections] if we have a sufficient number of judges and justices to cover the districts, which total close to 45,000 districts on the level of the republic. Nothing is hindering that at all, because it is not to our advantage to interfere with the will of the voter or the Egyptian.

Why? Because the opposition parties are also Egyptian and sons of Egypt. It might have been easy for any leader to follow the one-party system, or the centralized [autocratic] system as they say. However, we continue to speak of democracy and party multiplicity. As I said, there are now nine parties, although some of them are not strong. We must adhere to this. Thank God, I was a junior officer and not responsible for the leadership of the Interior Ministry. I would have completely rejected such matters. Why? Do I want a specific party? Then, why was multiplicity permitted?

Honestly, there are more than 100 opposition deputies in the parliament, while the current assembly numbers 407. In other words, the opposition comprises 25 percent. There is also an opposition that is not allowed to be represented legally, because it does not enjoy a legal existence. Rather, it is under the protection of the [Socialist] Labor Party [SLP], and I mean those who call themselves the religious current. We should know that, since the constitution of 1923, elections have been subjected to the supervision of the judiciary. There cannot be a main elections committee without a justice heading it, otherwise it would be invalid. I told the justice minister, you must provide a greater number of justices to supervise the main committees as well as the subcommittees, so that we can place a justice in some of the small districts that we nickname "one-seat towns," which is to say one deputy [per district].

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Does that mean that judicial supervision will descend from the large or main districts to the small districts?

[Musa] Yes, to the subcommittees and the committees of the large villages or the large associations. We have never objected to that. The constitution requires judiciary supervision of the electoral process. We thus inquired with the justice minister as to his abilities to provide a sufficient number of justices.

#### The Elections Will Be Connected to My Name

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What are the justice minister's abilities? Did you agree on a specific number?

[Musa] I did not specify a number [or ask] if he had justices and judges to cover all of the districts, which total 45,000 districts. Nothing prevents me of course. Rather, [I asked] what is available to him, taking into



account that we have 45,000 districts on the level of the republic, and that each committee should have a primary chairman and a reserve chairman. Therefore, we want to double this number. We do not say that to hamstring. On the contrary, we will place in the districts any number that the justice minister can provide, beginning with the large districts or the villages that have large populations.

I swear by the truth, God, and this country, because I am not a professional of position but a professional of vocation, a security man, I want these elections to be clean, because my name will be linked to them.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Based on your view of the political map in Egypt, what percentage of the new assembly do you expect will be represented by the opposition?

[Musa] It will of course be less than the old number.

### It Already Frustrates My Thinking

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Can you state a specific number or percentage?

[Musa] Truly, no. This is an expectation that is already frustrating my thinking. Why! Because under the law that stipulates elections by means of lists, the opposition won representation in parliament if it received eight percent of the vote.

Now, the election results will emerge from the governorates, far from the Interior Ministry's computer, because the chairman of the general committee will determine the number of voters in each district and from each party, whereas in previous elections, the votes were gathered in the Interior Ministry to be entered into the computer. "If they had listened to what I said regarding the 1987 elections, this would not have happened."

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What did you say in 1987?

[Musa] I said that the successful will remain, and I will not change the character, which is to say, replace district workers with groups, the intent being that I would exclude personalities themselves, and we would have eliminated any constitutional challenge, because the elections were sound in terms of the application of the percentage. However, what happened is a change in the character for other reasons.

### May God Have Mercy on the Computer

[AL-MUSAWWAR] His excellency the minister, what is the story of the computer?

[Musa] It is over. May God have mercy on the computer. Under the new law and individual elections, we have dispensed with the computer, because it computed the percentage of votes. Now, [a candidate is elected] by a majority. If I were running against you in a district, and you obtained 501 votes and I 500—congratulations.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is there then no need for the Interior Ministry's computer?

[Musa] It has no work now. May God grant it prosperity!

[AL-MUSAWWAR] His excellency the minister, the problem was not just the computer. Was it said that the Interior Ministry intervened to control the determination of the electoral districts, which were divided according to the disposition of the ruling party?

[Musa] We must be fair. How is it that we divide the districts, the Interior Ministry intervenes, and more than 100 oppositionists win?! I am not defending the ministry. However, permit me to say, I have the great honor of leading the Interior Ministry, because I am of the soil of this country. I swear by God and the truth that we want to advance, not go backwards. Therefore, we must respect the constitution and the law. No one sits forever in his position.

### Dubious Division

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Then what is the wisdom of reviewing the electoral districts?

[Musa] Under the existing system, there are 48 districts, and under the individual system, we are demanding that the number of deputies—whose number is currently 448 in addition to 10 appointees, and the lists were according to districts, which is to say that there is a list on which there are 12 candidates and another list on which there are 10.

Now, under the individual system, and this is not the opinion of the Interior Ministry, the division of the districts was effected with the knowledge of the legal committee, which was established to legislate the three new laws, and four principles were adhered to:

The number of seats, which is 448 nonappointed seats, and when we divide this 448 by two, the result is 224, which is the number of districts. The number of districts might be more, but it will not be less than this figure.

The second principle is our commitment to the districts in a single governorate being in proportion to each other, in the sense of each district having approximately the same number of votes as other districts.

The third is geographical contiguity in the sense of the nonmeshing of electoral districts, which is to say not allowing a remote area to be joined to another area.

The fourth condition, and this was the opinion of the Interior Ministry, is that districts that are diminished should not be augmented and districts that are augmented should not be diminished, so that there is no dubious division of districts and voters.

We hope that all will be satisfied with these laws and principles.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is the new division of the districts the same, old division of the districts for individual elections?

[Musa] They are the same districts. However, the number of districts in the old system was 350 members, whereas now it is 448. We gauged by analogy with the old, individual system, under which there were 175 districts.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Unfortunately, previous figures of the Interior Ministry regarding the referendum process in Egypt have usually accustomed us to a figure of 99.9 percent. Do you expect the coming referendum to be 99.9 percent?

[Musa] Of course, is it not reasonable?

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We know that the percentages of participation are very weak, and we are surprised that the announced percentages are unreasonable.

[Musa] To whose advantage? We will announce whatever may result. We have also declared that the judges will conduct the referendum, so that we will not be surprised by the three nines.

We will announce whatever we find in the ballot boxes. Honestly. We have no special interest in this. I want to stress that I am not among those who falsify results. The method of falsifying is unknown to me. Wait for the results.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] How do we guarantee the neutrality of the police in the electoral process?

[Musa] The neutrality of security!! Does not the presence of a justice on every committee guarantee that?

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Will not numerous districts lack justices?

[Musa] Do you want a guarantee of neutrality? We have made the punishment more severe in the new law. The sentence will not be suspended, even after 100 years.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Punishment for what?

[Musa] For falsifying and stirring up confusion regarding the results. The sentence was six months, and was suspended after this period. Now it lasts for life.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is that sufficient? Are there specific instructions from the interior minister to the directors of security to adhere to neutrality?

[Musa] The job of a security director is to maintain security. As minister, my job is to maintain security and stability. It is not our function to interfere in elections.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] If the division of the districts is so important, why do you not make the opposition parties a partner in it, if the motives in division are sound? Why did you not publicize the districts, or allow the opposition to participate, or consult the opposition parties regarding the districts?

[Musa] We have not contrived districts. The basis for the division of districts is a return to the division that was in

effect since 1923. The principles that the committee formulated are what compelled us to make this increase. I would like to say that the dialogue is still democratic. Do you assume that the opposition is more loyal and more attached to Egypt than us? No. We are also sons of Egypt. The executive process, especially in the Interior Ministry, is pursuant to the constitution.

### The Government and Not the Opposition

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Does the matter require legislated regulations?

[Musa] Why should I become a partner with the opposition. Is it represented in the government? The government implements the law. There is no capacity for the opposition.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Even if we listened to their ideas?

[Musa] Pardon me, no. I do not consult it regarding the law on the division of the districts. The opposition can be consulted regarding the law on the exercise of political rights. However, the division of districts is essentially the work of the government and the interior minister according to the law.

The issue is ultimately simple, because the division of districts will be announced, and whoever has arguments against it can submit them to the constitutional court. The referendum has not even been held yet, and it is already being challenged!! As Egyptians, we want to be somewhat serious.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We certainly all want that. However, we want to help the people to be more serious by purging the electoral rosters of the deceased that vote more than once, and so on.

[Musa] The guarantees are there and the court has ruled on the nullity of the current assembly. We said welcome, and the election of a new assembly will take place.

### Voting by Identity Card

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What prevents us from permitting the citizen to vote with his identity card?

[Musa] Voting by identity card in the referendum [is permitted], even if [the person voting is] not registered, because we are eliciting the opinion of the entire people.

However, voting for someone to serve as one's representative is different from a referendum, because the referendum concerns whether or not to dissolve parliament, whereas an election means entrusting someone to be one's representative. In that case, a voter must be registered in the election rosters and must have an election card. Perhaps a person is prohibited from exercising his political rights. The identity card can be used only to ascertain the identity of a voter whose name appears on the registration rosters.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Knowing that individual elections are more exciting and competitive, do you believe that the political circumstances permit, and are appropriate for, the electoral process?

[Musa] We can hold elections at any time, even if the country is in a state of war.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We are also discussing elections from the standpoint of the effects of the gulf crisis. Is it perhaps the case that the National Democratic Party [NDP] has achieved a number of political victories over the opposition parties and has chosen this timing?

[Musa] If that is possible, what is wrong with it? The NDP is in the arena, and it has a right in this regard.

### **The Parties and the Gulf Crisis**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do you believe that the positions of such parties as the SLP and the Muslim Brothers regarding the crisis will affect the elections?

[Musa] I want to leave that to the results, and I do not want to do an injustice to myself. However, one thing is certain: The parties that do not take a position of loyalty and commitment will be affected in these elections.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Based on your longstanding activity in the security field, what shortcoming do you see, but are unable to change?

[Musa] If there is a shortcoming, I would truly announce it. But they are now talking about interference in the local authorities [mahalliyat]. The role of the police is to preserve security, no more. The law prohibits the presence of any policeman within the committee, not just in a voting position, but in the scope of the committee. In other words, if an elections committee is in some school, a policeman is prohibited from entering not only the voting hall, but also the courtyard of the school itself.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] However, are there not police who take part in the committee itself?

[Musa] That is in violation of the law. However, the new tone is the interference of the local authorities, their employees, and others.

### **The Police Are Not To Go Near the Committees**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] You said that your name would be connected to these elections. What orders and directives will you require to guarantee that the police will not intervene?

[Musa] My instructions to police leaders will be as follows: Do not go near the committees, it is prohibited to enter unless the chairman of the committee so requests. However, in the event of unrest and fights, should I stand with my arms folded? I will intervene only to establish security, so that the election process can occur in peace and quiet. That is my role and function. Besides, to whose advantage would I intervene?

[AL-MUSAWWAR] To the advantage of the NDP, the ruling party, to which you belong?

[Musa] How does my affiliation with the NDP preclude my adherence to neutrality. Does belonging to the ruling party mean that I will force an opposition party to fail in elections!!

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Are there positions and behaviors on the part of policemen that go beyond falsification, such as partiality to the candidates themselves regarding the erection of pavilions, the holding of conferences and campaign parades, and a lack of equal opportunities?

[Musa] There are equal opportunities for all. Whoever wants to erect a pavilion, let him do so. However, in terms of security, we say that it must be in a place that is easily controllable, so that we can cope with any emergencies that might arise in these assemblies. My only demand is that there be general rules, even in a nonelection situation. We daily receive requests for the erection of pavilions or the holding of conventions or commemorative ceremonies, and we approve them. Our only requirement is the location and the ability to control it from a security standpoint. It is inconceivable for someone to request to erect a pavilion in al-Tahrir Square. We request a change in location due to traffic and other conditions. We do not refuse a request solely for the sake of refusing. The selection of the site is what can be discussed.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Will the chapter of registration in the rosters be opened now?

[Musa] I cannot. That is stipulated by the law, which prohibits going near the rosters as of the date of the call for a referendum.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Then, when will the elections rosters be reviewed?

[Musa] Annually, also by law, in November and December of every year. New voters are added, deletions are made, information is changed, and so on.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Why does the citizen not register in the rosters when he reaches the legal age?

[Musa] The solution here, when the draft [law] is completed, is the national number.

### **Changing the Ballot Boxes**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Also, what are the guarantees regarding the transport of ballot boxes and what has been said about them being changed?

[Musa] The box is closed in the presence of the committee chairman who seals it with red wax and his seal. If the box is subjected to any change, the committee chairman will raise an objection, and this box will be excluded. This frequently happens, not because of a change, but possibly because of transport, for example. When the committee chairman suspects a ballot box, he

is entitled to record this in his minutes, and the box is excluded. Guarantees do exist.

### The Services Are Legal

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What is your opinion regarding the interference of governorates in favor of the ruling party? Is it considered a sort of election interference if the governorates and directors of administrations provide certain direct services to the public of a district only before elections? Is that considered interference?

[Musa] First, is this service legal or illegal? Is the citizen entitled to it or not? Moreover, on the contrary, the provision of services to the citizen is natural.

It is not considered interference. Voting is by secret, not open, ballot. For a long time, we have frequently heard the popular adage being said in a time such as this, which is "we took his money and we broke his lantern," which means a candidate paid and the voters gave their votes to the candidate who convinced them. The balloting is secret, not open. The government's candidate does not, for example, represent us. The government gives us services, but we give our votes to whomever we want.

### The Money Game

[AL-MUSAWWAR] There is a fear concerning the amount of money going into the elections campaign. The truth is that, regardless of whatever interference may have tarnished the electoral process, since the 1950's at least, we have actually seen a retreat of the role of money and financial bribery in the election process. There are expectations that some currents—that will enter elections and that are based on some investment companies, Islamic banks, and the Islamic current—will spend lavishly in the electoral process. Does the ministry expect that money will play a large role in the coming elections?

[Musa] Honestly, this view is unfounded to a certain extent. Why? I do not want to disregard the political sensitivity of people. I also still maintain that no one can control the voters. The person who would pay the voter would do so before the vote, and the vote is secret. No one can push the voter to express a view that is contrary to his own view. However, there might be promotion of an idea in exchange for services, such as operating a clinic, a school, or a hospital. But I regard that as unlikely in the electoral process, because elections last for one day.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Regarding the exercise of political rights, are there politicians who are prohibited from exercising this right?

[Musa] No one involved in political cases is denied the exercise of his political rights pursuant to the constitutional court's ruling. However, this [prohibition] applies to persons involved in criminal cases.

### The Selection of Candidates

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do you believe that this campaign will be intense and harsh, and consequently the criterion of success will be a candidate's personal worth, the amount of his influence, benefit, and service to the district, his good reputation, and other such qualities, so that the criterion will be the person, not the party?

His excellency the minister, this compels us to ask whether you participate in selecting candidates for the NDP?

[Musa] I? In no way.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Not even in security reports?

[Musa] Who would request these reports from me?

[AL-MUSAWWAR] If that were requested of you?

[Musa] It has not been asked of me. However, if the opposition made such a request, I would share my view regarding its candidates with them.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] At least perhaps a security role would be desired, and perhaps some candidates would be accused of criminal matters and would have a link to the drug trade or something else, for example.

[Musa] We try to obtain the criminal status record or the background papers. If I am asked my view on one or another candidate, I express it honestly. I have no personal interest.

### The Deceased Voting in Elections

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We would like to know your opinion regarding what is said about the deceased voting in elections.

[Musa] A dead person voting in elections is falsification and a crime. Whoever uses this right and abets in the use of it is subject to a felony sentence. Under the new law, the state's legal action stands for life and cannot be suspended.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What are the most important guarantees in the elections law as you see them?

[Musa] Enough time and effort have been invested in the law to rid it of extraneous matter, so that it is promulgated in a form that places it beyond contestation or doubt. Here, I call on all of the parties to present new faces. I call on the voters, especially the intellectuals and those with ideological positions, not to be silent, but to join us in the electoral process, so that we can firmly entrench the electoral process democratically.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Will the minister of Interior nominate himself for elections?

[Musa] No. Until now, I have not thought of that.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] However, if you are asked to do so?

[Musa] By the grace of God, I have been doing the work that is required of any representative since my childhood. My door is always open. That is my nature. If I enter elections, that will not be new for me. Although this process does not attract me from within. However, if I am asked, I would welcome that. I believe that I would not find myself less [able] than any person in my electoral district, and if I nominate myself, I would submit my nomination in my town, because I am a fellah.

### Terrorist Operations

[AL-MUSAWWAR] His excellency the minister, what is currently happening regarding Egypt in the light of the current circumstances? What do you expect? Do you expect that the wave of violence being exported to Egypt will increase in relation to the existing threats?

[Musa] The problem goes beyond threats. Groups have actually been sent from Abu-Nidal and others. It is no secret that we are now investigating a number of terrorist cases.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What was their plan and target?

[Musa] Sabotage operations and attacks against several figures whom they can reach.

I am sorry, but, for security purposes, everything now known is not being stated. These groups are being arrested. We will announce them at the appropriate time.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] From where did they come? How did they enter the country? Did they come via Kuwait or the airport?

[Musa] They came through a number of accesses, and they included elements who reside here. Some of them used Egyptian passports, some of them are from countries whose citizens are permitted to enter without a visa or a card, and some of them are Iraqis who came with documents issued by our consulate in Kuwait, who said that they were Iraqis evading the Iraqi Army there. However, of course, you know that we have a million or more there, and the story of the sponsor who deprived Egyptians of their passports. The Egyptian went to the embassy to take out a travel document. Some of these elements went to the embassy on the basis that they are Egyptians. They came to Egypt. However, they acknowledged that. There are three such cases. They turned themselves in and asked for political asylum. They are ordinary people who refused to serve in the Iraqi Army.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Are these all of the cases that arrived, or are there organized elements that came directly for the purpose of sabotage?

[Musa] There are organized elements who were residing here. Contact occurred with them or elements that came and were assigned certain tasks. Legal measures were taken in every case.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What nationalities are they?

[Musa] They are from countries that had reciprocal arrangements with Egypt for entry by means of a card or without a visa.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Were they arrested with their weapons and sabotage implements?

[Musa] With their weapons, bombs, explosives, and so on, and they informed about them.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Were there Egyptians with them, or are there Egyptian elements that cooperated with them?

[Musa] No, it has not been proven that Egyptians collaborated with them.

### Egypt's Security

[AL-MUSAWWAR] There is a clear threat posed by several countries, the Iraqis, and the Palestinians. What exactly do you recommend to regulate entry into Egypt. Has the idea of cards proved to be a poetic idea that has no need, especially since we have borders and accesses that must be respected. What is your opinion on this matter?

[Musa] My view is that security is security and the security of our country is above any persons. Of course, these remarks are with all due to respect to everyone. However, as the interior minister, this is my conception. Otherwise, I would be obliged to go sit at home. I will maintain security. I will not become involved in foreign affairs. I made these remarks in the cabinet.

Entry into Egypt must be accompanied by guarantees, and incoming persons must be under control.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do these measures pertain to specific nationalities, or do they include all nationalities?

[Musa] These measures are being applied primarily to persons coming from Kuwait, because their passports were seized empty, and anyone can obtain a passport.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is there a specific number of passports that the Egyptian Consulate in Kuwait issued?

[Musa] By the grace of God, these operations were under control and were not left unorganized. Hours after the invasion, Interior Ministry security and port officers were on Egyptian borders.

Some of them could enter the borders and they helped Egyptians return, some of them went via Hafar al-Batin in Saudi Arabia, and others via the al-Ruwayshad area in Jordan.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do you expect that the large wave of returning Egyptians that began after the invasion will be repeated?

[Musa] The push has now subsided. Only a few are coming now, not more than 1,200. However, at the beginning of the push, the number of emigrants reached 23,000 per day.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What is the total number of returnees?

[Musa] 300,000 more or less.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Does that number constitute a burden on the ministry?

[Musa] These are natives of the country. In principle, it is not necessary for the citizen to leave his country or to immigrate. They will pose no burden as far as I am concerned. On the contrary, we need them. An agricultural laborer now earns seven Egyptian pounds per day. The country will absorb all who return. Very regrettably, the elite labor force and skilled workers are the ones who have been leaving, and we need them now more than ever.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] His excellency the minister, figures on the number of Egyptians abroad vary. Exactly, how many are now abroad?

[Musa] We must refer to statistics, but the only available statistics are based on: people who obtained work permits, traveled, and the destination to which they traveled was specified; the renewal of existing permits; or the existing census of the work force, which also does not convey the real picture.

I believe that, after these return, we will have 700,000 Egyptians in Iraq and Kuwait, very few of them in Kuwait.

#### Egyptians in Iraq

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What are the conditions of Egyptians now in Iraq? Is the Interior Ministry monitoring their conditions there?

[Musa] As events developed, monitoring was strongly stepped up. We now know that the Iraqi Government is detaining certain professionals—physicians, engineers, and nurses. Other professionals are being dismissed. Support professionals have also been detained.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is there really forced conscription of Egyptians there?

[Musa] No. There is no conscription for combat. Rather, there is conscription to serve the armed forces as drivers and so on.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] The ordinary Egyptian is very worried that Iraq will conscript Egyptians, causing Egyptian to confront Egyptian if war breaks out. Do these fears have any sound basis?

[Musa] Neither fanaticism nor sympathy could ever make an Egyptian confront his Egyptian brother and the

examples are many. They asked a man to call for the downfall of Egypt and Mubarak. The man refused, and they shot and killed him.

#### The Corpses Coming From Iraq

[AL-MUSAWWAR] The Iraqi ambassador labeled as unsound reports that the Iraqi Government is not giving the Egyptian Government a full autopsy report [sifah tashrihah] and not informing the government of the causes of death. What is your comment?

[Musa] What did he say about the 20 who arrived with crushed skulls? I will speak only on the basis of numbers. Egyptian society in Iraq totalled 1.5 million persons when the war started. There is no objection to 60 corpses arriving in a single month, because such a figure is normal in relation to the Egyptian population there. However, our attention was caught by the increase in the number of returning corpses and the omission of the autopsy reports. If a corpse arrives whole without breakage or gunshot wounds, we would say that the death was natural. However, when I find that some of the deceased present crushed skulls, gunshot wounds, or evidence of electric shock, I must investigate the reasons, especially given the increase in the number of bodies from 60 to 120 to 130, and the accounts of returnees. I must be gripped by apprehension.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What does your report on this problem include?

[Musa] The following is a picture that I presented to the cabinet regarding the return of corpses of Egyptians from Iraq, updated to 16 September 1990:

—Between 1 August 1990 and 16 August 1990, no bodies arrived due to the lack of direct flights, after the closure of lines between Egypt and Iraq. In the past, the lines from Baghdad to Cairo were direct. Now, transportation is via Jordan. After 16 August, corpses began to arrive again. Their numbers and the causes of death are as follows:

- Two bodies; fire.
- 35 bodies; electrocution.
- Eight bodies; no autopsy report arrived with the bodies, and the causes of death are unknown.
- Two; drowning.
- One; bursting of the trachea.
- Two; gunshot.
- One; strong hemorrhaging.
- 22; various clots-liver-diabetes.

Why were diseases specified in 22 cases, and the cause of death in the other cases was not reported to us. A crushed skull must be the result of a fall or a blow with a sharp instrument. In other words, there must be some cause.

This is from the period of 12 September 1990 to 25 September 1990.

Of course, the cause of death must be sent. Most regrettably, the bodies arrive at the goods yard, and the

families of the deceased come after being notified. Some of them refuse to have an autopsy conducted. We know the legal principle that the crime is regional. As long as the death is criminal, the authorities of the state in which the crime occurred must perform an autopsy and send an autopsy report on the death. The ambassador's remark about these deaths being the result of natural causes is incorrect. Does a natural death require the fracturing of the skull in this form?

### **The Problem Is Political**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do you believe that these are isolated or organized incidents?

[Musa] It is of course conceivable that problems between individuals will occur. However, we are troubled, for example, by the arrival of 35 bodies, one way, and the increase in the number of returning corpses, despite the drop in the number of Egyptians and the changing situation there.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What can you do to confront this?

[Musa] The Interior Ministry is performing its role in this regard. It has undertaken independent measures through international organizations.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Based on your information, what are the reasons behind the killing of Egyptians?

[Musa] Basically, Egyptians are being asked to take a certain position, such as support of Iraq's anti-Egypt position. Those who refuse are killed. The problem is primarily political.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Did the number of corpses increase after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and what is the number exactly?

[Musa] It increased from 60 per month to 120. However, it is noted that the number of corpses and their percentage increased notably a week before the invasion, reaching a peak in the month of the invasion. Therefore, we sent for autopsy information. Are there official reports on these incidents or not? The official report must contain the cause of death, so that the heirs of the deceased can demand their rights through the state according to international law.

### **The Detention of Egyptians in Iraq**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Are Egyptians actually being detained and not being permitted to return from Iraq?

[Musa] Of course, there is a decision by Saddam Husayn on that. Exit is now by visa. Passports have been confiscated. In other words, Egyptians are forced to stay there.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Did we not request, before that, reports on the circumstances surrounding these incidents? How did they respond? Should they not send a summary of the official report? Did we not request that?

[Musa] What happened in the past was that the primary concern of the family of the deceased was to bury the corpse. The majority of them are simple people, and they did not seek the causes of death. The problem began when these numbers multiplied, and the president charged me with investigating the matter.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What about the bodies that are buried there?

[Musa] Regarding those buried there, either the next of kin is there and consents to that, or the entire family is there and it prefers to bury the deceased there. This is one of the matters that we are investigating to determine the number of such people. Sometimes anonymous bodies arrive without names, and no one recognizes them.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do you expect a wave of forced immigration of Egyptians from Iraq?

[Musa] Only those wishing to return are coming. Forced immigration has not occurred. We should know that, since the invasion, 437 persons have traveled to Iraq after taking out new work permits, and 400 have renewed their work permits.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Why are they allowed to travel?

[Musa] We cannot prevent anyone from traveling under the constitution, lest a citizen submit a judicial claim against us for preventing him from traveling.

### **They Do Not Pose a Burden**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We see that most of the returnees will add to the unemployment problem. In other words, they will ultimately be a security burden.

[Musa] These returnees are native Egyptians. We cannot prevent them from returning to their country.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] How then will you cope with this problem?

[Musa] Just as I coped with those who came before. They are still Egyptian, and I cannot prevent them from entering the country. If a returnee has committed a crime, I will apply the law to him. That is not a problem.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Is the state taking measures to protect Egyptians now in Iraq?

[Musa] There is international law and there are Iraqis here in Egypt. True, they number only a few. However, you are now compelling me to say that I was the only one who said no to the trip to Baghdad from Cairo by the members of the [Iraqi] diplomatic mission until the return of our diplomats from Kuwait, who were detained in Baghdad. I actually prevented the Iraqis from traveling. The price of Egyptians is very dear. That was our message. When the Iraqis, especially the politicians among them, began to go to the airport to leave Cairo, while they were detaining Egyptian diplomats, I said that we will not permit the Iraqis to travel unless I am

notified that the Egyptians there have left. We informed them in their houses that they would not be permitted to travel. This matter reached the cabinet. I stated that international law and reciprocity exist. When Dr. Butrus Ghali conveyed that to the president, President Mubarak ordered the implementation of my view. When the Egyptian diplomats arrived in Cairo, he permitted the Iraqis to leave.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Going back to the subject of the export of terror, do you expect the arrival of new terrorist teams after the arrest of the first groups?

[Musa] If I did not expect that, I could not be called a security man, because a security man is by nature greatly suspicious. I must establish guarantees. When nothing happens, that becomes the success.

However, I must not react with indifference and depend on prayer and the presence of saints in the country.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Do you expect that many corpses will be returning from Iraq in the light of the current circumstances?

[Musa] I do not believe that will happen again unless new factors come into existence.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Will the Kuwaitis in Egypt be counted?

[Musa] Anyone coming to Egypt must register and comply with residency laws regarding the notification of the pertinent department and other measures related to residency.

#### Security Initiatives

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Why have the security agencies now become interested in investigating the deaths of Egyptians in Iraq and their real causes, although attacks against Egyptians working in Iraq occurred before the invasion?

[Musa] The current security initiative has no remote or close connection to the deterioration of relations, or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Rather, the security agencies have been concerned with studying every incidence of death before the invasion, and there were medical reports of the autopsy attached to the bodies, explaining the causes of death.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] However, many corpses arrive in Egypt with no medical reports. Some families of deceased persons have therefore attempted to ascertain the causes of death. Has no one inquired about them?

[Musa] Honestly, no such cases have come to my attention.

#### I Am Not Worried

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Let us speak now about extremism. What is the size of the extremist groups in your estimation? What is the scope of their activities? What are the

new factors in the security domain in light of the fact that you have followed a rational policy since assuming responsibility for the ministry, but were surprised by some tests of power on the part of some. Then, there has been more than one clash between the extremists and the police. What is your current security appraisal of these groups?

[Musa] I do not have a numerical figure on the size of the extremist groups, because they embrace an idea, and the proponents of this idea are not a source of concern. Why? Because, if I could contain this idea through an upright, sound idea, I would guarantee that it would not spread. However, if otherwise, a second containment would occur: The leaders and advocates of this idea and those who embrace it, wherever they are, would in any case amount to the size of the Muslim Brotherhood groups in their time. We all remember that they were arrested during a 48-hour period after the al-Manshiyah incident. I was an officer at that time, and I participated in the operation. If matters require the adoption of a certain position immediately, we will do so, although the president's directives have always been to avoid a police clash, especially since the clerics of al-Azhar and officials of the religious endowments are fulfilling their role by controlling and turning back extremism. I am not worried about the extremist groups now. Our role in the Interior Ministry is to provide security, calm, and stability to all groups of the Egyptian people. The method of the Islamic call is acceptable in the mosques and conferences. However, it is not at all permitted to impose this idea by force and violence. I have experience with these extremists from the time I was governor of Asyut. Among the methods that I pursued with them there is to turn to several religious scholars to discuss the ideology of these people. I also introduced this method when I assumed responsibility for the ministry. As you stated, there were actions that involved a test of power. I took my pulse and was surprised by the first test in the al-Fayyum operation. Initially, isolated incidents occurred in al-Minya and Asyut, in which police personnel were killed. Then, there were the al-Fayyum incidents, which, very regrettably, did not begin during my leadership of the Interior Ministry (but were two years before that). Their area of influence was "Kahk." It started with an agricultural engineer named Shawqi al-Shaykh, a student of 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman. He was able to become independent by means of a certain idea and he split off and formed what was called the "the Society of the Shawqiists." He began to impose his presence forcefully, to the point where he rode in his pickup truck with "six individuals" armed to the teeth with automatic weapons, cruising the town before the eyes of all the people. This was two years before I assumed responsibility for the Interior Ministry. The process worsened since that time despite the talk and commotion of the efforts of security at that time. The Shawqiist groups subsequently became open. Anyone who opposed or challenged this idea was killed immediately. Six policemen, guards, and shaykhs of the town died. It reached the point where two "boys" beat their



father; when the public prosecutor's office tried to arrest them, they beat the shaykh of the town and the guard died. The policeman who was guarding the church during Ramadan was beaten and died. The Shawqiists were behind all of these incidents. Then, they were dealt with. Forces went with megaphones and demanded their surrender. However, they took shelter in sewage ditches and pipes, armed with automatic rifles, and they began to fire on policemen. Some died and others shaved off their beards and went to Ismailiya and Suez, because their main occupation was fishing. However, we seized them all. Since then, matters have calmed down to a large extent. The latest incident involved a member of the Shawqiists who killed a member of the 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman group. The father of the victim had no choice but to take revenge on the killer with an axe. That is the status of the extremist groups.

#### Searching for a Role

[AL-MUSAWWAR] But what is the security situation now? Are they still active in al-Minya, Asyut, and other governorates?

[Musa] These people, especially the leaders, are definitely searching for a role. It is not easy for them to accept the termination of their idea. They therefore resort from time to time to highlighting their existence. I am nonetheless not worried. Why? If you originated an idea that you advocate, you must pursue a straight path by not disturbing security, because there is no ban on ideas. However, if you forcefully impose your view, that will not happen.

#### The Truth About the 'Ala' Incident

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What is the truth about the incident in which the police were accused of killing Dr. 'Ala' Muhyi-al-Din, who belongs to one of the groups?

[Musa] First, how did this man die? We initially did not know his identity, because he did not have any effects on his person that would reveal his identity when he was transported to the autopsy room. His identity was unknown until members of his family identified him. How was he killed? The information that was available to us is that he met his fate while walking on Tarsah Street in the afternoon. This is in an area that we call the People's Republic of China, because of the overcrowding there. How was he hit? Who hit him? The strange thing about the matter is that one of the newspapers wrote that a security man held a radio to notify of the completion of the mission: "complete sir, the mission is completed." Where did this conversation take place? Who undertook this act, and to whose advantage? Why do they continue to liquidate each other? The proof of this mutual liquidation can be seen in cases of physical liquidation that I will mention to you, all of which stem from a struggle for ideological leadership:

- On 26 May 1989, several elements of the al-Jihad organization attacked Sharif Qarni Muhammad Abu-'Awf of the Harakiists [al-Harakiyun—denoting

movement, connoting agitation] group in order to liquidate him because of his link with the breakaway Harakiist group, which was directed by Hisam al-Butraji, who was killed by them. They wounded Sharif in his right arm and body. This incident is written up in official report No. 4625 of 1989, felonies, Bani Suwayf.

- On 31 May 1989, several elements of the Islamic Jihad organization attacked Mustafa Sayyid Jad of the Harakiist group, stabbing him in his back and stomach, and killing him. This is written up in official report No. 333 of 1989, Bani Suwayf.
- On 1 June 1989, several elements of the Harakiist group attacked Walid Fawwaz Muhammad Fawwaz of the al-Jihad organization, stabbing him in the back in Bani Suwayf.
- On 20 June 1989, elements of the al-Jihad organization attacked Hisam Muhammad al-Butraji, liquidating him with cold steel. On the same day, elements of the al-Jihad organization also attacked Ahmad 'Abbas 'Abd-al-'Aziz of the Harakiist group with sharp implements and crushed his head completely.
- On 23 October 1989, two members of the al-Jihad organization, Ayman Mahmud 'Izz-al-Din and Muhammad Mahmud 'Izz-al-Din, beat their father, who had struck them because of his opposition to their view in an attempt to dissuade them from their extremist ideas. The incident, which also occurred in Bani Suwayf, is written up in official report 9173 of 1989.
- On 7 April 1990, Ayman al-Husayni Ramadan of the Harakiist group attacked Asamah Sha'ban Kamil with sharp instruments, cutting his left arm and severing the extensor of his left wrist.
- On 21 September 1990, a member of the Shawqi al-Shaykh group, 'Uways al-Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad al-Shaykh, fired several shots at members of the Islamic Society, including Muhammad Jad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Jawwad and others.

This is what is happening among the groups, whether the Harakiist group, al-Jihad, or others. Given all of these facts, why would the police liquidate 'Ala' Muhyi-al-Din? Why strike him in a public street, and not inside his house at least, so that I would not disclose myself?!

I have very great hope, God willing, that we will reach the real criminals. Liquidation is not our style or method. I honestly do not accept this word.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] This is the first time we are hearing of the so-called Harikiist [al-Harakiyun] group.

[Musa] The truth is that the members of these groups did not give themselves these names. All of these names are purely security's classifications of these groups. There is the al-Jihad, al-Tabligh [revelation], the Salafis, and others.

#### Deficient Thinking

[AL-MUSAWWAR] In a speech, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn appealed to these groups. Do you think

that these people can have an influential position on the Gulf crisis. If so, could it affect the Egyptian milieu and the existing Islamic currents?

[Musa] That thinking is deficient if someone believes it. Regardless of ideological differences, an Egyptian is an Egyptian. The domestic and international media hubbub, which has inflated the size of these groups, has created this erroneous belief. Yes, some of them have a base. However, such a base never worries me, because, by the grace of God, we are able to curb their recalcitrance in ordinary circumstances without using force, as long as we enforce the law. The penal code in itself makes their activity a crime. However, in view of the inflation that occurred, a delusive picture of these groups has been created. President Saddam's advisers have given him this impression, or he himself believed that these people have influence and weight. He therefore appealed to them.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Have you proved that these groups receive foreign support and financing?

[Musa] I cannot deny this matter. Most of the members in these groups belong to the low social levels. They are selected from the lower classes. Who is responsible for spending on them to promote the idea? I maintain that there must be foreign financing, and it does not necessarily have to be a very large amount. President Mubarak's effort to unite the Arabs in the period before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait helped to effectively close many accesses that were open previously, be they from the East or the West, or from here or there. As to whether financing will come from Iraq, welcome.

#### Security and Physical Liquidation

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Are you leaving the religious currents to liquidate each other? Are you helping in this process, whether or not it poses a danger?

[Musa] Not at all. The proof is that an official report is written on whoever is arrested, which is followed by conviction and sentencing. If a member of the Harakiist or another group attacks someone else in the al-Jihad group, is that not a crime? Would I allow him to do as he pleases? Who made that remark?!

[AL-MUSAWWAR] In some of the quarrels that occurred in al-Fayyum, young boys were used to cause chaos and hostile incidents. What is the gravity of this behavior in your opinion?

[Musa] All those who burned down the pharmacies owned by the Copts were children no older than eight. The gravity of the matter is that these groups have introduced this idea to the primary and preparatory schools, and they have embedded in the minds of children the idea of forming a group and making a child among them the prince of this group. Can anyone imagine that?!

#### The Ibrahim Shukri Incident

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What is the truth about what happened regarding the prevention of Ibrahim Shukri, the chairman of the SLP, from attending a popular conference in Jordan?

[Musa] It started when Mustafa Kamil Murad asked me whether or not he could travel. I answered him: You are free. He said: Something seems incomplete. I contacted Mustafa al-Faqi in the chairmanship, and I informed him of my decision not to travel. After that conversation, I received a reprimand call from Ibrahim Shukri, who told me: Remove the earphone and talk to me like you talked to some of them. I said to him: I did not request anyone and I did not talk to anyone. Whoever wants to travel can travel. I told him about what happened with the chairman of the Liberal Party. He finally told me: I want to travel. I told him: I bid you a good journey. I immediately called the airport officer and ordered them not to block anyone.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] However, what truth is there to the story about state security secret police officers preventing him from traveling, and moreover from basically entering the airport?

[Musa] On the day that Ibrahim Shukri called me and said that the airport officers had ripped up his passport to prevent him from traveling, I asked: What is the story exactly?

It was established that a passport officer, during a review of the passport, discovered an entry stamp. He began to look for the exit stamp in the pages of the passport, and found that a page was missing. The officer asked him about the reason for the disappearance of the page. No other officer save for the passports officer dealt with the passport. Here, the officer said to him: You cannot travel, because the passport is invalid. Ibrahim Shukri accused him of ripping out the page.

I asked: Did anyone other than the passports officer handle the passport of Ibrahim Shukri. It was confirmed that the passport had been in the possession of the chairman of the SLP and he did not submit it to anyone other than the passports officer. Moreover, they told him at the airport: Take out another passport and travel wherever you please.

After that, Ibrahim Shukri called and told me: I took out a new passport, and I want to travel. I told him: No one will block you. As a matter of fact, I asked Major General Muhammad Hafiz Mansur, the director of airport security, not to prevent anyone from traveling.

I want to say: Of what interest is it to me if he does not travel?

Will he succeed where all the countries of the world have failed?

Will he make peace? Everything is by virtue of God!!

**My Door Is Open**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] What about the prevention of some journalists from traveling abroad?

[Musa] That did not happen. If this actually happens, whoever is prevented from traveling must go to the nearest department to report it and write out an official report on the incident, or knock on my door at the ministry and submit a complaint. It is well-known that I do not close my door to anyone. A man from Bani Mazar, a driver, came to me. An officer had shaved his head. Before making inquiries, I ordered the suspension of the officer and the superintendent. The officer was relieved of secret police tasks and referred to the disciplinary court immediately.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] However, who ensures that the department will respond and write up an official report on an officer from the police apparatus?

[Musa]k He should come to me instead of the department!!

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Another incident that we place before your excellency: It happened that a colleague of ours from the AL-MUSAWWAR editorial board, who was assigned to follow what is happening regarding the [Iraqi] Bank al-Rafidin on al-Tahrir Street in al-Duqqi, and the mistreatment and beatings to which Egyptians are being subjected at the hands of some officers and authorized representatives of the police, was subjected, along with his photographer colleague, to insults on the part of officers when AL-MUSAWWAR photographed what was happening, and the officers removed film from the cameras. Is that reasonable?!

[Musa] First, I do not approve of the principle of beating and insults. However, can you imagine what is happening on al-Tahrir Street in al-Duqqi? Human masses are blocking the way and impeding traffic on a busy street. What are we to do, especially inasmuch as there is no other currency exchange window? Currency is not being remitted to Egypt to defray people's debts, although many are still holding onto their places in line by staying overnight on the sidewalks in the hope of exchanging currency.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] Why is the state security secret police detaining journalist-in-training Khalid al-Sharif, a journalist for the AL-HAQIQAH newspaper?

[Musa] Khalid Sharif has been released. I personally detained him. I did so by the grace of God, because, had we not detained him, he would have died with 'Ala' Muhyi-al-Din. "His group" would have been responsible for liquidating him, not security as is being said!!

**Security and the Citizen**

[AL-MUSAWWAR] How long will there be disrespect for the humanity of an individual and mistreatment of him in police departments? The people feel terror and fear upon merely entering the departments.

[Musa] If a person has aspirations, or a hope that he wishes to realize, my hope is to remove, from the heart of every honorable citizen, fear or feelings of being mistreated by the police. God willing, I will achieve that, with the understanding that esteem for security personnel will be based on a relationship governed by love and mutual respect between the citizen and the police officer.

About two months ago, it came to my attention that an elderly man entered upon an officer during a shift at one of the departments and greeted the officer, but the officer did not return the greeting. When the elderly man asked the man why he did not respond to him, the officer only rebuked him, telling him "You are my friend and you will not keep me company." Actually, the elderly man did not complain to me. However, when this information reached me, I said that the officer would go up to Asyut. Asyut, apropos, is not punishment so much as it is to teach the officer, through dealing with the people there, that greeting is a duty, and that respect for people does not at all diminish one's importance. A security man must have a noble character and a good upbringing. The selection of officers in the police academy will not be based on financial ability, which used to happen. Only children of good people will enter the police academy, in the sense of children of persons endowed with values, who are well mannered. Then will I have brought out a certain concept, namely that security is sacred service to this country, and I am a servant of every citizen, especially needy citizens. Then, the meaning that we are all searching for will be affirmed, which is mutual respect and trust between police officers and citizens. What might not be obvious to some police officers is that if a citizen feels that a security official respects him, that citizen will certainly extend assistance to him. In this regard, I will relate a simple story. A man came to the ministry's bureau and asked to meet with me personally. When I received him in my office, he told me about an attempt by some to use him to dispose of a shipment of heroin weighing nine kilograms. The drugs were in the possession of a Palestinian. The drugs and the persons were immediately taken into custody. The question is why would a citizen come voluntarily to report a drug shipment of this size had he not felt trust and sensed it from the man who was taking care of him and listening to him with full respect and trust?

[AL-MUSAWWAR] When will discipline return to the Egyptians' scene?

[Musa] When police personnel in the street have esteem and respect. All security personnel in the streets are "second induction" conscripts serving compulsory service. When the period of their service is over, they return to their civilian lives. I want a security man whose allegiance is to the Interior Ministry, who, when ask what his duty is, will respond: A security man, not a painter or a whitewasher. This will be achieved only through school, security studies, and the admission of persons with preparatory qualifications, and three years of schooling. Then I will obtain security personnel who are

prepared, responsible, know the nature of their work, and are reliable. We will open fields of advancement to them.

[AL-MUSAWWAR] We thank the minister for so generously giving of his time.

[Musa] I am the one to thank you for this opportunity.

### Security Court Chief Views Islamic Politics, Violence

91AA0020A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic  
3 Sep 90 pp 42-44

[Interview with Counselor Sa'id al-'Ashmawi, Supreme State Security Court Chief; "Counselor Sa'id al-'Ashmawi, Supreme State Security Court Chief: Brothers Are Lackeys, and I have Proof; Deluge Is Coming and We Will Drown in Ignorance; It Is Not Permissible to Approach 21st Century With 14th Century Mentality;" first three paragraphs are AL-SHIRA' introduction; date, place not given]

[Text] Counselor Muhammad Sa'id al-'Ashmawi is one of the few who have decided to swim against the current and to fly against the wind. He has taken a firm position against the religious tendency which he has called the "political Islam groups." He studied at Cairo's Law College and worked as assistant prosecutor. He is now president of the Supreme State Security Court and chairman of the Cairo Criminal Court. He has tried the most prominent Egyptian political cases, the latest of which was the armed Nasirist Organization case. He has authored tens of books in which he scientifically discusses thought within the religious tendency. The latest of his books is "Political Islam," a book which provoked a major controversy when it was published.

He has his private viewpoint on all issues raised in the Arab and Islamic arena.

AL-SHIRA' has interviewed al-'Ashmawi, opening the interview with a question concerning the issue that is now preoccupying the entire world, namely the Gulf developments. He was also asked to define his vision of future Arab political action. Al-'Ashmawi responded:

The future does not bode well. The Arab world is, in my opinion, approaching numerous regrettable developments. This Arab world will ultimately end up in material destruction or moral destruction because it is remote from the modern civilized approach and because it consumes civilization and does not create it. It is a captive, not a leader, of technology. The Arab world's present-day culture is a verbal culture and this world's action is vocal action. This is why it is lagging behind life's bandwagon, why it does not understand the present, why it has no futuristic vision, and why it possesses no integrated concept. Moreover, it has falsified the past so that it may not experience incentives or motives that require it to advance or to change. In this way, this world will become the captive of internal

conflicts and it will self-destruct. I add that I expect the United States and Europe to work to include Russia in the western camp and that the Soviet Union will turn into an oil country, considering that it occupies second place in terms of oil reserves. Should this actually materialize, the Soviet Union will become rich in a matter of years and will tie itself to the western world. Consequently, its oil will be cheaper than the oil of the Middle East which will experience an economic tremor as a result, considering that the Arab oil states do not possess the basic structure to survive. This structure is not an edifice, it is not roads, and it is not hospitals. What this structure lacks is the fundamental element in development, namely man, in the absence of the Arab citizen who uses these things ideally and who can make and produce them, not just let others make them for him or prepare for him the means of civilization. I believe that the Arab citizen, excluding a small minority that is being fought and that is isolated from society, is not eligible. The majority of the Arab people is not disposed to development due to the presence of numerous intellectual and ideological obstacles. So, this leads to the Arab citizen being unproductive and ineligible. Thus, as soon as the oil is depleted all that exists will come to an end and will turn into mere dilapidated buildings that can find nobody to manage them.

[AL-SHIRA'] You were the first to use the phrase "political Islam." What do you mean by this phrase?

[Ashmawi] I have found from my detailed studies of these groups that some of them, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, adopted in 1937 a decision resolving that they alone are Muslims and denying that anybody else is. They outlawed whoever was not one of their members and permitted the assassination of whoever opposed them. In the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's, these ideas spread and assumed a military and political character. So I decided to examine this tendency's slogans, and I demonstrated to the world that this tendency does not represent Islam but a tendency in Islam. I was the first to coin the phrase "political Islam" and to use it as the title of a book in which I have debated all the concepts of this tendency which I consider to be a political tendency.

"Political Islam" represents the groups that don the shirt of Islam to play a political role and to achieve political objectives. To accomplish this, they say that politics is a mainstay of religion or a mainstay in religion. They employ numerous terms that end up exploiting religion for political action.

Other groups have risen and each of them alleges that it is the Muslim group. This is why each declares the other groups and other Muslims to be infidels. Their main objective is to gain power by way of religion.

Thus, the political Islam groups view politics as the main aspect of or most important activity in religion. My viewpoint is totally different. Politics is an activity. But the Muslim, be he a merchant or an employee, for

example, is not required to abandon his work and devote himself to politics. It is my opinion that if the Muslim wishes to engage in politics, then he should do so through the parties or by evaluating government performance and then voting in elections.

### Lackeyhood

[AL-SHIRA'] You have made charges against the religious tendency and you have accused it of lackeyhood to foreign countries. What are your proofs?

[Ashmawi] I have not accused this tendency of lackeyhood even though I have been aware that it is not working for Egypt's interest. I know from my readings that there are ties between this tendency and numerous foreign intelligence agencies. When the followers of this tendency made serious charges against me, I was compelled to demonstrate that those making the charges are the culprits. In psychology, a well-known habit is "ascription," i.e. ascribing or attributing one's faults to an opponent. If the debate were scientific, we would ignore such accusations and would leave them for history [to judge]. I urge those who want to make sure of the relationship between the Islamic tendency groups and the intelligence agencies of foreign countries to read the following books:

1. "The Muslim Brotherhood" by Richard (Mesh).
2. "The Muslim Brotherhood's Secret Agency" by Dr. 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan.
3. "Hasan al-Banna" by Dr. Rif'at al-Sa'id.
4. "Dread of Khomeini."
5. "Who Killed Hasan al-Banna" by Muhsin Muhammad.

This is in addition to other books which I do not wish to discuss now. The books I have mentioned confirm the following decisively: There was a relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Canal Company which financed the brotherhood with 30,000 pounds that were delivered to Hasan al-Banna personally. It is well known that the company worked for the British and French intelligence. Moreover, the brotherhood worked for [King] Faruq and always sided with the king against the popular tendency. Furthermore, the brotherhood gained strength when the minority parties dominated. It is well known that the brotherhood was managed with the knowledge of the British intelligence to strike the national movement. Besides, the Muslim Brotherhood's grand master proposed in 1946 to the U.S. Embassy's political adviser to set up an apparatus with which to fight communism, provided that the apparatus was financed by the United States. The U.S. adviser turned down the offer, obviously. This document is published in Muhsin Muhammad's book "Who Killed Hasan al-Banna." It is a U.S. document.

It is also certain that the book "Dread of Khomeini" contains more than one document which indicates the U.S. intelligence's connection with Khomeini's revolution and with the brotherhood tendency that is centered in Geneva. The documents show that the Egyptian Government policy encouraged the fedayeen and those who carried arms and that Israel was exerting efforts to

get the Arabs involved in a war with it in order to demonstrate that the Arabs were fighting it and so as to establish itself on a military basis. The only party that urged war was the brotherhood which accused the government of infidelity. This was an act of treason on Hasan al-Banna's part. In this context, it is my assessment that the military option worked to Israel's benefit at the time and distorted the true nature of the struggle with Israel as a fundamentally cultural struggle. So what happened then and what is happening now holds the Arabs back in the Arab-Israeli conflict because it denies them the cultural option and imposes the military option on them. This is what leads the Arabs to failure. As long as one does not produce weapons, one cannot embark on war. Before one produces weapons, one must seek the cultural option. The battle is now a cultural battle. Israel is preparing itself culturally. Consequently, this explains why the radical groups are inclined, whether wittingly or unwittingly, to join the trench that is hostile to Egypt, the Arabs, and Islam. But what happened between the brotherhood's grand master and the U.S. Embassy's political adviser is obvious.

[AL-SHIRA'] If this is the case regarding your charge that they are lackeys, then what about their charge that you rouse and incite the government against them?

[Ashmawi] I do not rouse the government. On the other hand, all my decisions do not work in the government's interest. The government has been mobilized against the political Islam groups since 1946. It could not listen to my words just because I have written a book. The current developments are what incites the government. The groups also incite the government, as proven by their writings which incite the government and the entire world against them. They say that al-Azhar is not performing its role and that it is working for the government. Moreover, when they say that Bulgaria and Spain should be annexed to the Islamic world, does not this antagonize the outside world by showing the Muslims as people who want to confront the world anew with religious wars. To make gains, they antagonize the Egyptian Government against themselves. They even stir the entire world against them. I do not rouse anybody against anybody because it is in my nature to work to strengthen human rights, not strengthen the government. My court decisions attest to this fact.

### Intellectual Invasion

[AL-SHIRA'] In another charge, the groups say that you claim that Islam has no legislative role whereas you attribute such a role to Moses, peace be upon him. What is your opinion?

[Ashmawi] Some people have misunderstood these statements. The fact is that during my research on the [divine] messages, I have found that Moses' message came with numerous and detailed laws concerning the civil and criminal aspects whereas out of a total of 1,600 verses in the Koran, only 80 verses contain some legislation. I have found that the ratio of laws in the Koran is

less. This is why I say that the pivot of Moses' message is legislation. Moreover, Prophet Muhammad, (may God's peace and prayers be upon him), said: "I have been sent to perfect noble character. I am the prophet of mercy." This is my interpretation. I say that fundamentally, the Koran is a book of ethics and mercy. The groups give us the impression that the shari'ah is detailed and that it applies to everything. This is untrue. What regulates these religious laws is al-Ghazali's "Revival of the Religious Sciences," a book on marriage, inheritance, divorce, and so forth. For his purpose, al-Ghazali was compelled to use wrongly ascribed hadiths. The Islamic shari'ah contains no laws that regulate all aspects of man's life. The shari'ah should be credited, not discredited, for this omission because it wants to give man the freedom to regulate his affairs. The koran details some laws. If it detailed all laws, it would turn into a temporary book because by nature, laws are local and temporary. The shari'ah concerns itself only with personal status affairs, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This is in addition to one ruling in civil law, one procedural ruling, and four penalties, namely the penalty for theft, for slander, for adultery, and for (belligerency). These four penalties and the aforementioned laws cannot deal with all the events people encounter. The political Islam groups say that the right to legislation belongs to God, concluding that only the amir or master is the one to legislate. I say that the right to legislation belongs to the nation. We have a small number of [religious] laws and it has been left up to the nation to legislate.

[AL-SHIRA'] Another charge they make against you is that you belittle the danger of the intellectual invasion to society and that you even encourage it.

[Ashmawi] The phrase "intellectual invasion" is wrong and misleading, the same as the other slogans raised by this tendency's followers. We use all of civilization's products, such as television, cars, and so forth. These things alter the human character as they alter the nature of social relations. We use these products, and nobody has complained. I wonder about those who use civilization's products, who are influenced by these products, and who allow the products to influence their thinking, ideology, personality, and society but who refuse the scientific method that produces this civilization. The difference between me and them is that they want to consume, but not produce civilization, whereas I want us to produce civilization as we consume it. So, we take all of civilization's fruits but reject the scientific method, which is fundamentally the Muslims' method. Europe copied this method from the Muslims and built its civilization with it. Today, we take everything from the west, except the scientific method. I demand the adoption of this method because with it, we can produce civilization and not just consume it. If this tendency's followers call this an intellectual invasion, then I demand that we accept this intellectual invasion or reject the western civilization in its entirety. But I believe that they fear the scientific method because it is a provocative

method and because it criticizes the methods which they require their followers to accept. If I instill a scientific method in the followers' minds, then this method will make them engage in examination and criticism, and this is what leads to the development of a free man and a true Muslim who can examine whatever is presented to him and distinguish sound ideas from faulty ideas and thus avoid becoming the captive of slogans.

#### Who Is Lackey

[AL-SHIRA'] In addition to the above charges, they charge that you are a lackey and that a certain foreign country stands behind you. What do you say?

[Ashmawi] The purpose of this accusation is to prevent us from communicating altogether and to isolate us. If we contact the state agencies, we are informers! If we contact European universities, we support imperialism! If we contact U.S. universities, we support Zionism! If foreign magazines publish our articles, we work for agents! If I lecture in Russia, I am called a communist. I believe that I have imposed myself locally and internationally with my culture. The lectures that I have published or given in any country are public and are available to everybody to hear and see. I ask those who make this charge to define their accusation clearly, keeping in mind that the charge is made against these groups themselves. Last year, the press reported that U.S. intelligence financed the Islamic conferences (which I did not attend)! My information is that these conferences are financed by Zionism and U.S. intelligence. Here, I am entitled to ask: Who is the lackey? The lackey is the one who fragments Egypt's unity. The lackey is the one who divides Muslims into Islamists and Muslims and brandishes the weapon of declaring others infidel against everybody. The lackey is the one who conceals the basis of the struggle which is a cultural struggle. The lackey is the one who proliferates a militarist version of Islam. The charge of lackeyhood cannot be made off the cuff. It has its conditions, which are the destruction of Egypt, removing the intellect, and antagonizing the world against Islam. Who does this, I or the political Islam groups?

[AL-SHIRA'] You deny that Islam is a totalitarian religion. What is your opinion of this accusation?

[Ashmawi] Detail is required. If what is intended is that we accept their slogans that Islam is a religion, civil laws, canonical law, a creed, and so forth, then I do not, of course, embrace this. Rather, I approach the issue scientifically. I don't believe that Islam is a totalitarian religion but the religion of freedom. I believe that the Koran has legislated few laws and has intentionally refrained from organizing government so that it may leave the matter to the Islamic society. But they confuse jurisprudence with the shari'ah. However, I define the shari'ah by saying that it means "the method" and that its provisions are the provisions contained in the Koran and the Sunna. Therefore, it is not totalitarian. The shari'ah provisions are limited to the Koran and the

Sunna. The rest is left to society. This is a point of disagreement between me and them. They say that Islam is a totalitarian religion so that they may be able to impose a comprehensive social system in which they are the rulers, the legislators, and everything. When the Muslim Brotherhood groups were formed, they were influenced by communist ideas. This is why they said that Islam is totalitarian. This is wrong. Hasan al-Banna was totalitarian by nature. His ideas were developed and colored according to his nature. He offered us his viewpoint of Islam, not Islam itself, because Islam too great to be reflected by one individual. Al-Banna presented his viewpoint only. They want to highlight the unpleasant side of Islamic thought at a time when we should highlight the bright side of Islam, namely that Islam is the religion of freedom, progress, civilization, and humanism. This is the difference between my vision and theirs.

#### Age of Technology

[AL-SHIRA'] What is your opinion of what is raised about the need for the formation of religious parties similar to the west's Christian parties?

[Ashmawi] To begin, Europe's Christian parties rise naturally. Every country embraces the beliefs of the majority of its people. Governments in Europe and the United States are founded on Christian values. When they speak of Christian parties, they forget that they are founded on Christian values without any political considerations.

In Egypt, they want to establish totalitarian parties which they allege to be Islam itself. Whoever wishes to form a party has to offer a program and agree to the creation of other parties. Thus, a Jihad party, a Muslim Brotherhood party, and a Renunciation and Repudiation Society party will emerge. Each group fights with the other and causes division. This is the reason for objection. Out of concern for Islam and the country, they should not demand to form parties. The political struggle has involved them in battles with the government and with society at a time when they have distanced themselves from the fundament, namely Islamic education. If the formation of parties on a religious basis is permitted, conflicting parties will arise. Because of politics, they will fight each other under the guise of religion, as is currently happening in Lebanon between Hizballah and the Amal movement. Politics lead to division whereas ethics lead to unification. We want to begin by raising society with Islamic ethics.

[AL-SHIRA'] From your viewpoint, what is the ideal method to reply to the political Islam tendency?

[Ashmawi] This tendency is incapable of understanding, and its leaders are people who have their interests and their future aspirations, even if the price is the loss of Egypt. This is either because these leaders do not understand and think that they do understand or because they do understand but do not wish to apply what they understand. It is my opinion that no understanding can

be reached with them. The danger is to the people's broad base because it cannot make a distinction between religiosity and radicalism, especially since many a mosque preacher works for the interest of this tendency. They serve the tendency by hurling its ideas at the people in the absence of anybody who would debate them. They believe that this is religion. I believe that the government must address the people's masses by way of the media and must present religion to them with a sound scientific explanation. This is the only way to confront these groups. It must be said here that the deluge is coming and that this tendency will burn us if we do not pay attention and besiege these groups. There is in the Islamic world today a maelstrom that is moving against the course of history. This maelstrom may succeed despite this. But ultimately, it will fail and will drown everything along with it. We are at a phase when Islam will either rejuvenate itself or it will face a critical situation. The past age was the age of ideology whereas this age is the age of technology. The coming age is the age of faith. This is what I have said in the book "The Mind's Harvest." If we rejuvenate Islam, then it will play an enormous role in the age of faith. I believe that there are forces working to strike Islam. These groups may make gains within [the next] 10 years. But in the end, they will fail, and they will destroy everybody with them because they are opposed to the movement of history.

[AL-SHIRA'] What is your opinion of the official approach to this tendency?

[Ashmawi] The government is not tackling the tendency soundly. It tackles the security aspect only. This may be due to the fact that some have infiltrated some state agencies or because the government is not aware of the nature of the conflict. The government deals with these groups' criminal activity with a security approach instead of confronting the groups intellectually, even though the groups refuse to engage in any debate. However, fighting the groups intellectually will expose them to the overwhelming majority of the people.

#### Religious Tendency's Future

[AL-SHIRA'] Now that this tendency has succeeded in reaching the parliament and in publishing papers, do you think this success will affect the groups positively in the future?

[Ashmawi] I see that they have reached the parliament with the government's wish, and the same applies to their acquisition of newspaper concessions. But it must be noted that behind this success there is financing represented by the investment companies. Striking these companies will affect the groups. However, their outward success will affect Egypt because they sow the seeds of national sedition between Muslim and Muslim and between Muslim and Christian. Moreover, they obstruct the law of progress, and they cause Egypt's intellect to be absent from the stage. They approach the 21st century with the mentality of the 14th century. All this will lead to fully destroying Egypt's entity unless we confront and



tackle this tendency because it has certainly concluded agreements with other foreign organizations or because it is exploited, unwittingly, to destroy Egypt. Look for those in the region who wish to destroy Egypt and you will find the connection between these groups and their intelligence agencies. Moreover, we must know that our war with Israel did not end in 1973 and that this war has started in another form. This is why they are participating in this war on Israel's side.

[AL-SHIRA'] What do you say to the parties that have allied themselves with this current?

[Ashmawi] All these parties are engaged in politics without foresight. They work for the short run. Each party chairman works for his life only. Any individual who gets to sit with these parties' chairmen realizes that their horizons are very narrow and that they do not comprehend what is happening in Egypt and in the Arab world. These chairmen do not understand history's movement. The danger and the disastrous malady is that each of them works for his own benefit, not for the benefit of the group, and for the present, not for the future.

[AL-SHIRA'] What is your opinion of the Islamic tendency's reiteration that Egypt's laws are infidel laws and that whoever rules in accordance with them is an infidel?

[Ashmawi] Islamic laws and legislation are found, as we have already said, in 80 verses out of all of the koranic verses. What should we do in the cases of espionage, conspiracy, rape, and sodomy? All these are crimes for which no penalty is provided [in the Koran]. So what should we do? Should we or should we not provide punishment for these crimes? They are people who do not understand. Moreover, the Koran itself adopted some laws that preceded it in the pre-Islamic era, such as the penalty for theft. Does this mean that the Koran is infidel?

#### Violence Phenomenon and Emergency Law

[AL-SHIRA'] What is your opinion of the true causes behind the political violence phenomenon?

[Ashmawi] This phenomenon dates back to the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first political Islam groups, in 1937. It was then that the idea of violence against society developed. When other groups emerged, they also decided that everybody else was an infidel. Thus, we entered into a maelstrom of violence founded on a religious basis whereas religion is innocent of such violence. The assassination of Muslim or of non-Muslim causes security to be shaken. Consequently, the groups weaken the nation's strength versus other nations because they destroy society. This serves the interest of foreign forces. I attribute the violence existing at present to the Muslim Brotherhood thought. The violence developed with this thought and it proliferated with and through this thought.

#### Emergency Law

[AL-SHIRA'] What is your opinion of the continued presence of the emergency law throughout this period?

[Ashmawi] These groups forcefully compel the government to confront them beyond the framework of the law. Radicalism dictates that governments confront it with special laws. Egypt cannot confront an extreme terrorist tendency with ordinary laws. If these groups adhered to legitimacy, they would force the government to adhere to the constitutional laws. They are the ones who force the government to use violence against them.

[AL-SHIRA'] But even though the emergency law has been applied, it has not stopped such acts.

[Ashmawi] Yes, but the absence of this law will cause the violence to turn into a cascade that is many times as strong it is at present. The law has been created to control crime, not to prevent it.

[AL-SHIRA'] As a judge, what are the most outstanding political cases presented before you and do you decide with your mind or your heart?

[Ashmawi] There are tens of cases but the most outstanding are the cases of the communist party, the Nasirist Organization, spying for Israel, the great escape, and a part of the Jihad case.

As for my decisions, I seek justice in them because I hold human rights sacred. Therefore, I think with my heart and feel with my mind. Consequently, my decisions end up being totally impartial.

[AL-SHIRA'] What is your opinion of the torture to which the religious tendency followers are subjected?

[Ashmawi] I believe that they are always opposed to the regime. This dictates that order be imposed among them. In light of this struggle, excesses do occur. But they are unacceptable and those who perpetrate them must be punished.

#### Editors Offer Analysis of Assembly Speaker Murder

##### Terrorism as Intimidation

91AA0030A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
17 Oct 90 p 7

[Article by Salah-al-Din Hafiz: "Terrorism and the Assassination of Democracy"]

[Text] Whatever associations the crime of assassinating Dr. Rif'at al-Mahjub may have had, and whoever the individuals may have been who planned, instigated, and carried it out, whether they were from inside the country or from outside, we have received the hideous, bloody message and know what it contains. Everyone knows what the reply to it is, although it certainly will not be by



the same dirty weapon, the weapon of treachery, assassination, and terrorism, despite the fact that divine and human law say the same thing: "In retaliation there is life for you." [Koran 2:179].

The masters of bloody terrorism chose Egypt specifically, so that the dirty war might begin from its stage, because Egypt is specifically intended; she deserved the punishment that they imagined would be sufficient to shake confidence and stability and muddy the atmosphere. We must first recognize that these bloody-handed persons have become skilled in committing what is known as "the total crime." They chose the victim carefully. He was a peaceful man of law and politics, deeply immersed in the soil of the society from which he emerged. He worked for it in his own way; many people supported him because of it and many people opposed him. But even those who opposed him never countenanced settling arguments with him by the machine guns of treachery. They appealed to the judgment of public opinion and dialogue, even if it was heated.

The masters of black terrorism were also skilled in choosing the scene and timing of the crime. They carefully arranged its commission and the escape. Whoever did it must certainly be a highly skilled, well-trained professional who belongs to agencies and gangs deeply rooted in crime—particularly crimes of assassination. How many such agencies and gangs there are, especially in the Arab world! How strongly they interlock, and how they cooperate with many similar agencies that are not merely Arab, but regional and international! They work like Chinese boxes, cooperating, coordinating, and exchanging information, operations, money, and weapons. All the professional terrorism gangs lack homeland and loyalty, except for a loyalty to cold-blooded, unemotional treachery and murder. It makes no difference whether they are Egyptian, Arab, Israeli, or international; whether they work on their own behalf, or as agents and hirelings.

Fine! Why Egypt in particular? Why just this timing? What is the aim?

We think that moving the scene of armed terrorist assassinations into the heart of Cairo has one specific aim, that of punishing Egypt for her "deed." Her deed is those publicly proclaimed principles, positions, ideas, and policies that make some people sleepless, threaten the interests of others, and challenge the ambitions of still others. Thus, it essentially makes no difference whether the bidding was in the country or abroad.

We can enumerate three main reasons that moved the dens of armed terrorism to punish Egypt at this particular time:

—First, to punish her for her firm, principled stands that cannot be bartered or bargained over; whether concerning Iraq's attack on Kuwait; Israel's savage repression of the Palestinians; or opposition to superpower schemes to swallow the Arab homeland, drain its resources, and reapportion their influence over it.

These principled positions of Egypt provoke all those who are profiting from the occupation of Kuwait and the displacement of its people. They provoke all the bloody persons who want to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque in order to build the purported temple. They provoke all those (Persians or Europeans) who lay wait for the Arabs, not to mention those who hate enlightenment and democracy.

—Second, to punish her for her continued pride in being an oasis of security and stability in a region awash with tension and anxiety about politics, security, society, and economy. How should she enjoy one night of stability, when others around her are being scorched by the flame of conflicts and tensions? Why should she appear before the world tranquil, quiet, and stable, even in the face of her many domestic incidents that become aggravated and violent, yet quickly fade away—incidents of sectarian unrest and the excesses of extremist groups? Why do tourists come only to her? Why do investors settle in her? Why do refugees of every race and color come to her? Indeed, why are the Shepherd's and Semiramis hotels, the sites of the hideous crime, full of Kuwaiti families fleeing from the oppression of their brother?

—Finally, to punish her for her democratic path, a path she is now proceeding to secure and strengthen, while regimes around her shake, governments are strained, and the spirit of one-man despotism spreads.

Egyptian democracy with its prevailing periphery is one of the most important targets for the bullets of terrorism—yesterday, today, and tomorrow. They hope to stop this rising tide and extinguish this radiant torch in a cloud-covered sky. We can be certain that there are people who are not happy with the winds of democracy in Egypt. There are those who do not want democracy to grow and send its roots deep into Egyptian soil and thence into wide expanse of Arab soil.

We believe that the crime of assassinating al-Mahjub in this way and at this time was a hideous, bloody, noisy terrorist message aimed at breaking the clear line of democratic practice in Egypt. Whether the message came from groups inside Egypt or outside Egypt, the result is the same, and the aim of punishing Egypt is the same, especially now that Egypt is in a transition period between two parliaments: one around which partisan and legal turmoil raged, leading to its dissolution on the same day as the crime, and another that has raised broad hopes that it will represent the real forces of the people through honest, clean elections.

I do not want to belabor this interpretation, which may appear to be a "conspiracy" interpretation; yet I find myself drawn to reading the motives, aims, and methods of the terrorist operation in a way that necessarily leads to the same interpretation.

The incident has now taken place. Blood has flowed on the normally calm Nile Corniche, turning it from a lovers' meeting place into a source of violence and

worries. Are we to accept it and surrender? Are we now supposed to avert our eyes from the crime of the occupation of Kuwait and ignore the crimes of Zionists in Jerusalem? Should we shut the windows of thought and enlightenment, suppress freedom of opinion and innovation, smash the beacons of freedoms and democracy, abolish parliament and political parties, confiscate newspapers, and break pens? If we did, would we be safe?

I do not think so. Indeed, I am sure that the opposite is true. All we can do is assert our true principles, strengthen our sound pan-Arab and national positions, and build our democratic path to be sturdier than it was and than it now is. We must shake off the flabbiness and laxity that have affected certain aspects of our life, encouraging terrorism to penetrate, execute, become bold, and pose a challenge—to hit and to run!

### Assassination Theories

91AA0030B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
17 Oct 90 p 7

[Article by Salah Muntasir in "Merely Opinion" column:  
"On the Verbal Stock Exchange"]

[Text] Stocks of the Iraq-Kuwait subject have fallen noticeably on the talk-and-comment exchange held daily among groups of friends or individuals at home, in the club, or in the coffee house.

To use stock exchange language, talk about the incident of Dr. Rif'at al-Mahjub's assassination has suddenly become a hot item, a primary center of interest on the verbal transactions market.

Among the points on which many people disagree is who was the murderer, and would it be better for him to be Egyptian or foreign.

I have heard the views of some people who prefer and even hope that the murderer is Egyptian. If the murderer is foreign, it would mean that Egypt's enemies have successfully infiltrated her security shield and have carried out their schemes. Holders of this opinion think that if it had to be, better that the criminals be from within us, rather than coming to us from abroad. Their success in infiltrating would mean that the shield still has holes.

Another view holds that it is preferable for the murderer to be foreign and non-Egyptian. For Egyptians to think about committing such crimes is basically against the Egyptian nature and temperament. It would in itself be a disaster if Egyptian thinking had reached such a degenerate level of criminality.

A third view, between the two previous ones, fears that the murder may have been Egyptian, but impelled from abroad. According to this view, this is an even greater disaster. It means that both the security shield and the Egyptian personality have been penetrated.

In any case, the murder, if he was Egyptian, can be narrowed down to the extremist groups; if he was foreign, to the groups impelled by Saddam Husayn or by Palestinian terrorists. Some people do not discount a role by the Israeli Mosad. However, the Mosad possibility is weak. The only support for it is the fact that in confronting crises, such as the massacre at al-Aqsa Mosque, the nature of the Israelis is to try to cover up the crisis with a sensational incident.

Regardless of whether one supported Rif'at al-Mahjub or disliked his highhanded way of managing parliamentary sessions, everyone agrees that if death is the certain end of every individual, the best end for Rif'at al-Mahjub was an end that united everyone around the man. Those who hated him are today not mentioning any mistake of his; those who liked him can ascribe no greater merit to him than that he died as a martyr for his country.

### IRAQ

#### Disadvantages of Current Iraqi Policy Examined

91ES0077Z Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish  
21, 22 Sep 90

Article by M. Ali Birand: "We Cannot Act as if Saddam Will Certainly Be Eliminated"]

[21 Sep 90 p 11]

[Text] The policy of the Turkish Republic with regard to Iraq has an aspect which, in our opinion, is extremely flawed and which may cause severe damage to our country if "what is expected does not happen" in the future.

All the statements that are being made and the public remarks of our senior officials to reporters is based on the assumption that "Saddam Husayn will be removed from power at any cost." Sometimes we even fail to restrain ourselves and say: "This problem cannot be ended unless Saddam is overthrown." In other words, Saddam must either be assassinated by the Americans or overthrown by an internal coup or fall victim to an accident. Moreover, Iraq must be crippled.

Turkey wants this because it sees an Iraq ruled by Saddam and the Ba'ath Party as a threat to itself and because it believes that the water issue may lead to major problems in the future.

This impression in Ankara was born out of the observation that Iraq acted as the lone standard bearer of the water issue last year and harassed Turkey by winning the support of the Arab world. Iraq thus gave indications that it would take a harsher approach in the coming years.

In addition, Saddam Husayn's occupation and subsequent annexation of Kuwait cannot be accepted or

applauded. Regardless of the causes and irrespective of what historical documents show, that act cannot be approved.

This is our departure point.

Now let us put aside the aforementioned principles, and let us look at the other face of the coin. In other words, even if we do not endorse or approve Iraq's action and even if we comply with the UN decision for an embargo to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to what extent is it in our interests to anchor our basic policy solely to the "assumption that Saddam will be overthrown"?

Would not a more careful and finely-calculated policy be more useful?

Because we must also think about the converse of this issue:

1. What will happen if Saddam is not overthrown, and we persist on this policy? Would we not find a more hostile Iraq confronting us?

2. Would an Iraq which is completely devastated and crippled by bombardment and whose leader has been overthrown be more favorable or more dangerous for Turkey?

Now let us seek answers to the two questions posed above.

Today Saddam is enjoying his strongest period. The Ba'ath Party and its leader are always bolstered in times of crisis; their authority is weakened in times of peace. Consequently today Saddam has the strongest support of his nation.

—One way to overthrow Saddam is his death as a result of massive American bombardment or in the course of a war.

According to observers, this possibility is steadily receding. Saddam's steps to protect himself and the growing preference of the world public to coerce Iraq through an economic embargo rather than a war are making the military option increasingly more difficult.

—A second way to overthrow Saddam is an internal coup.

This outcome appears to be much less likely than the previous one.

—That leaves only the economic embargo.

This option requires many months to produce results. In our opinion, the overthrow of Saddam by this method, though not impossible, appears to be less likely than the other outcomes.

Then should we not conclude: The overthrow of Saddam by one means or another is not at all "guaranteed," and eliminating Saddam from the Iraqi scene by firepower or an economic embargo is becoming more difficult every day?

We are not saying that he can remain unscathed. We are saying: "He may be eliminated" but it is becoming "more difficult."

That being the case, no matter how much Turkey wants to be rid of Saddam and no matter how favorable it finds that to its interests, would it not be better if it left a small exit for itself?

Rather than basing all of our calculations on an Iraq without Saddam, can we not, like the Westerners, adopt a less severe and destructive policy taking into account the possibility that Saddam may not be overthrown?

Can we not avoid postures that denigrate the person of the leader?

Of course we can, and we must think about this aspect of the issue.

Moreover, if we view the issue with cool heads, there are many other threats that await Turkey even after Saddam's departure. We will broach that issue in our article tomorrow.

#### [22 Sep 90 p 11]

[Text] We noted in our article yesterday that, even if we do not endorse what Saddam Hussayn has done and comply with the embargo fully, it would be erroneous to act on the assumption that "Saddam will definitely be overthrown." We also pointed out the advantages of a policy which takes into account the opposite possibility and which leaves an open door. More correctly, we expressed the hope that our basic policy be multidimensional rather than single-dimensional.

Today we would like to examine what problems our country would face if "Saddam is overthrown and Iraq is razed to the ground."

The probable scenario is: Iraq is crippled by American bombardment, it is crushed so severely that it will not be able to recover for many years, and Saddam Husayn is eliminated.

What circumstances would we face in such a situation?

It is certain that the vacuum to be left behind by Saddam will be filled by the Ba'ath Party which is considered the dominant power. Even if the military takes over the government formally, the Ba'ath Party will continue to function. That will create a new rapprochement between the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'ath parties (because Saddam has been eliminated). As a result the policies of the two countries will be coordinated.

From our standpoint it is this which poses a serious threat.

1. The first practical outcome of this rapprochement will be that Iraqi oil will be pumped to the Mediterranean through Syria (using the old pipeline) rather than through Turkey. In other words, Turkey will lose its leverage on Iraq as well as a major source of income.

2. Syria and Iraq will be able to coordinate all of their policies (because Saddam has been eliminated). They will form a joint front on the issue of water and will confront Turkey from a stronger position.

3. Syria and Iraq will act jointly on the "Kurdish" issue and will pursue coordinated policies. Moreover, the regime that will replace Saddam—as happened twice in the past—will choose to grant autonomy to the Kurds and to appease them. Saddam's hard-line policy will be replaced by a more compromising one—even though only temporarily. The country that will be most disturbed by that will be Turkey.

4. Such a rapprochement between Syria and Iraq will upset balances in the region and will create an alliance which Turkey does not want.

5. In the event Iraq is obliterated on a massive scale, Turkey will participate in the subsequent funeral, and the severe upheaval that will occur in the region will inevitably have an adverse impact on us.

What we want to say is that, although the removal of Saddam from office and the crippling of Iraq may, in some sense, appear to be "in Turkey's interests," the other prospect is not at all comforting and will bring with it perilous developments.

Moreover, even if Saddam is eliminated, one should not expect the regime that will replace him to withdraw from Kuwait immediately. Neither Saddam nor any other government will withdraw from Kuwait unless forced out by arms.

Then what must be done?

We must not base our policies on the assumption that Saddam will definitely be overthrown and that Iraq will be obliterated by massive bombardment.

The policy that is most suitable for Turkey's interests is to suffice with policies which will ensure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, without going to extremes and always leaving an open door.

Iraq must not be allowed to occupy and annex Kuwait and to upset the balances in the region. In our opinion—if Turkey's interests are considered—the way to do that is not the overthrow of Saddam and the destruction of Iraq.

Some of our friends have criticized us for saying that "we should get used to living with Saddam." They have said: "Turkey supports humanity and justice."

These are very nice and appropriate principles, but it is "interests" that determine relations between states. No state supports another because of "loyalty to principles"; they all act on the basis of whether their interests are served.

As we stated at the outset we are not proposing that Saddam be treated with tolerance or that his actions be

approved. Our objective is to show the reader that there is another "point of view" and to point out various alternatives.

Let us not forget that when this crisis is over all the outsiders will go home but we will stay here and will continue to be neighbors with Iraq. If we miscalculate today we will be in deep trouble when that happens.

**New Book on Kuwait's 'Restoration' Reviewed**  
91AE0028A Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER  
in English 17 Sep 90 p 6

[Article by Mustafa 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Najjar and Muhammed 'Abd-al Muttalib al-Baka'; reviewed by In'am N. Jabir]

[Text] "Kuwait, Part of Iraq" offers evidence to Iraq's right to Kuwait.

The first chapter, "Kuwait is Historically and Geographically Part of Iraq, presents evidence to facts that have always been overlooked.

The second chapter, "The British Stand Towards Iraq's Projects in its Southern Part," reveals Britain's policy which was meant to isolate Kuwait from its motherland, preventing any effort in the direction of restoring the part to its origin.

Chapter Three, "Kuwait is Part of the Administrative Order of Basra," provides documents and events which confirm the indisputable fact that Kuwait is a district affiliated to Iraq's southern province of al-Basrah.

Chapter Four, "The British Administration of Basra and the Iraqi reactions," deals with Kuwait after World War I when the Ottomans were defeated. The chapter studies this stage and the post-World War II period. The chapter also observes Iraq's reaction, both on the government and public opinion levels.

The chapter, moreover, speaks about the reaction of the people in Kuwait and their uprising to restore Kuwait, the part, to its motherland.

Chapter Five, "The Liberation of Kuwait and the Return to the Motherland," is devoted to the story of the end of the al-Sabah family who went too far in doing harm to the motherland. The chapter presents evidence to the treason of the al-Sabah family and the crime they perpetrated. It was that designed on Iraq which had come out the victorious from an eight-year war [sentence as published]. Besides, this chapter documents the events which took place in Kuwait on 2 August to lead to the toppling of the regime of the al-Sabah Regime."

The land of Kuwait which is part of the land of Iraq was subject, according to archaeological and geographic excavations, to the same changes. The environment, climate in addition to other factors of everyday life underline the fact that Kuwait is part of Iraq. This fact was never questioned throughout various historical ages.

Only when the coloniser cut it from the origin did that fact come to be suspected. The result was weak people in power and a prime aim to undermine the power of Iraq and its cultural role in the region in general and the Gulf in particular.

The book contains historical, political and demographic evidence in addition to documents that affirm the fact that Kuwait is part of Iraq.

## ISRAEL

### Oil Suppliers Getting Scarcer

91AE0016B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
6 Sep 90 p 3B

[Article by Yehuda Sharoni]

[Text] Toward the end of 1989, a mysterious tanker docked at one of the southern piers of the Port of Eilat. The tanker had transported fuel originating in Iran, a fact known to decisionmakers in Israel. Iranian authorities almost certainly also knew about Israel being the final destination of the cargo. The Iranian deal did not, at least, surprise elements close to the energy sector. They know that fuel, like money, has no odor, and in many cases, fuel cargoes originating in the states of the Persian Gulf have found their way to Israel. The routes by which oil reaches Israel are tortuous, inasmuch as, officially, Arab states do not sell oil to the state of Israel. Thus, the report published at the end of last week by the French LE FOUINE [as published] newspaper came as no surprise.

In the report, energetically denied by Energy Ministry leaders, it was claimed that Israel is acquiring oil shipments from Iran in exchange for which it is supplying Iran with other services. Reports of this type usually appear in the foreign press, because the local censure almost immediately rejects any news regarding Israel's oil procurement sources.

The problem of procuring oil has become especially sensitive as a result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Until then, dealers in the energy sector tended to define the world oil market as a buyer's market. In other words, the oil surpluses and the constant breaching of the production policy determined by the OPEC states, have caused oil supply to increase. In such a situation, buyers have more power than sellers, which is reflected in prices. Only two months ago, the price of a barrel of oil was \$14 (according to North Sea [Barnet] prices). Since then, prices have doubled; a barrel of North Sea oil now costs \$28. The sharp increase in prices has in turn caused a sharp increase in the prices of automobile gasoline and other refined products. In this situation, it would be convenient to implement reform in the fuel sector. A final goal being considered with regard to such reform is the possibility of completely eliminating Israel's contracted oil acquisitions. Until the mid-1980s, Israel procured about 70 percent of the oil it consumes through

contracts with three main states: Egypt, Mexico, and Norway. It made the balance of its acquisitions on the spot market. The spot market acquisitions enable the state to ensure supply sources over the long range. The reasons for that are the nature of the supply contract itself and the special relations that Israel has developed with oil suppliers.

### The Procurement Situation Has Changed Gradually

Toward the end of the 1980s, the situation changed gradually: Contracted oil acquisitions declined gradually, while spot acquisitions increased. The logic in this policy was that the price of oil obtained on the spot market is usually lower than that obtained under contracts, making acquisition on the spot market more worthwhile. Another reason is that the costs of transporting fuel acquired on the spot market were lower than the average costs of transporting contracted fuel acquisitions.

In 1988, more than one half of Israel's fuel acquisitions were on the spot market. Contracted acquisitions of oil in 1988 were distributed as follows: About two million tons of fuel were acquired annually from Mexico, about two million tons were acquired from Egypt, and 750,000 tons were acquired from Norway. The concept of the "buyers market" resulted in a decision in 1989 to reduce the volume of oil imports from Mexico to one million tons per year.

Toward 1990, the approach changed, and oil acquisitions from Mexico were increased gradually. Last year 55 percent of Israel's fuel acquisitions were contracted, and 45 percent were on the spot market. Last year, Israel imported crude oil amounting to 8,244 million tons. Of that amount, 4,650 million tons were acquired in contracted acquisitions and 3,594 million tons were procured on the spot market.

The contracted acquisitions were distributed as follows: 1,972 million tons from Egypt, 1,625 million tons from Mexico, 710 million tons from the North Sea (mainly from Norway), and 371,000 tons from west Africa (mainly from Cameroon). In the spot market, or what is called the free sector, the volume of acquisitions, as stated, was 3,594 million tons. A significant percentage of these acquisitions were finished products, i.e. distillates.

Of this amount, the refineries acquired 1,635 million tons, and the balance was acquired through the direct importation of crude oil (mainly by the Electric Company), gasoline, and jet fuel (by the Defense Ministry).

### The Identification of Additional Sources

Before and after Professor Yuval Ne'eman assumed the post of energy minister, the directors of the fuel companies made efforts to locate additional sources of oil supply for Israel. Thus, in recent years, Israel has sought to procure oil from such countries as Britain, the Soviet Union, Venezuela, and several other countries that

cannot be identified for security reasons. The Arab boycott continues to deter many states from selling oil to Israel.

When the previous energy minister, Moshe Shahal, visited the energy exhibition in Montreal about two years ago, he asked his British counterpart to examine the possibility of supplying oil to Israel. The British energy minister promised, with characteristic politeness, to examine the request. After several months, Israel's Energy Ministry, as expected, received a negative answer.

Israel's experience in procuring British oil has been negative. In the early 1980s, there was a sad episode in which Israel, through the Balkoil [as published] Company, sought to acquire North Sea oil from Britain's Sanoil [as published] Company. Because Britain does not sell oil to Israel, the Sanoil Company was misled when it was told that the final destination of the oil was not Israel. Britain uncovered the deception and impounded the oil shipment. Consequently, Sanoil submitted a huge claim of about \$30 million against the Balkoil Company and against the state of Israel. That episode shows that the price of "exercises" of this type is liable to be high.

In recent months, probes have been made regarding the possibility of acquiring oil from the Soviet Union. For this purpose, Avraham Agamon, the general manager of the Deleq Company, and representatives of other fuel companies visited Moscow. In the meetings that took place with the president of the National Fuel Company of the Soviet Union, a negative answer was received. The Russians explained that as long as the Soviet Union does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, there is no chance that it will sell oil to it.

The heads of the Sonol Company, and the outgoing general manager, Amir Maqov, during the past year, checked into the possibility of acquiring oil from South American countries. The contacts held for that purpose have not produced results as of yet. When a country is willing, despite everything, to sell fuel to Israel, in more than a few cases, it turns out that the quality of the fuel is not suited to the uses of the Israeli economy.

The greater stringency of environmental quality standards has forced Israel to identify crude oil of a better quality, thus turning oil procurement into a difficult mission.

#### **Arens' Performance at Defense Assessed**

91AE0023B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew  
10 Sep 90 p 7

[Article by Avy Benyahu]

[Text] A number of weeks ago, when the American Secretary of State's assistant for human rights, Richard Schifter, visited in Israel to prepare his yearly report, he made a statement that came as somewhat of a surprise to

senior Army personnel and journalists: "I find a broad, basic understanding with Moshe Arens regarding human rights issues in the territories much more so than I found with his predecessor."

Indeed, it should be acknowledged that this is not the same Arens. After almost three months at his post, the current defense minister is a source of weekly surprises in all matters related to the policy that he is making regarding the handling of the uprising in the territories and Palestinian residents.

#### **Fears Proved Wrong**

He has not conceded his clearly hawkish world view and belief in the whole land of Israel. He also persists in his refusal to include in the meetings that he holds in the territories, PLO members, persons who have served sentences, or the Jerusalem leaders of the Palestinians, whom he defines as "citizens of Israel." However, at the same time, Moshe Arens has been very careful to respect the residents of the occupied territories. He is dictating clear patterns of behavior to the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] regarding all aspects of the IDF's punishment policy, which has already shown signs of a change.

When he entered the defense minister's bureau in Tel Aviv for the second time, the IDF's general staff was somewhat dismayed. The senior officers' cadre, as well as politicians and journalists, feared that Moshe Arens would order the Army to "rout the uprising in the territories," even if Arens were to formulate such an order in his diplomatic language. They feared that he would be obligated to the Likud ministers and right-wing Knesset members, who so frequently used to criticize [former defense minister] Rabin, [chief of staff] Shomron, [former central regional commander] Mitzna', and the IDF's method for handling the intifadah. They also feared that Arens would bow to the settlers, and that a large blood bath would begin in the territories. But this has not been the case.

In his first day as defense minister, he turned his back on the soldiers of the IDF and went to visit the settlers. Through this measure, the publicity that accompanied the visit, and the promises made during it, Arens won over the hearts of the settlers. He paid them "lip service" by allowing them to activate a "civil guard" within the fences of a small number of settlements. He ordered the IDF to strengthen security on the main roads and to buttress the settlers' sense of security. At the same time, maximum efforts were directed at returning life in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to normal.

#### **Competition Among the Commands**

After Yitzhaq Rabin ordered the closure of the universities and colleges in the territories, Arens ordered their reopening. Since Arens became defense minister, not one house in the territories has been destroyed, compared to the many dozens of houses that were destroyed under his predecessor. A senior officer in the general staff with whom I spoke this week disclosed that Arens is not

permitting the regional commanders to destroy houses. In the worst cases, i.e., serious crime and bloodshed, he would authorize boarding them up.

Last week, he directed the IDF to act quickly to release 125 Palestinian minors held in IDF detention facilities in the territories. The military prosecutor's office is already handling their release on bond and expediting judicial proceedings related to them. In either case, within several days, most detainees between the ages of 14 and 16 will be back with their families, except those charged with throwing gasoline bombs.

The defense minister is also greatly encouraging the commanders of the IDF's southern and central regional commands to compete for the lowest number of injuries and violent incidents. The results of the past three months in all matters related to the uprising testify to success, although the causes of success do not inhere solely in the policy being made by the defense minister's bureau.

The discussions that Arens holds with Palestinian figures in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are characterized by a comfortable atmosphere of trust and honesty. The Palestinians claim that the discussions are actually purposeless, because the PLO is the Palestinians' sole representative, and the dialogue should therefore be held with it. However, Arens continues to hold these meetings, arguing that "their importance lies in their occurrence," and that a channel for meetings and dialogue must be maintained.

Elements in the civil administration and other security bodies who monitor the mood on the Palestinian scene and the sentiment of the residents relate in writing and orally that, among residents of the territories, there is great appreciation for the humanitarian measures being taken by Moshe Arens and his policy of returning life to normal. These elements believe that this appreciation also has an effect on the level of violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Moshe Arens is depicted in his current tenure as defense minister as a protector of human rights and as a liberal regarding many issues related to both the territories and his other purviews. Without any connection to the political views that he represents and the direction in which his movement and colleagues in the government are headed, his positive approach to human rights cannot be taken from him. He should be praised for it and encouraged in it.

After Yitzhaq Rabin ("you enter upon them and I will deal with the reporters and jurists"), Arens is a breath of fresh air.

### **Cabinet's Performance Appraised**

91AE0023C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
11 Sep 90 p 1B

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus]

[Text] The praises sprinkled on the three-month old government are early and completely groundless. True,

many things have happened that have been a blessing for it, but this government bears no responsibility for their occurrence. The Americans stopped pressuring the government to answer "yes" or "no" to Baker's questions. Iraq has replaced it as the bad boy of the Western World. The PLO has sided with the bad guys. The intifadah has lost the world's attention. The Labor Party, with all the beautiful people, is on its face. Levi is in America, Sharon is in Moscow, and Arens is in Germany—all of them being received with the honor of kings. Up to 1,000 new immigrants are landing in Israel each night. Zionism is really flourishing. The dilemma of whether to attack or not, who will fire the first shot, and so on, does not, for a change, preoccupy us. The Arab world is in distress, the Government of Jordan is on the verge of collapse. There is an enormous refugee problem that is not our problem, and Israel seems to be the only sane one in the region.

All of this is Shamir's rosy dream come true. All that he dreamed would happen is happening without him raising a finger. A low profile i.e., sitting quietly and not acting, is Shamir's natural condition. All gains come from the cosmos, not from man. How not to act without making an effort.

The government has been very lucky, but high marks are not given for inaction and a low profile. The government has not done anything. Its main success has been to sit comfortably in a good spot in the middle of the lake without making waves. It will probably remain there for the foreseeable future regarding the entire political process. There are thus grounds to assume that the political process is entering a deep freeze. Regardless of whether war breaks out in Iraq, solving the Palestinian conflict will not be the United States' greatest priority. That should serve the Shamir government's ideology well, provided that it does not develop (as happens to a government of this type) into adventurism if the predictions of the fall of the Hashemite royal house in Jordan come true.

The central problems on the agenda in the coming year will be employment and housing. These two socioeconomic issues are like a powerful time bomb, next to which the intifadah and the Palestinian problem together seem like child's play. Amazingly enough, the government is so enamored of its low profile image that it has also applied it to matters that require high-level action. The government has not made any serious economic decision. It faces a huge expenditure of 40 billion shekels within the next three years, but it remains unclear where the sum will come from. How will a quarter million new jobs be found? From where will investments come, and in what will they be invested? How will this entire economic effort be integrated with the elimination of duties in Europe in 1992? One asks all of the questions and is amazed at why the government is being praised for what seems in the meantime to be complete inaction in the above-mentioned areas at a historical time in the life of the state.

During the government's three-month existence, personal relations within it have worsened. There is tension between Levi and Arens, and between Levi and Sharon. Sharon is not talking with Nisim. Nisim is not talking with Moda'i, and Moda'i is not talking with most of the cabinet ministers. Everyone is focussed on appointing their confidants to key positions, and accumulating points toward the expected contest for the Likud's leadership.

The government's stability is also in question. The absence of Moda'i and his friends from the Knesset vote on the additional budget does not herald the government finishing out its days. Added to that is the crisis that is developing with SHAS [Sephardi Torah Guardians], Rehav'am Ze'evi's desire to bring down the government and advance elections in view of the polls that predict success for him in an election, and Tzomet's threat to leave the government if the electoral system is not changed. In such a situation, the government, under the orchestral baton of a prime minister who fell in love with a low profile even before it was considered an advantage, has not yet begun to seriously contend with absorbing the large immigration wave, the social disquiet, and its deficient economic policy. Burning, fateful problems still face the government. Inaction is certainly not the answer. This government deserves no compliments.

#### Deputy Ministers Described as Real Power

91AE0023A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
14 Sep 90 p 1B

[Article by Yo'el Marcus]

[Text] It is currently very difficult to tour the walls of Jerusalem without encountering a traffic light, a *falafel* stand, or a minister's aide. The latter usually has identifying features that are difficult to mistake: On the television screen, and in every photograph, the aide's head bobs behind the minister, in a good spot in the center. After government meetings, the aide carries the minister's briefcase and gets into the Volvo with him. Before MOQED [television news program], he straightens the minister's tie, and at the end of it, he whispers in his ear: "A great appearance. you were really strong." From his office, the aid can see the minister's door. He determines who shall and shall not enter it. He is the minister's screener, cheerleader, and Western Wall. He brings in and takes out [people to see the minister], and everyone shows up early at his door to become ingratiated with him.

The minister's aide has complete control over the minister's two most important extremities, his ear and his posterior, the former for whispering information and gossip, and the latter from which to defend the minister from his enemies and adversaries. If a minister has no enemies, trust the minister's aide to find them. The minister's aide is an impresario, director, prompter, guard, and adviser. He is in fact the minister's manager. Some are convinced that they invented the minister. The

aide's priorities are different from those of all other public workers. His first duty is to the minister. The state is his battle field. Everyone else is the enemy. Interior Minister Der'i's six aides [who came under a police investigation] proved that they are similar to a general staff patrol: Not only do they enjoy praise and power, they also fall on the altar of the state—excuse me, the minister.

The assumption that the ministers administer the state is a widespread error. The state is actually managed by 100 to 200 minister's aides, who manage the ministers, who manage the state. In contrast to a Hasidic court where there is a single Hasidic master, the minister's aide reigns in the minister's court, a beeper on his belt, and a plate of sandwiches on the table. The aides themselves have aides and secretaries. It is sometimes more difficult to reach them than the minister. More than once, I have been compelled to call ministers to ask to be connected with their aides, not always with success. Usually, the aides are more busy than their ministers.

This is the most powerful position in the state, a new type of aristocracy that has arisen over the last 15 years. Many are wayfarers born outside the governmental womb. They are not exactly officials and not exactly party workers. However, they are involved in everything. The most famous of them are Peres' "Blazers," so called, according to gossip, because they did not have enough time to change their suits between flights abroad. However, the ones wearing open-necked shirts and sandals among them also merit cars, car phones, desks with five telephones, two intercoms, facsimile machines, and positions of power.

According to government service regulations, a minister is entitled to bring with him his bureau chief (or aide), a spokesman, a driver, and a secretary. In actuality, a minister surrounds himself with an entourage that is four or five times larger. Peres, as prime minister, once had 14 aides. The way to circumvent the service regulations is to appoint ministerial aides to different governmental cadres. Yosy Beilin and Dan Meridor were government secretaries. However, in actuality, they were Peres' top aides. Yitzhaq Shamir has Yosy Ben-Aharon, who is in fact a director general, but in effect the prime minister's top aide. Shim'on Sheves was in charge of settlement, but actually helped Yitzhaq Rabin protect his rear guard in the party. There are aides for all purposes who do not receive a salary—friends, image helpers, and television aides. There are also mere advisors who bear titles; if that honor does not satisfy them, their positions apparently bring them income that does not appear in the state budget. The more aides a minister has, the greater his importance. How would a minister look sitting in forlorn fashion in his bureau, with only a secretary—excuse me, bureau chief—yawningly interposing between him and the simple people? The local version of the Bourbons' courts.

Not all ministerial aides are cut to the same measure. Some know less than they pretend to know. However,



some know the minister's thinking better than the minister. In fact, the minister does not know what his thinking is until he hears it in the morning from his aide. There are aides whose power lies in their image making ability. Some write speeches. Some have a wealth of general knowledge, knowledge of English, and the ability to manipulate the media. They are part servant and part master of the minister. Some aides serve as a charm to protect the minister, inspiring him with confidence and caressing his ego. Others free him from the yoke of tedious tasks. Nor are their motives uniform. Some aides remain in government service after cushy positions are arranged for them. Some of the ambitious among them view their ministerial positions as a spring board; some of these have become directors general, directors, Knesset members, and ministers. Then, there are greedy ones who leave the spotlight for lucrative private business; they suddenly appear in Rappaport Export-Import, buying, selling, and building villas and penthouses.

Israel's American dream has assumed a new form. "My son the doctor" is already passe. The Jewish Mother can now move on to the next dream: "My son the minister's aide."

#### **Israeli Expert Examines Implications of 'Awn's Fall**

91AE0063A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew  
19 Oct 90 p 12

[Interview with Dr. Qais Pierrot, a member of the Middle East circle at the University of Haifa by correspondent Dorit Gefen; date, place not given]

[Text] The fall of General Michel 'Awn to the Syrian offensive and his seeking refuge in the French embassy constitute a serious blow to the Christian forces that opposed the Ta'if agreement. Has the prospect been created in Lebanon, after 'Awn's fall, for a new internal order according to the Ta'if agreement under the compulsive protection of Syria? Who are the elements likely once again to rekindle the civil war in Lebanon? What are the prospects that the Land of Cedars will finally get on track for a relatively peaceful existence? Is it possible to overcome the ethnic tradition in Lebanon, with all its complexity and conflicts? Will the Christians reconcile themselves to the erosion in their position? We talked about these questions and others with Dr. Qais Pierrot, a member of the Middle East circle at the University of Haifa, who specializes in the issue of Lebanon.

[Gefen] Is the fall of Michel 'Awn really a turning point in Lebanon?

[Qais Pierrot] Yes. First of all it is a turning point from the point of view of the government superstructure, which is now undergoing change. Up till now it had been Michel 'Awn who delayed the implementation of the changes decided upon at Ta'if which were intended to establish a new pact or agreement between the various parties and factions in Lebanon. It is true, of course, that the Ta'if agreement was forced, but it has prospects.

[Gefen] And 'Awn constituted an obstacle to implementing the agreement?

[Pierrot] Yes.

[Gefen] And now it will be possible to fully implement the agreement?

[Pierrot] It is hard to say that the agreement will be fully implemented, but at least formally it was 'Awn who generally delayed its implementation.

[Gefen] What is in the Ta'if agreement?

[Pierrot] The Ta'if agreement is, in fact, a continuation of previous agreements going all the way back to 1943. What is special about it is the new division of parliament. It will be 50 percent Muslim and 50 percent Christian; i.e., a change favoring the Muslims. But you have to remember that in the overall definition of Muslims, it is not a question of one monolithic group. The Sunnis and Shiites are still two separate, different communities, not only from a social and religious viewpoint, but also from a political viewpoint. The Christians are also split, but after the civil war, they are beginning to show signs of consolidation into one community, even though there are differences of opinion between those who are Orthodox and the Maronites.

[Gefen] What was special about the Syrian attack and the fall of 'Awn as compared to foreign intervention in the past?

[Pierrot] The successful timing. Al-Assad's choice of this timing was perfect from his point of view. He exploited the crisis in the Gulf, and the position of the U.S. and the West very well. He understood that Israel was too neutralized to respond, as were other elements, and he therefore succeeded. Second, the intra-Lebanese forces were, in fact, also neutralized in struggles between Samir Geagea and Michel 'Awn. They had made an attempt before on the life of 'Awn.

#### **The Nature of the Temporary Compromise**

[Gefen] When people talk about Lebanon, it seems that it is all *deja vu* but the blood feud and controversies always remain. Is the present Syrian intervention just another episode in Lebanese history, or is there a chance that it will finally bring about internal quietude?

[Pierrot] In Lebanon there is no prospect for a complete and decisive solution. It is in the nature of Lebanon for crisis to break out, from which they move to compromise. None of the past crises was solved except temporarily by compromise. It was that way after the 1952 crisis, after the 1958 crisis and so on after that. All of the crises ended in temporary compromises...until the next crisis. We might say that compromises are what have made Lebanon what it is. It began back in 1861. It is doubtful if there could be an overall solution. You have to understand that the differences are not just in the ruling structure, not just there do you find the ethnic

division. Ethnicity characterizes the structure of Lebanese society. It is seen in every area of life, in society, in culture, in economics and in education. Even if the government structure could be changed and its ethnic division done away with, it would still be impossible to change the basic structure. Ethnicity is rooted in Lebanese society. From that point of view, Lebanon is different from other countries. All of its history is built on crises and compromises between the various communities and groups living in Lebanon.

[Gefen] What will the position of the Christians in Lebanon be now? In the past they had a preferred position, and it seems that they are losing it. Is the fall of 'Awn a kind of "final nail in the coffin" of the Christians in Lebanon?

[Pierrot] The Christians have, in fact, lost the advantage they had in the past. There has been an erosion in their position, for which the reasons are demographic. Today they are a minority of the population as compared to the Muslims. Further erosion has come about because of the conflict between the various Christian factions. In my estimation, the turning point in their position was in the military defeat they suffered in 1983 in the Shouf Mountains. You also have to consider the new leadership that has arisen among the Christians. They are young people who don't accept the tradition of compromises. I am talking about 'Awn, Geagea and 'Eli Hobeiq. They are completely different from the veteran Christian leadership of Gemayel the father or Faranjieh—who knew how to compromise. The appearance of a militant leadership among the Christians, influenced very much by the period of the civil war, has acted with violence to achieve its goals at any price. The leadership reflected by Michel 'Awn, has also hurt the Christian position.

[Gefen] Isn't there now a danger that the Christians will be abandoned to acts of revenge by the Muslim communities?

[Pierrot] I don't think so. But what will happen from now on in Lebanon depends on how able the country, the government, is to rein in the forces that could undermine it, especially in Beirut. If the government does not have power, the militias will continue to act and not much will change. As to revenge, in Lebanon revenge is not a private problem. All the groups in Lebanon are today interested in living in peace, but also in victory. That is to say, everyone wants to come out a winner. Beyond that, you have to remember that the Syrians are there.

[Gefen] Will the Christians reconcile themselves to the Ta'if agreement?

[Pierrot] From the beginning not all of them opposed it. Except for 'Awn and small militant groups, most of the Christians were reconciled to the agreement. The Christians understand that if they don't accept a 50-50 compromise in parliament, they will be compelled in the future to accept something worse.

[Gefen] Isn't there the danger that a militant leader will emerge to take 'Awn's place?

[Pierrot] There is no great likelihood that a leader like Bashir Gemayel or Michel 'Awn will emerge now, who could unite the Christians around him. The first reason is the fact that the Syrians rule in Lebanon—not only in the Muslim areas, but in the heart of Eastern, Christian, Beirut.

[Gefen] Couldn't violent opposition to the Syrians arise among the Christians?

[Pierrot] Someone might try, but the Syrians will not sit idly by. They will not permit a Christian leader to unite the Christians against the Syrians. Among the current Christian leaders, I also don't see anyone who could do that.

### The Syrians Know How To Get the Job Done

[Gefen] Is Lebanon today a Syrian protectorate; hasn't it, in fact, lost its independence; isn't Hrawi a puppet president?

[Pierrot] I wouldn't say that Lebanon is no longer a country. The Syrians know how to get the job done. They are after one main objective—leaving Lebanon under their influence. They will prefer to intervene from a distance, without giving the Lebanese the feeling that they mix in on every internal issue. President Hrawi is no different than all other Lebanese presidents. He is no different from Sargis or Faranjieh. The function of the president in Lebanon was always to compromise between the various factions and communities. A successful president is one who can solve the problems of all the groups in the country, who stands above the factional and communal conflicts. I imagine that President Hrawi will try to achieve that kind of position and will compromise and bridge the various streams. That has been the function of the every Lebanese president since the independence of Lebanon.

[Gefen] What are the prospects for the "Pax Syriana" holding for at least a long time rather than being just a fleeting episode?

[Pierrot] That depends on a number of factors. First, the Syrians, of course. They will remain dominant; they will try, of course, to prevent conflicts between the different streams. I don't believe they will try to ferment new civil war in Lebanon. Since that depends first and foremost on the Syrians, then it certainly depends on the entire Middle East and on developments in the Gulf. If there are no unexpected upheavals in the area, there is a chance that we will see several years of calm in Lebanon.

Nevertheless it should be pointed out that within Lebanon there are still forces that want to undermine the Ta'if agreement. There are three main elements: The Hizballah, who want a fundamentalist, Islamic Lebanon; the Druze, Gumbalat, who accept the agreement but don't feel it goes far enough since it has not changed the

general picture. The desire of the Druze is to get to a point where Lebanon will not be an ethnic country. The reason is simple. Within the ethnic division, they are the smallest minority. The third element is the Christians, the Christian forces, who want to turn the clock back, to get back for themselves the political piece of the pie that they lost. It may be that if they have the opportunity, they will try to do something, but for the moment their position does not allow that.

### Strategist Refutes Defense, Economic Worries

91AE0023E Tel Aviv DAVAR (Weekend Supplement)  
in Hebrew 14 Sep 90 pp 14-15

[Remarks by Brigadier General (reserves) Dr. Hayim Yavitz, by correspondent Yisra'el Landers; place and date not specified]

[Text] Dr. Hayim Yavitz has a sort of contagious optimism that transforms dangers into opportunities and obstacles into challenges. War in the gulf? There are no grounds for fear: Saddam Husayn is an inflated balloon. The enormous difficulties posed by the absorption of a massive wave of immigration? Not to worry, the difficulty will serve as a lever for growth and for it to flourish. One must only do what is required by the strategy that he proposes, and everything will be for the better, and moreover a blessing and a dizzying success.

Do not fear Jews, act wisely (i.e., according to Dr. Yavitz's advice), "and the rugged shall be made level and the rough places a plain." Hold your heads high, because a bright future awaits you around the bend.

Brigadier General (reserves) Dr. Hayim Yavitz, who has dealt with strategic planning his entire life, is not among the experts who are afraid to express a resolute opinion. In our discussions, no question was raised that compelled him to respond: "That is outside my field," or "it is difficult to know," or, "the coming days will tell." His lexicon does not include such expressions as perhaps, apparently, it seems to me, if I am not mistaken, and on the one hand and on the other hand. Everything, or almost everything (I am not a Yavitz), is clear and understood; only an imbecile would fail to understand. Every stage of his explanations ends with a smile, which means: Is it not as clear as day, and, is it possible otherwise?

Nonetheless, Yavitz recognizes the limits of prediction. "It is impossible to predict events. Only the directions in which existing processes are developing can be predicted. To limit the danger of errors as much as possible, the majority of the factors in a given field of inquiry must be taken into account." The advanced education that he acquired in France helps him in analyzing and weighing social processes. He studied sociology, international relations, and strategy at the Sorbonne, receiving a doctorate there for a dissertation on relations between the major powers.

### The Locomotive Is on the Way to Success

Whoever inclines to invalidate his predictions as flights of a fertile imagination should know that he has frequently been proven correct. This is understood, it turns out, not only by his superiors in the army and the security system, but also by whomever has needed his services after he was discharged in 1983 and turned to private business. Together with Dr. Ben-Tziyon Nave, the former general director of REFA'EL [Combat Means Development Authority] and Scitex, and Colonel (reserves) David Binya, a former senior intelligence officer, he is the owner of the Bina Company, which, Yavitz states, is concerned with initiating, implementing, and monitoring joint projects between industries and information centers in Israel and industrialized Western countries, mainly in the information-rich branches, "not in the fields of security and weapons sales," he emphasizes. If the elegance of Bina's offices on the second floor of the IBM building in Tel Aviv can serve as evidence, Bina's clients are willing to pay a considerable amount for the advice, appraisals, and plans of Yavitz and his colleagues.

Yavitz has spent 29 of his 53 years in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], and was, among other things, in charge of appraising the national situation for AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence]. He served as the IDF's attache in Western Europe and was responsible for strategic planning centers in the national security unit. He participated with Professor Yehezke'el Dror, and Professor Amnon Yugav in the steering team for planning the IDF's future battle-field disposition. For several years, he served as a political and security strategy adviser to subcommittees of the Knesset foreign relations and defense committee. He also exploited his experience in strategic planning in the public post of coordinator of the Forum for Strategic Thinking about the Future of the Economy and Industry in Israel, which is currently publishing its recommendations.

In contrast to those who look with fear upon the growing wave of immigrants, Yavitz thinks that this wave is the greatest miracle that has happened to the Jewish people and the greatest asset that has fallen to its lot since the establishment of its sovereignty in 1948. The Jewish population is likely to increase by about 20 percent over the course of five years, and this increase should be a lever for the country to flourish. Immigration is producing extraordinary demands that go beyond current needs, requiring a structural change in society and economy, which is exactly what we need. Without immigration, we would continue our normal existence without being emboldened to implement the necessary changes. Now, recognizing that we have no alternative, we will implement these changes. We will be obliged to build 350 housing units per day for immigrants and young couples. We will be obliged to build highways, trains, electricity grids, and other infrastructural systems. We will be obliged to provide for other needs that arise from the development of the infrastructure. If we

do this with wisdom, we will find that we will have at our disposal a first-rate strategic resource.

In the next five years, we will have to implement projects costing \$30 billion to \$40 billion. These projects will be a business attraction for foreign governments and multinational companies. For example, the Government of France could provide \$3 billion in credit for 20 years, so that a French company could build a rapid train network in Israel. The company building the network could agree that two-thirds of the work and production can be performed in Israel. One half of the remaining third could be offset by the transfer of Israeli knowledge and technology.

Yavitz becomes excited as he describes the plans that he is devising. His face glowing with happiness, he explains: Projects worth \$30 billion to \$40 billion would mean, economically, a three-fold increase in production. Obviously, our ability to repay our debts would also increase, and we would be able to increase the foreign debt at a rate that exceeds 20-25 percent, which is the expected population growth rate. That means full employment in the economy, which would grow and move toward economic independence. Therefore, nothing justifies fears that the immigrants would be a burden. That is nonsense. "Immigration will be the locomotive that leads the state to success in the struggle for socio-economic independence. Consequently, we must not slow the rate of immigration, but increase it. The immigrants, with their education and experience, in addition to the young generation of IDF discharges, are a great human resource. The developed state of Israel, which is no longer a desert pear cactus, as it was 40 years ago, will be able to exploit this resource to boost growth.

#### The Political Stock Exchange Will Collapse

The question is whether the leadership will succeed in exploiting this opportunity. However, at precisely this time, the governing system has become bankrupt. What happened first in the areas of defense and the economy is now happening in the area of politics. Following the Six Day War, we inflated the value of defense stocks more than their real value, until the defense stock exchange collapsed in the Yom Kippur War. Later, we inflated the bank shares until the securities exchange collapsed ten years later. The same thing is happening with the political shares of Knesset members. These shares have been inflated beyond their real value. Each Knesset member, who is considered a tongue of the scales [a small faction that joins a large faction, giving it a majority], exaggerates his own value, paving the way for corrupt acts that provoke public feelings of repulsiveness and aggressive tendencies. "The members of Knesset cannot hide their heads in the sand. The clock is ticking. The day is not far when the political stock exchange will also collapse. In such a crisis, there might be violent acts that could hurt Knesset members and other elected public officials. Therefore, it is necessary to change the system of government while there is still time to stop the power games of Knesset members and to prevent the Haredi

[Orthodox] minority from gaining influence that is out of proportion to its real power in the public."

Yavitz does not belong to any party at present. In the past, he was a member of the Labor movement. However, he became disappointed with it, because it deviated, he believes, from its historical path. "If you ask about my views, they correspond to those once supported by the Unity of Labor Party, which is to say the activist, realist, and pragmatic Labor movement."

In his remarks about the political crisis that is expected to arise from the lack of confidence in the leadership, Yavitz's good mood becomes turbid, but he immediately recovers: "I am pessimistic about the present, but very optimistic about the future."

He believes that fears of Saddam Husayn's power and threat are baseless. The United States is striving not only for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, but also for the elimination of Saddam and the neutralization of his threatening power. This goal can be achieved only through force. When the time comes, the American administration will attempt to subdue the Iraqi Army quickly, and with elegance and strength, to coin the phrase Bar-Lev used on the eve of the Six Day War.

[Landers] Is that possible?

[Yavitz] The Iraqi Army is a balloon. If the force opposing it acts exclusively according to the book, without any military genius, it could totally break the enemy's resistance in 48 hours, sustaining damage that would not be on an irreversible scale."

[Landers] What does that mean regarding the volume of losses?

[Yavitz] If there is no real failure, only several hundred Americans would be hit. The Iraqi Army would break up as the Egyptian Army broke up in 1967. The Iraqi Army has been inflated beyond all proportion because of the number of its soldiers and the quality of its weapons. However, in order to activate everything in unison, a comprehensive organic capability is required, which the Iraqis lack. The average Iraqi commander cannot organically employ more than three tanks in one strike. The rest is all quantitative mass. If Western forces fight according to the organic outlook of the modern battlefield, the Iraqi Army's balance will be upset within a very short time, and it will flee. The American ground army indeed lacks experience in desert regions, and it moves very awkwardly compared to the Marines, the Navy, and the Air Force. Therefore, superiority will be obtained by means of naval and air power, whereas the ground force will advance to exploit success, led by a representative Arab spearhead that will dictate the Iraqis' surrender."

[Landers] Will the Iraqis not use unconventional weapons?

[Yavitz] They do not have a nuclear potential, only preparation toward achieving such a potential. Their

chemical weapons pose a danger primarily to themselves, because they could explode before they manage to launch them. Our intelligence and operational sensitivity will enable us to surmount exceptional cases of bombing and missile launch attempts. Believe me, the Americans are producing much propaganda regarding the Iraqi force to justify the enormous multforce deployment to eliminate a cockroach such as Saddam Husayn and his Army."

### The Price of Victory

[Landers] If the Americans see a need to mobilize such a large force against the Iraqi Army, how could Israel withstand an Arab front that would include the Iraqi Army?

[Yavitz] In the future battle field, quantity will not be the determining factor. Rather, the determining factor will be the quality of soldiers, combat means, and organic employment capability. Israel has a great advantage in this area. It is understood that all of this is contingent on alertness, readiness, and preparation to destroy forces in a precise manner. Regarding the Iraqi Army, an expeditionary force of one size or another, not the entire Iraqi Army, would oppose us. We should know that the IDF is built for the next war in an outstanding manner. If a war breaks out, the IDF will win it. The enemy knows that. Therefore, war has yet to erupt.

[Landers] Were you among the critics who argued that the IDF adheres to an obsolete security outlook that would damage its capability in the battle field?

[Yavitz] The entire debate was over the price of victory. According to the old outlook, we would strike our heads against the wall by deploying masses to overcome the enemy's defensive obstacles. The others and I argued that the human price we would pay if we based ourselves on this concept would be inestimably greater than the price we would pay if we based ourselves on the future battle-field concept. According to my outlook, we must be arrayed to use sophisticated means capable of striking the enemy with great accuracy at ranges that are greater than the ranges from which the enemy can strike our forces. In this way, heavy losses can be inflicted on the enemy without taking risks. In the past five years, the IDF has to a large extent progressed toward this concept, although, in my opinion, progress is still too slow. However, I should indicate that I do not believe in push-button wars. We cannot obtain battlefield superiority, force the enemy to pay the price of war, or dictate a cease-fire to the enemy unless we shift the war to the enemy's territory. Therefore, I still think that the plane and tank will continue to have a vital role in the next 30 years.

[Landers] What slowed progress toward adopting a new security concept?

[Yavitz] The general staff's preoccupation with current security precluded it from being able to devote sufficient attention to the future. It would be desirable for the

deputy chief of general staff to be a sort of chief of general staff-designate, who would one day command the army that he builds. Other factors in the slowdown include budgetary constraints. Restructuring the Army while strictly maintaining constant readiness for a war on the condition of absolute superiority over the enemy entails very large expenditures. It seems that it is worthwhile to spread the costs over a long time. However, upon calculation, it becomes clear that if we shorten the period of the cost spread, the total cost of defense is lower.

Yavitz differs with the view that the end of the cold war and the formation of a new world order are diminishing Israel's strategic value. The countries of both the Eastern and Western blocs belong to Western civilization, and they recognize that Islamic fundamentalism is currently the greatest threat to world peace. Israel is performing a service for Western civilization by taking a stand against this threat. In the new world order, there is a growing trend toward stability and order. In the past, the Soviet Union and China attempted to undermine stability to increase the demand for military aid. By supplying such aid, they promoted their expansion. They are now trying to rehabilitate their economies. For that purpose, they require stability and cooperation with the West. Therefore, the two superpowers have an interest in forming political arrangements that will relieve tension and ensure stability in sensitive areas." [first quotation mark omitted in the original]

How is it possible to progress toward a settlement in the Middle East?

In Yavitz's opinion, the Arab countries, not the Palestinians, are the gate to peace. There is no need to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state, but action must be taken to resolve the distress of the Palestinians. For this purpose, he recommends a plan that calls for cantons in which the Palestinians would have autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs. He does not believe that peace can be obtained without an agreement with Syria. In negotiations with Damascus, an agreement on control in Lebanon must also be reached. "Syria, beyond the shadow of a doubt, has a central role in guaranteeing stability in Lebanon in the framework of relative independence. This can be obtained only through cooperation with Israel and compromise with it regarding the Golan Heights."

In general, Yavitz states: I fully believe that Israel has won its struggle for existence. It must now also succeed in its struggle for political, economic, and social independence. That struggle, which Israel can also win, requires other approaches and starting points. Yavitz again smiles optimistically, as he did so many times in the conversation. In times when there are obviously many causes for concern, you hope that his optimism is justified.

### 1,000 Days of Intifadah Termed 'Wasted Opportunity'

91AE0016A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew  
7 Sep 90 p 14

[Article by Pinhas 'Inbari]

[Text] The thousandth day of the intifadah closed a long circle that began a month before the intifadah erupted on 9 December 1987. This circle began with the nocturnal glider operation by Ahmad Jibril [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command] immediately after the Arab summit in Amman. Perhaps it even began six months before that with the escalation of the Islamic Jihad's activity in the Gaza Strip.

New light is shed on the beginning and current direction of the intifadah by PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat's clear support of Iraq, his removal of his "mediator" mantle, and his explanatory remarks to the effect that he is in the same ranks with the enemies of imperialism and will always be found on the other side of the barricade, opposite Israel and the United States.

The intifadah did not begin as an uprising, but as a jihad based on the Islamic Jihad's formula, or an armed struggle based on Ahmad Jibril's formula. The Islamic Jihad's actions in Gaza on the one hand, and the glider operation of Ahmad Jibril's General Command on the other hand, were the true harbingers of the intifadah. Nonetheless, FATAH [Palestine Liberation Movement] managed to intervene in the intifadah's initial stages to divert the course of the events so that it became a sort of public-political struggle involving minimal use of violence, and a channel, not for the liberation of Palestine as Jibril and the Islamic Jihad would have it, but as a channel for dialogue with Israel in some framework, such that the framework subsequently crystallized as the elections plan and the Baker plan.

The Palestinians recognized Israel, disassociated themselves from terror, and produced the slogan: Two states for two peoples. According to this criterion, if the intifadah progressed as it should (according to FATAH's criteria), the Palestinians would enter into America's area of influence, which would necessarily lead to the start of a U.S.-PLO dialogue. It is instructive to read remarks made by Dr. Talal Naji, Ahmad Jibril's deputy in the General Command, at a conference in Tripoli in northern Lebanon in April of this year (the remarks appear in the organization's mouthpiece, ILA AL-IMAM, 26 April, No. 2,037). Naji explained that the glider operation was needed as a response to the proceedings and results of the Arab summit in Amman. According to him, the Arab regimes tried to diminish the Palestinian problem at that summit, and they dealt on the whole with the gulf war, then between Iraq and Iran. Naji maintains that 'Arafat abetted this trend at the Arab summit. "Accordingly, we in the General Command decided to restore to the problem its lustre and central position, and to reinstate it as a top priority, not from a

local point of departure, but from a pan-national, pan-Arab point of departure (so we decided on the glider operation)."

The intifadah actually broke out as an emotional, spontaneous explosion of embittered masses. However, had it not been for the meddling hand from abroad, perhaps it would have erupted later. The glider operation was intended to rouse the Palestinians in the territories and to move them toward armed struggle.

However, the intifadah was not understood as such in Israel, due in no small part to the hysteria of the settlers, who regarded the threat posed by Palestinian rock-throwing as equal to that of a nuclear bomb. The defense minister at the time, Yitzhaq Rabin, brutally suppressed the uprisers, and it is no coincidence that he shook hands with Rabbi Levinger, who demonstrated on the eve of the intifadah next to Dehayshah [refugee camp], a rock in his hand, demanding that a heavy hand be used against the stone-throwers.

Rabin was late in understanding the political message of the intifadah, namely that it is actually an alternative to armed struggle (did the Americans finally enlighten him?). He also failed to draw all of the necessary conclusions from the little he belatedly understood. Until his last day as defense minister, Rabin maintained that the political process is only a tool to suppress the intifadah. He did not want to hold discussions with proud Palestinians, but with servile, humiliated Palestinians.

The intifadah thus failed as a tool to advance a bilateral political process between the Palestinians and Israel. This failure is due in large measure to the fact that the Palestinians did not encounter an Israeli partner. Some Israeli columnists, who are not on the extreme right, are even now sighing as they say: If only the PLO had recognized Israel and abandoned terror. That sentiment is precisely the PLO's problem, namely that although the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist and declared its desire to renounce terrorism, many Israelis had trouble psychologically digesting this revolution in the PLO.

The intifadah had lost momentum before the crisis in Kuwait. As a result of the intifadah, many were killed, disabled, and arrested, the economy was severely damaged, and education suffered dreadfully. The Palestinians stopped for a brief rest. Then, the gulf crisis occurred, and it became clear that 'Arafat had drawn far-reaching conclusions from the failure of the intifadah: He no longer has confidence in the power of the Palestinians alone, but now relies on Iraq's military power. He has also added the term "jihad" to "intifadah," and he has found no reason to censure or act against terror. He has in fact joined forces with the instigators of the intifadah, the secular and religious members of the rejectionist front, and he has returned to their starting point.

'Arafat's good friend Saddam Husayn is generally opposed to the intifadah. He does not think that the Palestinians should separate themselves from the overall

struggle of the Arab nation. When the uprising broke out in southern Jordan, the PLO was at pains not to call it an "intifadah," a term that is supposed to refer to a specific, Palestinian process. Saddam Husayn has already called the invasion of Kuwait an *intifadah*, and the Palestinians applauded.

The *intifadah* is now an empty vessel devoid of content. The unified command's fliers continue to be published, each numbered in sequence. Strikes and semi-strikes continue, but without momentum and enthusiasm. As the volume of public incidents in the *intifadah* declines, the number of explosions on street corners and beaches in Israel is increasing.

In sum, the *intifadah* is a story that went sour, not only for the Palestinians, but also for us.

### Country Urged To Join New World Order

91AE0016C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew  
7 Sep 90 p 7

[Commentary by Gadi Yatziv]

[Text] The need to now establish a new political order in the Middle East, parallel to a solution of the gulf problem, is not an arbitrary caprice of Western leaders or an American attempt to exploit a future success. "The new political order of the Middle East" is now an objective need to the extent that, without it, any solution to a problem stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be virtually devoid of significance.

The problem caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is neither the arbitrary suspension of Iraq's independence of Kuwait, nor the rise in oil prices, nor even the danger to Israel's security. Rather, the problem is the formation and growth of a regional military power whose discretion and policy are cut off from the international political order and are not dependent, relatively speaking, on the situation of the rest of the world. This has not happened since the end of WWII, and it cannot be permitted to happen in an oil-saturated region that supplies the rest of the world with energy.

Iraq's growth as an independent, regional power was possible only because it occurred in a transition period between the breakup of the old world order and the creation of a new world order. The Soviet Union has in fact relinquished its influence in the region, having retracted its wings, which were spread over its client states. The United States, on the other hand, has not yet decided its position vis-a-vis all of these states, nor has it formulated rules of behavior that would link the region's countries to the new international system.

It should be remembered that, until recently, nothing could be put up or taken down in our region except as a function of the international system of relations, and as a result of the balance of forces or the content of compromises between the two superpowers. Israel could not reap the fruits of its victory in Operation Qadesh and

in the Six Day War, because the major powers did not allow it to do so. The Soviet air train on the seventh day after the outbreak of the Six Day War, and the American air train on the third day of the Yom Kippur War, came only to prevent the client state of the rival power from determining political developments by force. The withdrawal of Israel from Sinai on three occasions, and the cease-fire at the end of the Yom Kippur War symbolized the fact that the power of a regional force is very limited regarding political gains.

### The Role of "Staff of Wrath"

In addition, the fact that there has been no forced peace in our region in all of these years does not testify to the impotence of the superpowers, but to the fact that this state of affairs has been well integrated, as a reasonable compromise, in the bipolar world order.

In the old order, Israel was assigned the honorable role of being an American "staff of wrath" vis-a-vis the Arabs. In this role, Israel had to be strong, stubborn, and fortified, and it had to have a good hold on the territories occupied in the Six Day War. It was forbidden to annex these territories. They could be returned only after the Arabs reconciled with the United States and crept from the Soviet to the American area of influence. The strengthening of Israel placed the Arabs in a position of political impotence and ongoing frustration in the light of their inability to regain the territories, although they knew that their goal could be achieved if they only abandoned their alliance with the Russians. The Soviet Union was less influential in our region. It was able to provide the Arabs with economic and military rehabilitation, national pride, and hope for better days, but it could not give them real political gains in territorial terms.

Egypt's President Sadat was the first Arab to understand the significance of the situation. He exchanged one superpower patron for another, and moved westward, receiving the Sinai peninsula in exchange. 'Arafat, in his foolishness, understood the situation too slowly, too late, and too partially. He began to move in the right direction only two years ago. Now, he has spoiled the momentary breakthrough in understanding that overcame him in 1988.

### The New Winds From the West Must Be Allowed To Reach the Middle East

Saddam Husayn deluded himself into thinking that it was possible to exploit the power vacuum that developed in the region. The United States was expelled from Iran, and it seemed to him that Iran was open to a successful blitzkrieg. When that long war ended, he was left with a large army; he discerned above his head that Soviet wings were gradually folding and destined to disappear. He began to diversify his sources of arms. He developed unconventional weapons and became convinced that he was outside both the dread of the Americans and the



protection of the Soviets. This was an error in perception. It is currently impossible to be outside the protection of a superpower, unless you are an agreed part of the international order and play the game according to its rules. The countries of the world are now interdependent to such an extent that almost no country in the world could accede to another country breaking the unwritten international law and playing according to rules that are not a function of the system of agreements and understandings between the nations of the world. The United States, in practice, is in now charge of the functioning of the mechanism for formulating different agreements and compromises. Whoever does not recognize this authority, and damages it, instead of holding discussions and bargaining with it, is destined to a certain downfall.

For this reason, the gulf crisis cannot be solved unless the new rules required by the new world order are applied to our region. In this new world order, Israel's role will also be changed. We will no longer be a tool for pressuring the Arabs, who will be persuaded to move westward. Rather, from now on, we must be integrated in the world effort to eliminate potential focuses of tension. The Arab-Israeli conflict, which was very functional in the previous order, is now unreasonable and in need of an immediate solution.

When the American Secretary of State, James Baker, states that the solution to the conflict in the gulf will be a springboard for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, he means exactly that. He means that local caprices of national leaders are incompatible with political stability in this region and will no longer be exploited by the major powers. These caprices must simply be cleared from the field, and the "new winds" blowing in the West must be allowed to break through and reach the Middle East as well.

### Leader of Temple Mount Faithful Profiled

91AE0061A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 19 Oct 90 p 6

[Dan Izenberg talks with Gershon Salomon, the leader of the Temple Mount Faithful: "The March on the Holy Mountain"]

[Text] In all the uproar caused last week by the killing of 21 Palestinians on the Temple Mount and the stoning of Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall, the spark believed to have set off the fire has been almost entirely overlooked. It was a small group of extremists called the Temple Mount Faithful who many blame for setting off the chain of events leading to the bloody clash between police and Palestinians, and the international outcry and condemnation of Israel which followed.

Weeks earlier, the group, led by Gershon Salomon, had announced plans to lay the "cornerstone" of the Third Temple during the Succot holiday. The fact that police refused to give Salomon permission to carry out his ceremony and that the High Court of Justice upheld the police decision, did not prevent a frenzied response on

the part of Palestinians—Muslim fundamentalists and secular nationalists alike—who believed Salomon constituted a genuine threat to their control of the Temple Mount.

The Palestinian reaction perplexed many Jews who regard The Temple Mount Faithful as a small, powerless group of naive idealists at best, or malicious troublemakers at worst. Salomon, who describes himself as a strictly observant Jew, has also aroused the wrath of the Orthodox community which maintains that it is forbidden for Jews to visit the Temple Mount compound.

Salomon, however, takes himself very seriously, and therefore finds the Arab response to his action perfectly appropriate. He sees himself as a key leader in the struggle for Jewish rebirth, a struggle upon which the future of the Jewish people depends.

He regards last week's events as vindication of his warnings that Arab control of the Temple Mount threatens the Jewish hold on Jerusalem, the administered territories and Israel itself. "The Temple Mount has turned into a terrible threat to our security and the future of Israel," said Salomon. "The stoning of Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall proved the [Arab] violence and aggression has gone beyond the confines of the Temple Mount."

Salomon added that the incident had also awakened Israelis to the threat emanating from Muslim control of the Temple Mount. He declared the incident would not deter him from continuing his mission, including visits to the Temple Mount and a petition to the High Court of Justice against alleged Muslim destruction of Jewish archeological findings on the Temple Mount.

It is hard to match the image of Salomon as the firebrand leader ready to march alone into the Palestinian lion's den with the ostensibly gentle, soft-spoken, and courteous man whose book-lined study includes a work by Nobel Prize winner Octavio Paz, along with the Talmud and many volumes on Israel.

On the other hand, an aerial photo of the Old City, with the Temple Mount prominently displayed, and an Israeli flag planted in the middle of his desk, reveal the ideology in him.

The antiques that furnish his home in Jerusalem's Givat Hamivtar neighborhood—old furniture, a large collection of menorahs, embroidered Holy Ark curtains, Sephardic Torah cases—convey a sense of the past that molded him.

The first member of his family to settle in Palestine was Rabbi Avraham Shlomo Zalman Tzoref, a student of the Vilna Gaon, who came to Jerusalem at the end of the 18th century and quickly became a leader of the Jewish community. Salomon identifies almost completely with his illustrious ancestor; he describes Tzoref as nothing less than the founder of modern Zionism.



"He said explicitly that the Messiah and the salvation of the Jews would not come about through a miracle but by the natural acts of man—by the sweat and blood of the Jews," said Salomon. "He believed the mystical yearning for the Messiah was a catastrophe."

Tzoref, who changed his name to Salomon when he assumed Austrian citizenship in return for a promise of Austrian help in building up the Jewish community, believed that Jews must cease living off charity and become productive. During the 1820s, he helped establish one Jewish settlement near Jericho and another, called Na'aran, near Gaza. Fifty years later, Tzoref's grandson, Yoel Moshe Salomon, founded Petah Tikva.

According to Salomon, Tzoref was excommunicated by the religious establishment for introducing revolutionary ideas into the community. More significantly, many Arabs hated him for his pride and independence; he was stabbed to death in 1857.

The struggle between Tzoref and the Arabs was over the Hurva synagogue, a magnificent structure which aroused the jealousy of the Moslem authorities who ordered it destroyed. Tzoref fought to rebuild the synagogue.

"He regarded its re-establishment as a symbol of the growing strength of the new ideological struggle which he wanted to lead," said Salomon. "The struggle over the Hurva was like the struggle over the Temple Mount today."

With defiant pride, Salomon said that after the Jordanians conquered the Jewish Quarter in 1948, Arabs opened Tzoref's grave and scattered his bones, so great was their hatred almost 100 years after his death. "They never forgave him," he said.

With the same pride, Salomon says his life has also been threatened by Arab leaders over the past few years. "When the mufti and deputy mufti threaten me, I laugh from the bottom of my heart," he added. "They don't know the strength of the Jewish people or the crucible in which I was forged."

According to Salomon, this is not the first time he and the Arabs have been in direct confrontation.

In 1958, when he was serving on the Syrian border as commander of a company of paratroopers, UN observers warned Salomon that Syrian gunners were aiming for him because of his exploits in the battle for control of the large tracts of no-man's land separating the Israeli and Syrian lines.

"I felt I was doing something important for the country," Salomon said of his military service. "I felt I was doing something to liberate the land."

After a year on the northern front, an Israeli half-track rolled over Salomon and crushed his legs during a battle behind Syrian lines, leaving him with a permanent limp. "I'm a religious Jew," said Salomon. "I believe divine

Providence kept me alive because I was destined for an historic mission—to bring Israel's salvation to fulfillment."

Less than 10 years later, when Defense Minister Moshe Dayan gave the keys of the Temple Mount back to its Muslim custodians after the Six Day War, Salomon, founded the Temple Mount Faithful.

In fact, "faithful" is one of Salomon's favorite words. When Prime Minister Menahem Begin began negotiating with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1977, Salomon, who was then a party activist and Begin loyalist, formed a group called "The Faithful to the Principles of the Herut Movement." When Begin signed the Camp David accords, Salomon quit the party.

The principle Salomon is fighting for is the spiritual rejuvenation of the Jewish people. "I came to the conclusion that parallel to the struggle for the Land of Israel, we must begin building the cultural and spiritual aspect of the nation which stems from our Biblical roots," Salomon said.

Salomon mentions with pride that at last week's controversial gathering, three of his followers were wearing clothes and holding musical instruments that were based on designs from the biblical period.

He believes the Temple Mount is at the core of this spiritual rejuvenation. "It is our testimony and license to this land," says Salomon. "It's a known fact that whoever controlled the Temple Mount controlled all of the Land of Israel. The Arabs know very well that once we gain control of the Temple Mount, we will close the circle and the legitimacy of our control over the land will be complete."

### **New Windshield Protection on Market**

91AE0023D Tel Aviv DAVAR (Weekend Supplement)  
in Hebrew 14 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Moshe Kohen]

[Text] The Laboq Factory has come up with solutions to protect vehicles and shop windows. The factory, located at Kibbutz Netzer Sereni, currently offers effective protection services for vehicles and businesses.

The factory's products have gained popularity among Israeli residents who travel along the roads of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, and different elements abroad who rely on Israeli experience. The factory produces protective windshields made of plastic. Its manager, Yosef Laboq, is considered a world renown expert in the protection field. Having come out of a select IDF [Israel Defense Forces] unit, he became aware of the need for protection for vehicles and businesses. The result was the development of a transparent, non-flammable, unbreakable plate.

Since the outbreak of the intifadah, many people have been injured while travelling in the territories. There was

no answer to the throwing of stones and gasoline bombs. The Laboq Company developed initial solutions for the protection of vehicles. With time, it perfected its system. The company now offers free installation services to residents of the territories (the protection is subsidized completely by the Transportation Ministry).

In addition to protecting Israelis travelling in the territories, Laboq's protection has also proven its effectiveness in protecting against injuries due to car accidents.

The windshield-shaped plate can absorb a blow from a rock, hammer, or axe, and it can withstand continuous burning from fire without losing its transparency or being consumed.

Laboq offers a number of degrees of protection against rocks, and blows from axes and sticks. It even offers full protection against pistol or submachine gun fire. The material, which is based on a polycarbonate featuring very high transparency, undergoes hardening and coating processes to prevent scratches and produce a product that is 200 times harder and twice as light as ordinary glass.

The Laboq Factory offers additional means for greater safety on the roads, including the mounting of a transparent plate in front of the windshield, which permits travel according to the requirements of the law and offers full protection from strikes. Side windows can also be well protected; breaking them has become an impossible mission.

Cheaper glass alternatives exist. However, they are not suited to the situation prevailing in the territories, because they burn easily. The Laboq Factory has installed protection on 62 automobiles of the Judaea and Samaria Development Company. Circumstances have proven the effectiveness of the protection. The factory is currently specializing in protecting the vehicles of security and civil institutions.

Several months ago, one of the vehicles it outfitted with protection was hit by a gasoline bomb that ignited. The bomb burned for more than ten minutes before it could be removed, but the vehicle's body and windshield remained intact.

Laboq's business is flourishing even without sales promotions. Advertising is provided by television teams operating in Judaea and Samaria. They were the first to mount the protective windshields, and they discovered the effectiveness of the material during the course of their work. The press reported on the Israeli invention, with the result that the new production line at Kibbutz Netzer Sereni is working to respond to the growing demand in local and foreign markets.

The special windshield also provides very effective protection against criminal acts, which is of interest to banks and other financial institutions. Laboq's protection gives their valuables greater protection.

The flow of orders from abroad is increasing. Not long ago the company finished a special project entailing the installation of protective windshields on several vehicles of a security company from a foreign country. Purchasing agents of foreign commercial companies are currently interested in acquiring know-how from the company.

Laboq's managers emphasize that their products have been approved by engineers of the security system and the Transportation Ministry, and by government experts from the United States, Germany, France, and the Netherlands.

"We can guarantee greater security to Israelis travelling on the roads in the territories, and, no less importantly, security for financial institutions and Israelis who fear theft, traffic accidents, and terrorism acts. At present, the Laboq factory is progressing in its development of bullet-proof products. The factory's engineers have succeeded in producing a plastic material that is one-half the customary weight and thickness [of comparable products], which can stop bullets from one side only. The material would be very effective for financial organizations such as banks, and stock exchanges. It can also be installed in shop windows to make break-ins difficult.

Recently, the Laboq Factory acquired a coating line, and its managers stress that the development of protection products has yet to be exhausted.

#### **Move From Manufacturing to Services Urged**

91AE0061B Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 12 Oct 90 p 14

[Interview by Joel Bainerman, POST economics editor, with Dani Gillerman, president of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce]

[Text] There are few representatives of the Israeli economy as independent as Dani Gillerman, president of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce.

Gillerman can afford to speak his mind. He doesn't represent any specific interested party or lobby and, unlike his counterpart at the Manufacturers Association, his constituencies include the entire Israeli business sector: importers, exporters, traders, banks, insurance companies, department stores, shipping agents, transport companies, petrol companies, etc.

It is because of where he stands that Gillerman has become one of this country's most ardent supporters of the importance of the role the service sector can play in the Israeli economy. The government's lack of appreciation for the service sector, he claims, is decades behind that of the rest of the world.

"Israeli policy in the service area is a type of Marxist pornography which states that only somebody who carries a 5-kg hammer is economically productive," Gillerman avers. "The rest of the advanced world has long

ago discarded such anachronistic ideas, yet Israel continues to discriminate between manufacturing and services by offering subsidies and cheap credit only to the former. The advanced economies of the world have already witnessed the move from manufacturing to services, which are registering an increasing amount of many nations' GNP and exports."

Indeed, in today's world it is difficult to distinguish between manufacturing and services. Because one feeds so much on the other it's impossible to tell who actually contributes more to growth or exports.

"Companies which provide marketing services such as data and research are essentially a service, as well as the first stage of production, even before research and development. Good marketing turns hours of labor and great ideas into hard currency and is the first link in any export drive. It is a service which is vital to the future of any economy."

Gillerman thinks that particularly in the light of the influx of Soviet Jews the government should start giving the service sector a closer look. Many of the immigrants, he claims, will enter all types of services from home renovation to wholesaling, as these businesses require little start-up capital and have no barriers to entry.

"New immigrant scientists could offer high value-added technological and consulting services to our economy and others," he envisions. "It will be a tragedy if, due to short-sighted government policies, these people are forced to turn to factory work because this is the sector the Ministry of Industry and Trade is targeting for increased government support."

The service sector's lack of respectability and recognition is just one of many problems Israel's economy confronts.

"The key to Israel becoming an economic force to be reckoned with, is in her opening up not only her trade borders but her mind to the global scheme of things," Gillerman thinks; "to knock down non-tariff barriers because it's good for the Israeli consumer, not just because Israel has committed itself to do so via international trade pacts; to concentrate at what we do best and put all our efforts into those areas where we enjoy a relative advantage. This is the real benefit of free trade and open borders."

The cost of trade protectionism is well known to Gillerman's federation. Earlier this year, it released findings of a study which showed that it costs the Israeli consumers \$2 billion more a year due to protectionist trade practices which lower purchasing power and act as a stimulant to economic activity.

In addition to higher prices, protectionism ultimately leads to protecting industries which pay low wages, stifling the progression from moving from yesterday's "sunset industries" to tomorrow's "sunrise industries" where higher wages are typically paid.

"The Histadrut is a major problem in this area as it is a firm supporter of trade barriers in the Israeli economy," Gillerman adds. "It concentrates far too much on existing jobs rather than creating new ones. As a trade union, the Histadrut has proved to be quite responsible in recent years; yet the time has come to dismantle the other hat it wears, as an employer. This dilemma has come to a point where it can no longer be reconciled. Only as a trade union can it truly represent the needs of the workers."

On the privatization process, Gillerman says it is moving slowly only because of the vested interests in government corporations, as ministers simply don't want to part with their control.

"As yet, no efficient system for the sale of government corporations has been devised," he asserts. More emphasis is needed on selling off state-owned enterprises via the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. If five or six large companies were sold, similar to the recent Bezek public issue, it would turn our stock exchange into less of a casino and more of a vehicle to generate economic growth.

Regarding Europe 1992, Gillerman claims that much too little was done much too late. Too many initiatives dealt with who should do what, rather than what should be done, "a classic argument in Israel."

Another hindrance to economic growth, he claims, is the high interest rates. To bring them down, he suggests opening up the capital markets, not in the limited way Finance Minister Moda'i suggested in his recent economic plan, but in full force.

"Why shouldn't American banks be able to set up shop here and lend their capital to the highest bidder?" he asks. "Capital markets operate according to the mechanisms of any market, supply and demand. If the market to import capital was thrown open and the business sector was flooded with it, by definition the price of it would come down and, as a result, the economy would be stimulated. This is one area where the service sector can play a vital function."

Next, Gillerman would let the shekel float freely against international currencies and be subjected to supply and demand. In this way, the government wouldn't be able to constantly devalue its own currency. Gillerman points out that, since its establishment, Israel has witnessed over 800,000 percent of devaluation of its currency.

"What do the Italian, British or Japanese governments do when their currency is eroded against their export earnings?" asks Gillerman. "They produce their goods more efficiently by increasing their productivity. Here, our manufacturers immediately call for a devaluation—and, because of their influence in the government, usually get it!"

## SAUDI ARABIA

### Debate Over Role of Women Discussed

91AE0080B Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English  
25 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Fayzah S. Ambah; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Jeddah, 24 Oct—A lively debate over the role of women is going on between various elements of Saudi society as well as on the pages of European and American newspapers and television screens.

Marine Jacquemin, with Television Francaise 1 (TF1), on a segment on Saudi society, talks to a woman so conservative she refuses to be photographed and talks with her back to the camera. In the same segment she interviews a woman mingling with colleagues in an integrated office.

Peter Vandermeersch, a journalist for the Belgian De Standaard, talks to the headmistress of a local high school who tells him that Saudi women are treated so well by society that "Western women envy us." A Saudi woman who manages her father's company describes the society's attitude toward women as "overprotective" and says to Dominique Legarde of Le Quotidien de Paris that she'd rather be less protected and have more choices.

Vandermeersch, who has talked to women who have expressed a desire to drive, asks a television journalist what she thinks. "Heavens no, I much prefer having a driver," she answers.

These contradictions baffle Western journalists who don't know which of these opinions represent 'the true side of Saudi Arabia.' "All of them do," says Taghrid, a former university student, who estimates that a lot of her acquaintances want change, she says, "but not all of them admit it."

The debate on change has been sparked by the Gulf crisis, and by the presence and questions of the journalists that have been to Saudi Arabia in the past two months. At last count they were over 900; more than the total number of journalists to have visited the Kingdom since its inception 58 years ago. In between concentrating on the actual crisis and the presence of foreign troops, a lot of them are taking advantage of being in the Kingdom for the first time and are writing about Saudi society and any changes the crisis might bring about.

Journalists found that faced with the specter of war, Saudi women realized that they might not have been able to manage had a confrontation actually occurred and the men were sent to the front. According to unofficial estimates, 93 percent of Saudi women don't work and Saudi women are not permitted to drive.

A large number of Kuwaiti women escaped by driving to Saudi Arabia and Taghrid remarks that had they been

Saudi women who were stuck in Kuwait they wouldn't have been able to escape because many of them don't know how to drive.

The conservative element argues that women might use the privilege of driving as a way to mix with men, away from prying eyes. They also contend that women don't need to work because Islam demands that the male members of a woman's family provide for her. Islam demands that all Muslims, men and women alike, be productive, counters the other side, and being chauffeured around alone with a driver could also be interpreted as un-Islamic, they add.

The main hurdle to an increased number of working women seems to be a belief, by many, that Islam prohibits men and women from mingling. One local journalist disagrees. "As long as the man and woman are not alone, and the women are wearing the Islamic 'hijab' (head cover) there is nothing wrong with it," he says. Maha, a Saudi woman who is looking for employment believes that confining women to certain jobs "greatly reduces their chances of finding a job."

The government issued a directive in the early stages of the crisis allowing women to work as nurses and to volunteer for civil defense courses.

It is still too early to tell whether or not many changes will come about because of the crisis but, whether or not there will be war, "changes will have to be made because we must prepare for the eventuality of another crisis," says Maha. There is a general consensus on one thing though. If change comes, it will be slow and calculated.

## TUNISIA

### Minister Claims \$391 Million Loss From Iraqi Invasion

91AA0025B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
26 Sep 90 p 18

[Article: "Tunisia's Losses Resulting From the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait"]

[Text] The minister of economy and finance, Mohamed Ghannouchi, stated that the negative financial repercussions for Tunisia, as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, have been estimated at 140 million Tunisian dinars (\$161 million) for 1990 and 200 million dinars (\$230 million) for 1991.

In a report submitted by the minister of economy and finance to the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies, he stressed the importance of Tunisia's losses in commercial transactions. Whereas the size of the transactions with Kuwait was small, amounting to no more than 20 million dinars (\$23 million) in 1989, they were considerably larger with Iraq. Tunisia's imports from Iraq were worth 70 million dinars (\$80 million) in 1989, derived from the purchase of oil and sulphur used in Tunisian chemical industries. It was expected that these imports

would total 100 million Tunisian dinars (\$115 million) in 1990. In return, Tunisia exported textiles, spare parts and cement to Iraq in 1989, worth 45 million dinars (\$52 million), while during the first half of this year, Tunisia exported 40 million dinars (\$46 million), which suggests a continuous increase of Tunisian exports that have now stopped flowing to Iraq.

The minister of economy and finance also stated that confirmed deals with Iraq totaled 100 million Tunisian dinars (\$115 million), and that commodities currently prepared and ready for export, in accordance with specifications requested by Iraq, have been valued at 23 million dinars (\$26.5 million), damaging 200 Tunisian businesses, in addition to damaging the balance of payments.

The Tunisian minister of economy and finance added that his country had established close ties with Kuwait, in order to fulfill joint projects, especially tourism, banking and real estate. Kuwait's total investments in Tunisia amount to 150 million Tunisian dinars (\$173 million). This is apart from what is being implemented or what Kuwait had agreed to invest subsequently. Cooperation with Kuwait is also embodied in 26 loan agreements totaling 380 million dinars (\$437 million). The implementation of 17 projects has been completed, while nine others are underway. Consequently, agreed-upon financing for the period between 1990 and 1993 amounts to 160 million dinars. The minister added: "If we take into account the temporary interruption of the activities of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, headquartered in Kuwait, loan resources will rise to 360 million dinars, including 60 million which was expected this year, and 100 million expected for next year." The minister concluded that difficulty in continuing the joint projects will be experienced, in addition to the expected repercussions with regard to the balance of payments this year and next. Moreover, the minister also concluded that the return of large numbers of Tunisian workers from Kuwait and Iraq would create additional pressures on the labor market, and would also take remittances worth 5 million dinars annually away from Tunisia.

Accordingly, and in addition to these direct repercussions, the ramifications of this crisis, and the resultant problems that could arise in international markets, especially monetary inflation and higher prices, together with a slowdown in growth and development, will affect Tunisia as well, with regard to inflation and less value from the sale of its products prepared for export.

### DUP Leader Describes Role of Islamists

91AA0025A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic  
3 Sep 90 pp 32-33

[Interview with Brahim Banderbala, Assistant Secretary General of the Arab Democratic Unionist Party, by Muhammad Mustafa al-Mahdi: "Islamic Movements

Will Determine Destiny of Arab Maghreb;" date and place not specified; first three paragraphs AL-SHIRA' introduction]

[Text] Brahim Banderbala is the assistant secretary general of the Arab Democratic Unionist Party [DUP] in Tunisia, one of the new opposition parties, which joins together several groups of Arab nationalists, Nasirists, Ba'thists and Marxists.

Brahim Banderbala, a well-known lawyer in Tunisia, has been active for a long time in the Young Lawyers' Association and the Human Rights Association. One of the new generation of young intellectuals, he began his political and intellectual activities at university at the beginning of the seventies. He has become a symbol of these public activities in Tunisia and in the Arab Maghreb, and is one of their most prominent intellectuals and leaders.

The following interview with him concerns the DUP, the Tunisian scene, and Arab Maghreb.

[Al-Mahdi] What are the DUP's principles?

[Banderbala] We are a party that obtained legal authorization on 25 November 1988. Our goal is to create a broad organizational framework, bringing together various Arab nationalist sentiments in Tunisia, provided that they are independent organizationally and in decision-making, with no connections to any quarter, especially to a nation or a ruling regime.

Our party's principles are contained in its slogan: democracy, unity, socialism. It is a party that believes in democracy. The party tries to embody it in its ranks and make democracy the basis for its existence, so that all nationalist groups, and intellectual or political sentiments within the party may speak together, become integrated and interact. This is not to produce a tyranny of the majority over the minority, nor to singlehandedly lead the party. The party also believes in democratic cooperation with other political parties on the national scene, and in coordination among them, in order to confront circumstances or to support national, democratic action. The party also strongly and fundamentally believes in Arab unity. It calls for and works for the achievement of comprehensive unity among all parts of the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Gulf. As a point of departure for this belief, the party supports the regional, federal groupings that have been established in the Gulf, the Maghreb and elsewhere. However, the party considers them as merely a step along the road to unity. By its direction, and the nature of the situation, the party sees that there are special national, nationalist or regional interests within the Arab nation, which we must respect and must not ignore. Consequently, we believe that preparing circumstances and political, economic, and social factors will form the strongest guarantees for achieving unity. We also believe in the feasibility of gradual steps, like establishing a federal unity or a confederation now, as a first step.

### A Party for Nationalists

[Al-Mahdi] Do you consider yourselves a Nasirist group or party? What is the position of the Nasirist experience in your thinking?

[Banderbala] The party brings together all Arab nationalist orientations, including many Nasirists. However, it is safe to say that there are also many Nasirists who have not yet joined the party. The party also includes Ba'ithists, Marxists and nationalists.

From the intellectual or political aspect, we are a party that is very close to the Nasirist experience. We try to share in it and profit from it, along with taking into consideration the changes and developments that have occurred with regard to Arab and world reality in the last two decades, after the death of the great leader, Gamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

[Al-Mahdi] Why was the establishment in Tunisia of a Nasirist or Arab nationalist party like yours delayed until now?

[Banderbala] The Nasirist sentiment has been in Tunisia since the emergence of Nasirism in the Arab world. Nasirism was in fact formed in the Suez War of 1956, the establishment of Egyptian-Syrian unity in 1958, and the spread of nationalism that followed. There is no need to reiterate that Arab nationalism is deeply rooted in the Tunisian Arab community. As proof, the Bourguiba regime strongly clashed with this movement from the beginning of independence but, despite all its attempts to eliminate Nasirist sentiment, or the nationalist movement, it failed. Popular storms and intifadahs, spontaneous or guided, continue to attest to their presence, strength and opposition to many of the former regime's policies. However, despite that, the Nasirists and Arab nationalists were unable to form a party in Tunisia, because of the absence of democracy. This situation continued to exist until the beginning of the seventies, when certain organizations began to be established in the university. With time, and the accumulation of experience, the strength of this movement intensified and became influential in the national movement in Tunisia.

### Rejected Statements

[Al-Mahdi] There are some who say that the intellectual and ideological changes now going on in the world will put an end to the previous revolutionary and nationalist experiments in the Third World, with Nasirism at their forefront. What is your position as a party, especially since you began your activities at the beginning of these changes?

[Banderbala] We reject those statements, because they have not grasped the true nature of the changes that are going on currently in the world, or in the Arab nation. Before claiming to have deduced the end of Nasirism from the events of Eastern Europe, those people should try to understand the events of the Arab world. Then they could see how much their nation, to which we

belong, is in dire need of an intellectual, political, social, economic and nationalist program that could form a basis for action for them, a program for a future, a rebirth and cultural growth. If they were to undertake this mission, they would understand how right the Nasirist nationalist experience would be as a basis for that program, because it can accommodate all nationalist views and ideas. The best evidence for that is merely to mention the name of 'Abd-al-Nasir in a dramatic play or in a film. Twenty years after his death, his name still excites the masses' feelings, arouses their hopes and stimulates them. Of course, this does not happen only because of sentimental reasons, but rather, because of purely objective reasons. This is because sentiments do not last for 20 years, whereas ideas such as this last much longer. This phenomenon in itself is nationalist proof that the Nasirist program is still alive and capable of continuing. On the contrary, I maintain that the historic changes, which the socialist world is witnessing, do not signal the end of Nasirism, but rather affirm its principles, credibility and principal ideas.

### Democracy Has Stagnated

[Al-Mahdi] How does the party view the current political situation in Tunisia?

[Banderbala] President Zine Al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali's regime began with the spread of great hopes for the achievement of democracy. Many rapid strides were taken, but the democratic experiment quickly stagnated after the legislative elections, in which the ruling party (the Destouri coalition) obtained all seats in Parliament for itself, thereby repeating the experience of the 1985 elections. The connection between these two events is not a mere formality; the second one occurred before the general circumstances that prevailed in the days of the previous regime were dealt with and changed. This particularly means the elections law, in whose shadow the democratic process came to pass, and which itself was the law of the previous regime. Therefore, results were produced as if they were the voters' purification process. In addition, there were administrative and legal measures and regulations that prevented millions of Tunisia voters—against their will—from voting. The opposition parties, including our party, have asked that these legal and administrative obstacles be dealt with, simplified and corrected for the citizens. The opposition has also requested the postponement of elections, so that they can be held in sound, democratic conditions, because the ideal is not just to hold elections and to vote, but rather, it is to obtain a Chamber of Deputies, which truly represents the community and which will realistically and strongly consider the aspirations of the voters. This is what has not been done.

[Al-Mahdi] What is your interpretation of the decline of leftist and liberal political movements, and the rise of the Islamic movement?

[Banderbala] The fact is that the traditional leftist or liberal experience is only an attempt to establish foreign

intellectual and political theories imported from abroad. In practical experience, when the adherents of those theories tried to plant them in the local or Arab Tunisian environment, they quickly failed. It was evident that the reality was not responsive.

Let us be realistic and precise in looking at these movements, because time no longer respects or tolerates intellectual adolescence. The leftist movements have western roots; they have no roots in our country. They have not succeeded in creating any roots or standing in our Arab-Islamic society.

[Al-Mahdi] Where do the Nasirists or Arab nationalists in your party place themselves—with the leftists, or with the local Islamic or non-Islamic forces?

[Banderbala] The Arab nationalist unionist message is a complete, comprehensive, cultural program for the Arab *Ummah* [the Arab nation as a whole]. Islam in content and meaning, along with intellectualism or contemporary sciences, is new oil for the lamp of modern culture and life. However, Islam is the glorious and eternal basis for our ideas, intellectualism and lives. We see no contradiction between Arabism and Islam. On the contrary, we see a definite and natural inseparability, which is impossible to sever. I believe that the leadership of the Islamic movement in our country has understood this dimension more than any other Islamic movement in the Arab world. Therefore, they have succeeded in including this in their ideas and message, and have reassured the nationalist, unionist side with their invitation to Islam.

[Al-Mahdi] What is your position vis-a-vis the Islamic movement in Tunisia, specifically?

[Banderbala] I emphasize again that Islam is what is Arabicizing North Africa. Today, we are Arabs, and nationalists intellectually. By community, geographically and historically, we prefer Islam. Among the special qualities of the Arab Maghreb is unity of religion and unity of creed. Therefore, it would be difficult here to infringe upon the citizens' spiritual dimension, not because it is a part of their beliefs, but because it is also the most prominent factor in the composition of their persona. Because colonialism and the political regimes that governed Tunisia infringed upon Islam, the nationalist and social reaction was strong, and created a powerful Islamic movement. We as a party declare that we support the establishment of any rational, Islamic movement under the aegis of democratic life. We emphasize that we reject *Salafiyah* [an Egyptian Islamic reform movement] thought or religious extremism, because we believe that Islam is a rational and tolerant religion. We also believe that extremism can only produce counter-extremism, and this of itself must only lead to the elimination of democracy, and might tear apart society and generate dangerous struggles.

[Al-Mahdi] What is your evaluation of the political situation that exists in Algeria? What is its impact on Tunisia?

[Banderbala] We note that democracy in general is respected and is proceeding in accordance with honorable traditions and principles. This is an extremely important matter, and will have profound effects on the entire area, especially the countries of Arab Maghreb.

[Al-Mahdi] What if the Islamic movement wins in the next elections in Algeria? (This interview took place before the municipal elections held in Algeria on 12 June 1990.)

[Banderbala] If the Algerian Islamic movement wins half the municipality seats in the next elections, and we expect that...we expect that it will win more than half, then that will put this movement more than halfway toward obtaining power. This might cause the parliamentary elections to be conducted either earlier or as scheduled. Undoubtedly, this development will create profound and new consequences within Arab Maghreb, especially in Tunisia, since Algeria would be the strategic depth for Islamic movements in the area, and might determine the future destiny of the region in the long term.

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Opposition Leader Discusses Gulf Crisis, Saudi Tensions

91AE0044A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
10 Oct 90 pp 18-20

[Interview with Ibrahim al-Wazir, head of opposition, by Matar al-Ahmadi: "I Expect Changes in San'a, Fear They May Be Bloody"; place and date not given; first four paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction]

[Text] About two years ago, the news agencies carried a story about an assassination attempt against the head of the Yemeni opposition, Ibrahim ibn 'Ali al-Wazir, in the American city of Dearborn, near Detroit. Although the assailants fired ten machinegun bullets at the Yemeni thinker, writer, and politician, he survived. The first bullet hit the edge of his coat, while the other shots hit Naji Ghaysi, one of the men accompanying him to dinner in the restaurant, causing him serious injuries requiring hospitalization.

Al-Wazir, who was born on 18 December 1931, spent a large part of his childhood in prison, after his father, 'Ali ibn al-Wazir, and his uncle, 'Abdallah ibn al-Wazir, led Yemen's first revolution in 1948. As Jamal al-Banna, brother of the religious leader Hasan al-Banna, has said: "This movement laid down a charter for consultation (*shura*) and constitutional government." It did not, however, succeed. Its two leaders were executed, and the children of their families were thrown into prison. Al-Wazir managed to escape from prison and participate in forming the League of Truth and Justice when he was 15 years old. He took refuge in Cairo, whence he returned to Yemen to found the Union of Those for Consultation (*Shura*) and Cooperation. Its primary goal was a Koranic



state, i.e., application of the rules of the Book of God, the Sunnah of the Supreme Messenger, and consultation (*shura*) on affairs.

At the time of the 1962 coup in Yemen, al-Wazir was in Cairo. He formed what was known as the "third force," which opposed the position of the two factions. Al-Wazir continued to move between Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Europe, and the United States. He published several books, including *Face to Face With Tragedy*, and *Message to Yemeni Emigrants*, after learning about the conditions of expatriate Yemeni and other workers. When he returned to Yemen and became acquainted with the ruling regime, he wrote his book, *Instead of Injustice*. After the 1967 setback, he published his book, *The Bitter Harvest*, in addition to the books, *The Lesson, Letter to the Nation*, and *On the Threshold of the 15th Century of the Hijrah*. These were addressed to the ruling regime in Yemen and to Muslim generations.

Ibrahim al-Wazir, head of the Yemeni opposition, spoke to AL-MAJALLAH about the new disaster facing the Arab and Islamic nations as a result of Iraq's attack on Kuwait. He explained his general view of the situation and his specific view of the Yemeni Government's position supporting the attack.

[Al-Ahmadi] How do you see the internal situation in Yemen in light of the Iraqi attack on Kuwait?

[Al-Wazir] The Iraqi regime's overwhelming of Kuwait is a link in the chain of disasters that have descended on this nation, hindering its unity, and frustrating the desired revival whereby the nation would assume its pioneering cultural role in the Arab and Islamic world. It is also a result of the culmination of one-man despotism and tyranny. It reminds me of how God warned this nation against the method of the mighty Pharaohs: "So he made his people unsteady, and they obeyed him; surely they were an ungodly people." [Koran 43:54] Yemen entered the vortex of military rule in a world that does not restrain the hand of a wrongdoer or deter a despot and in a nation that has not heeded its messenger's loud warning to it, a plain and clear message contained in the noble prophetic tradition: "Restrain the hand of the wrongdoer; bend him to what is right, and compel him to it perforce: or God will surely set your hearts against each other, and will curse you, as He has cursed them." It is a warning of a devastating divine curse—and this is what the nation is suffering. Although a relative opening toward freedoms took place after unification, the internal situation in Yemen in light of the Iraqi attack has become clear for all to see. Meanwhile, the conspiratorial policy of the political leaders has been not merely against Kuwait and all its Gulf neighbors, but against the Yemeni people itself. The people were not consulted on policy. Their interests were not considered. Their covenants, compacts, religion, and history were not respected. Perhaps the institutions that were proclaimed after unification and that are supposed to express the nation have not yet taken up their responsibilities because of the speed of events.

Personally, from my study of what has happened I deduce that these suspect leaders, who have participated in the most dangerous plot ever directed at the destiny of this nation, have links to international Zionist forces that have ensnared them to carry out a certain role and then be spit out like pits. That is what time will reveal to every searcher for the truth and student of what is happening on the [Arab] scene. Sadly, the interests of the people in Yemen have been greatly and devastatingly harmed. Even more sadly, these disastrous forces lying in ambush have by these dark treasons attained undreamed-of results, rupturing the bonds of love, cooperation, and brotherhood between a single nation. I want to call attention to the fact that all who are sincere in the field, especially reformers, must work to restore solidarity and cordial relations between peoples. Nations have no road to follow today or tomorrow, except the road of love, cooperation, and building.

#### Weak Demonstrations

[Al-Ahmadi] What are the facts about the demonstrations supporting the attack that took to the streets in some Yemeni cities, as reported by the news agencies?

[Al-Wazir] Eyewitnesses have told me that those demonstrations were extremely weak. They were composed of members of the what is known as the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, which in Yemen is a weak party of hirelings. Yemenis sarcastically call them "owners of proletarian socialist villas that cost millions." Everyone knows that the masters of this party have not had a single project worth mentioning in Yemen. They are the rabble with which this nation has been afflicted not only at the uneducated level, but also at the level of those who claim to think. The demonstrations did not amount to 50 people on the first day, as an eyewitness has told me; but on the second day the government used force to get people, the schools, and government employees on the street to march.

[Al-Ahmadi] How has the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen over the Iraqi attack affected the internal situation in Yemen?

[Al-Wazir] There is no doubt that the people will find that this dispute has a broad effect on their conditions. The government did not consider the importance of Saudi Arabia's unlimited support and the role of that support in stabilizing the government. I believe that the people, through God's favor and by continuing the struggle and *jihad* of their enlightened vanguard, will be able first to preserve their gains of unity and relative freedom and then to transform them into a reality that expresses their interests at home and abroad. As part of a nation with a mission and role at the level of all mankind, the people will also be able to prevent any individual from abusing their private and public destiny.

[Al-Ahmadi] What are the possibilities for change in the Yemeni Government?



[Al-Wazir] The government in Yemen is, as I said, the legitimate child of previous eras. The forces able to create real change were the ones that actually opposed previous regimes and offered their best men as martyrs so that we would not arrive at the state we are currently in under the military. However, one must say that the government in Yemen after unification is different from what it was before unification. Before unification, the government in the north represented the dictatorship of an individual, with his whims and inclinations. In the south it represented the dictatorship of a party and its false ideology. Unification took place in a world-sweeping wave oriented toward freedom, democracy, and pluralism. The salvation of the two leaderships lay in unification. It created a kind of balance between the different forces inside and outside the government. Iraq's overwhelming of Kuwait has revealed that at the presidential level the government was isolated from all the institutions and had suspicious links that prepared for the disaster. Its dreams disappeared in the face of the decisive awakening in the Gulf and among Arab, Islamic, and international peoples who were hopeful about a new era of peace and freedom on earth and who therefore saw the dangers of aggressive one-man rule casting its hateful shadow over a region where the interests of all mankind meet. I think the countdown on the plotters has begun and that a new era of restoring what they corrupted is on the way to correcting conditions sooner or later.

#### Yemeni Opposition

[Al-Ahmadi] What is the Yemeni opposition's position on the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and on the official position toward this attack?

[Al-Wazir] I cannot speak for all tendencies and wings in the Yemeni opposition, even though I have the honor to lead the largest and most authentic of the opposition forces and the one closest to the concerns, aspirations, and values of Yemeni citizens. It needs to be said that there has been a continuation of the oppression and a prolongation of the corruption and despotism that the current military government inherited from the dark ages that caused all this confusion and injustice. It also needs to be said that the opposition in Yemen is basically an extension of the revolution of Rabi' II, 1367 [February-March 1948]—an Islamic reformist revolution led by the nation's ulema. The revolution's goal was to establish Islamic rule based on consultation (*shura*) and the way of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs. As everyone knows, many forces joined to thwart the revolution. The oppressive government returned that ruled Yemen by isolation, ignorance, poverty, and disease, building no schools, repairing no hospitals, and paving no roads. After the revolution failed, the government began some minor projects. For 7 million people there were about four elementary and secondary schools, two hospitals, and a single paved road between San'a and al-Hudaydah. Then the nation was surprised by military coups that the people thought were life-giving water. However, these were mirages: thirsty people thought

they were water, but when they reached it, they found nothing. They were like a false dawn. In an atmosphere of rabble-rousing and demagoguery the like of which history had never seen, the nation marched in noisy, confused parades until the great setback of 1967 occurred. Only an alert minority awoke to see clearly. The period was marked by flattery, fawning, and specious reconciliation. Iraq's overwhelming of Kuwait has been the dividing line on the level of the [Arab] scene, laying bare the regimes that were said to be progressive and revolutionary. These regimes came to power in the name of the reversal in Palestine, but never for a single day did they turn their attention to the fundamental problem of Palestine, a problem threatening the very existence of the nation, except with more and more rabble-rousing and demagoguery. We awaited them from the east, and they came from the west. Kuwait became the road to Palestine. They are the great farces. Worse than that, you find people in this nation who listen, if only for a single moment, to this inane prattle. Since the constitutional revolution, the position of the Yemeni opposition has been and still is on the side of the constant principles of the nation—justice, freedom, consultation (*shura*), and decisionmaking that expresses the nation and operates through the nation's institutions. This was the message of the revolution's martyred leaders, may God be pleased with them. It is decision-making by institutions, not one-man decisionmaking. The opposition believes that the dark past has formally and objectively ended, never to return, and that the residues of former times and the military men who are heirs to those times will not be able to turn back the clock on this country.

[Al-Ahmadi] Can you explain the internal makeup of the government in Yemen?

[Al-Wazir] The government in Yemen is as I explained earlier. Those on the side of the president now are his tribal group and those who have benefitted from his government in past years in the so-called General Convention. As I said, there is the Socialist Party, whose policy was not in agreement with the Ba'th Party and with Iraq throughout its history in the south. I believe that the president's behavior has drawn everyone into this predicament into which the nation has fallen. Those against the president are tribesmen, most of whom have not been friendly to the government during its term in power. Everyone remembers the positions of the tribes of al-Mashriq and al-Jawf and most of the tribes of Bakil and Hashid. The important goal to be realized is that decisionmaking should come from consulting (*shura*) the nation, not the one-man decisionmaking that has harmed the interests of the nation. The civilian forces represented by free organizations are for pluralism, freedom, and consulting the nation. They must take their place to remedy errors. Otherwise it will be conflict. Let whoever perishes perish on the basis of clear testimony, and let whoever lives live on the basis of clear testimony.

[Al-Ahmadi] How do you explain the official Yemeni position toward Iraq's attack on Kuwait?

[Al-Wazir] The official position has been a disaster. It is a result of the nature of the government. It is not strange for a one-man government conducted in the absence of the nation, a government that denies the simplest rules of morality, fairness, and justice. Kuwait supplied South and North Yemen with every kind of unconditional assistance. The Koran has taught us: "Should the reward of goodness be other than goodness?" [Koran 55:60] Also, if anyone does not help the oppressed and restrain the oppressor, God's annihilating curse descends upon him. The tragedies that are constantly being reported in the news of the world call for a resolute stand on the side of the oppressed.

[Al-Ahmadi] As has become evident from the position toward the crisis, the Yemeni tribes do not seem to be on the president's side. Do you think a clash will occur between the two sides?

[Al-Wazir] The Yemeni tribes have expressed their position publicly in the newspapers. They are a force, inasmuch as they fear neither ruler nor tyrant and have feared neither throughout history. A clash depends on the position of the forces that oppose any disturbance of the equation that has led to relative freedom and pluralism. These forces are receiving full support from the people and leaders of the tribes.

[Al-Ahmadi] How do you see the subject of unity in light of the circumstances that President 'Ali Salih has created?

[Al-Wazir] Unification was achieved splendidly because it was a popular demand. The whole nation longs for a greater and more universal unity that will include the entire Arab and Islamic nation—but a union of free men, not of slaves. Conflict may occur if the political balance is disturbed. I think what has happened has caused a split that may not be repaired. Only time will reveal the extent to which the bad consequences of a clumsy, rash policy can be remedied. The first signs of a retreat have started to become visible on the horizon to those who follow the course of events. At the level of the earth there is a new world where is no place for escapades and whims that shake the security and freedom of peoples and their right to progress and universal brotherhood.

[Al-Ahmadi] Do you expect changes in the San'a government?

[Al-Wazir] Yes, I expect changes. I fear that these changes may not be peaceful and that they may not come by means of an aware majority, especially after the facts have become clear.

[Al-Ahmadi] How would you compare Iraqi and Kuwaiti aid to Yemen?

[Al-Wazir] How can I compare something almost nonexistent, Iraq's so-called aid—unless you mean building up the party and hirelings—with something to whose existence many projects testify, such as the university, with its tens of thousands of students?

### Party Addresses Issue of Returning Workers

91AE0029B Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
17 Sep 90 p 5

[Article: "In Memorandum to Minister of Expatriates' Affairs, Yemeni Party Demands Aiding Expatriates Fleeing Kuwait Developments"]

[Text] Sanaa—AL-THAWRAH—The Yemeni Citizens League Party has submitted to the minister of expatriate affairs a memorandum which defines some aspects of the dimensions of the problem experienced by the Yemeni expatriates who were in Kuwait and who have fled it as a consequence of the regrettable events. The memorandum also urged the need to devote attention to our harmed expatriate sons and to aid and assist them in their ordeal.

The memorandum says that the problem is embodied in the tens of thousands of Yemeni citizens in Kuwait who have suddenly lost:

1. Their jobs and their private businesses and, consequently, their monthly income.
2. Their life's savings in their place away from home.
3. Their homes and all their contents. Many of them have spent tens of years away from home and no longer have a refuge in their homeland.
4. Their children's schools.
5. Some of them were spending their vacation at home. Consequently, they lost everything in Kuwait.
6. Their families who live in the homeland have lost what the expatriates used to remit monthly to sustain these families. Consequently, the families are left with no income.

To alleviate the impact of the catastrophe, the memorandum has proposed the following:

1. Permit every expatriate coming from Kuwait to enter with all his belongings (if he has anything) without paying any customs fees. This includes exempting the expatriates' vehicles from customs fees.
2. Provide all arrivals from Kuwait with a monthly cash aid for a certain period of time until their affairs in the homeland are put in order.
3. Give priority in schools and universities to the children of arrivals from Kuwait, taking into consideration the fact that many of their children have lost their school certificates or that the certificates have been left in their schools in Kuwait.

[4 not included in original text]

5. The government should urge merchants and the capable citizens of this honorable country at home and abroad to extend a helping hand to their expatriate brothers in Kuwait by way of the government and through a committee to be formed by the government for the purpose, under your chairmanship, with a number of national figures and persons of legal status as members.

**Editorial Discusses Nation's Role in Crisis***91AE0029A Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
15 Sep 90 p 16*

[Editorial by Husayn Jibarah: "Yemeni Position and Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] Since the start of the Gulf crisis, the entire world has been observing with extreme interest and anxiety the developments and the consequences to which the situation may lead. The consequences may not be laudable if the Arab leaders fail to adopt a responsible collective position that ensures containment of the crisis and that prevents the foreign military intervention—intervention which has already worsened the crisis—from achieving its objectives through its troop concentrations that are posing a threat to the security and safety of the region's countries. The continued presence of these troops may accelerate a worsening of the situation and may push it toward explosion. This will give the foreign forces or presence the justifications to keep the Gulf region under the major powers' influence and control on the pretext of protecting the region's countries from an Iraqi aggression that may be committed against them, as these forces allege. In the face of this development and since the first days of the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, the position of the political leadership of the Republic of Yemen vis-a-vis the events between the brothers has continued to be the principled and unsurpassable pan-Arab position. This firm position has been embodied in the summit which convened in Cairo upon eruption of the crisis and in the numerous press conferences and interviews in which brother Lieutenant General 'Abdallah Salih, the Presidential Council chairman, has answered the questions of U.S. and European press missions, of the Yemeni press, and of other Arab and foreign journalists. This position rejects annexation by any party to the detriment of another party. It is a pan-Arab position that is eager for solving any conflict peacefully and with the language of dialogue, not by force. It is a position that is eager to see Yemen, all the fraternal leaders, and all the benevolent and peace-loving forces exert maximum efforts to develop for the Gulf crisis a peaceful solution within the framework of Arab solidarity in order to eliminate the causes of this conflict freedom of the major powers' military intervention in the Gulf region—an intervention that has escalated the tension, complicated the situation, and posed a threat to the sovereignty of all of the region's countries. In its foreign policy toward the Gulf crisis and toward other issues involving Arab and international dealings, Yemen moves on the basis of firm rules and principles. This policy emanates from the objectives and principles of the glorious Yemeni revolution which is directly tied to the national and pan-Arab interest and from adherence to the UN charter and to the principles of positive neutrality and nonalignment.

This is because adherence to and abidance by this course is likely to bolster the principles of national sovereignty in the united State of Yemen, to reinforce the effort to ensure this legitimate liberationist national right for all

of the region's countries in the Gulf and in the northern Peninsula, and not to permit any foreign military intervention or infiltration that has no objective other than to protect its interests by mobilizing troops and fleets and bringing sophisticated destructive weapons whose illegitimate presence has muddled the conditions and caused them to move in the direction of a deadend. An independent Arab solution to contain the crisis has been obstructed by this presence which is trying to exert the maximum pressure possible in order to influence the Arab decision-making which, when acting in total independence and in the absence of direct intervention in the region, is capable of solving the problem of the Gulf crisis within the framework of dialogue between the sons of the single Arab family.

Thus, and on the basis of what has already been noted, it is the duty of the Republic of Yemen in its capacity as an Arab state that is close to the Gulf developments to contribute with an effective pan-Arab role and within the framework of a comprehensive and sincere Arab effort to find a political solution to end the Gulf crisis. It is also logical that what threatens the security and stability of the Gulf states as a result of military intervention must inevitably constitute a source of concern for our political conditions, considering that the Republic of Yemen is a neighboring country and one of a number of Arab countries that occupy an important geographic and strategic position in this region.

Accordingly, the Republic of Yemen does not approve of the foreign presence in the region which poses an immediate threat to the security and sovereignty of the Gulf region and of the neighboring countries. Yemen will continue to stand against this glaring intervention. It will also continue to work side by side with the brothers and with all the benevolent forces in order to develop the best peaceful solutions to end the problem and to try to drive the ghost of war away from the region or from posing a threat to the region. It will also work for concerted Yemeni and Arab diplomatic efforts in the direction of solving the crisis and of establishing an independent peaceful Arab solution as the alternative and the option that must shoulder its pan-Arab duties in solving the crisis, in dealing with its dimensions, and in confronting the so-called tune of the foreign military option which is trying to be the alternative and the master in the region.

**Another Day**

In the mid-1950's and in the wake of the Arab revolution in 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt, the Arab region turned into something resembling a volcano. The Arab countries, which suffered at the time under the yoke of colonialist domination and of the reactionary, oppressive, and backward regimes, were then ready for a comprehensive national and pan-Arab revolution to rid them of foreign domination and influence on the one hand and, on the other hand, of lackey regimes in a number of Arab countries from the Gulf to the ocean. The 23 July 1952 revolution under the leadership of the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir constituted the mammoth national

and pan-Arab upsurge which ignited and inflamed the Arab masses' feelings throughout the arena for a sweeping revolution against the intruding colonialist presence and for toppling the lackeys of colonialism—the individualistic and backward tyrants.

Under the umbrella of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, the Arab unity-seeking struggler, the support and backing provided by the glorious July revolution brought about the phase of national liberation and of wrenching the political independence of not just the Arab peoples. The winds of the revolutionary tide led by the vanguard of Arabism blew into the heart of black Africa and into numerous countries in the three continents. The peoples of those countries struggled for freedom and liberation until they achieved full independence from colonialist control. The Yemeni people who struggled throughout generations to rid themselves of the imamate's backward, individualistic, and ecclesiastic rule until their will triumphed with the rise of the glorious September and October revolutions recall with utter pride and honor the

stances of Arab Egypt, revolutionary Egypt, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's Egypt in supporting and aiding the Yemeni revolution. The Arab leader's support for the Yemeni people's revolution in its confrontation against its enemies who included the rancorous imperialist and reactionary forces was one of the factors which had a major impact on overcoming the symbols of backwardness. Here are the struggling Yemeni people now preparing to celebrate the 28th anniversary of the immortal 26 September revolution, this great national occasion which is distinguished by the accomplishment of the greatest gains of the September-October revolution, namely the establishment of national unity, the elimination of the residues of fragmentation, and the uniting of the Yemeni homeland, both land and people. This is the great gain that has been accomplished with free Yemeni will and with the efforts of the sincere political leadership which is leading Yemen on the path of comprehensive social and democratic progress under the umbrella of the united state.

## INDIA

**Punjab Presidential Rule Extended, Singh Speaks**

91AS0149A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
6 Oct 90 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, 5 Oct—Both Houses of Parliament today adopted a statutory resolution approving the continuance in force of the proclamation of 11 May 1987 in respect of Punjab extending the President's rule for a further period of six months with effect from 11 November 1990.

Responding to submissions made in the Lok Sabha before it adopted the resolution, the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, admitted that the "biggest fault of his life" was his inability to hold elections in Punjab while he announced yet another economic package to restore confidence among the people of Punjab. He, however, declined to give a firm date for setting in motion the electoral process in the troubled State. The Prime Minister said when his Government took over in December last, both the allies (BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the left) and the Akalis, including Mr S.S. Mann, supported the National Front Government openly expecting the dialogue on Punjab to make headway.

**Allies Favour Poll**

However, since then those near had moved away and today even the Akali party was not ready to stand with the Government. In the process the government's political base had eroded, Mr Singh said. While his Government was ready to face any eventuality from across the border in Pakistan, Mr Singh said it would be wrong to connect all the Sikhs with what was happening across the border. The Prime Minister also rejected the charge of a Congress(I) member, Mr P. Chidambaram, who, while quoting Mr Singh's letter to the leader of the Opposition, said that even the BJP and the left were opposed to holding elections in Punjab. Mr Singh said the allies were not against holding elections and in fact they were for it.

The issue according to Mr Singh was whether it would be possible to hold free and fair elections under the present circumstances and ensure voting without fear. In a situation like this, it was necessary to listen to one's conscience and in this context responding to an Akali member, Mr Atindarpal Singh's charge that much was expected from the Government when it came to power, the Prime Minister said the political capital had indeed been eroded. While accepting this position, Mr Singh said in a situation like this, it would be better to tell the truth.

**Doubts Erased**

In order to restore confidence among the people of Punjab, the Government had repealed the 59th Amendment, released many of the army deserters and such persons who had been detained in jail and against whom there was no evidence. While we did move forward, the

Government had also succeeded in removing substantially the doubts in the minds of Sikhs both inside and outside Punjab, he said. The Prime Minister said, "We have created an atmosphere though not complete," and remarked, "Attempts would continue to be made to create a conducive political atmosphere." While placing supreme faith on the contribution of Punjab to the country, he said there were two opinions on the election scenario.

Mr Singh said while on the one hand there were people who felt that the announcement of elections could lead to an exodus of people belonging to the Hindu community thus fuelling the demand for secession and ultimately leading to internationalisation of the problem, the other opinion was that the continuance of Governor's rule and therefore police rule could further alienate the people. It would thus lead to a blind alley where things go out of hand.

**State Advisory Council**

Mr Singh said, "We are therefore clear that President's rule could not be repeated and ultimately the confidence of the people in democratic institutions should be restored and we should move towards that." As on date of the total killings in Punjab, nearly two-thirds were Sikhs and one-third were Hindus and many of the normal crimes such as smuggling and dacoity had declined. In view of these developments, the Prime Minister said the allies had been consulted and the consensus included the possibility of setting up a State Advisory Council which could be a mid-course between President's rule and elections. As there was no constitutional provision for such a Council, the Prime Minister said it would be worthwhile to have a debate on it.

Mr Singh, while promising to look into the "excess" committed by the administration, said it would be rather unfair to blame the bureaucracy for all the ills considering the fact that they were functioning under difficult circumstances.

**Job Scheme**

Later, announcing the economic package for Punjab, the Prime Minister said the government proposed to provide jobs to 100,000 youths under the self-employment scheme of which 10,000 alone would be drawn from the border areas. A special grant of Rs [rupees] 100 crores would be made available for human resource development with general education accounting for Rs 50 crores, technical education Rs 25 crores. In order to tackle unemployment, the Government was considering the setting up of a petrochemical complex and sugar mills besides four cotton textile mills. Another 10,000 youths of Punjab would be recruited in the Army, paramilitary forces and police. While the Thien dam would be completed faster, fencing along the border would be extended by 336 kilometers and flood lights by another 207 km.

Immigration and customs facilities would be strengthened in Amritsar airport and the demand for solution of water problem would be pursued.

He said the demand of the Akali member Mr Rajdev Singh, for the release of the women detained in jails would be looked into and as regards the persons involved in the 1984 riots, Mr Singh said they would be dealt with by special courts set up for the purpose.

On the 'Right to Work,' Mr Singh said it would be considered in the forthcoming meeting of the National Development Council and the views of the National Youth Council would also be taken into account. Rounding off his response, the Prime Minister said as far as elections to Punjab were concerned the valuable time that would be available by virtue of President's rule would be utilised for talking to the people for restoration of the democratic process.

#### **Decisions on National Security Council Told**

91AS0147A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
8 Oct 90 p 11

[Text] New Delhi, 7 Oct—Members of the National Security Council [NSC] and senior Government and armed forces officials were apprised on Friday of the steps being taken to get the newly established body functional. This was the first such meeting and the NSC, a specialised sub-group of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs, was established in August last. It comprises the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, Finance, External Affairs and Home.

The Secretary (NSC), Mr M.K. Narayanan, who is also the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet Secretariat, apprised the assembled officials on how the NSC would function and the structures that would be established to support the Council. The meeting discussed suggestions on organising the various tiers of the NSC and new proposals were also taken up. Among the officials present were the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretaries of Defence, Foreign and Home and the Director, Research and Analysis Wing, the Director, Intelligence Bureau, the Chief of the Army Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff. According to one official, it was not a meeting of the NSC as such but a working session to thrash out ideas that would assist in the implementation of the NSC idea.

The NSC Secretary put up at the meeting the basic papers relating to the structure of the Council. Despite criticism, the Government has gone ahead with the idea of using the Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC] as the interim Secretariat of the NSC. The criticism of this move was that it would violate the principle of keeping intelligence assessment and policy-making separate. However officials argue that given the short lead-time provided, there was no alternative to using the JIC which, in any case, has been more or less defunct.

#### **Dedicated Secretariat Later**

Officials say that the use of the JIC would be strictly interim and as soon as adequate talent is identified, a dedicated Secretariat will be set up. Given the Government rules on secrecy, the Government finds it difficult to open up to the vast reservoir of talent available in business, academia, research institutes and industry. However, there is a realisation that the Government alone cannot handle this task and procedures to tap this talent are being worked out.

The meeting debated specialised task forces that have to be set up to provide inputs to the NSC. There has been some discussion on whether there ought to be three or four task forces and whether they ought to concentrate on issues or develop an area-specific approach. There is a feeling that some work needs to be done on issue-specific terms such as that on the emerging financial scenario or the challenge of technological change. However others have argued that from the politico-military standpoint, geo-strategy played the dominant role in shaping threat assessments. The final decision on this is likely to be taken by the Prime Minister.

The National Security Advisory Board [NSAB], the third tier of the NSC and its public interface has also been left largely to the Prime Minister himself. His office is processing the names of 30-50 individuals who will form part of the NSAB which is somewhat like the National Integration Council.

#### **UK National Elected Naga National Council Chief**

91AS0143A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
26 Sep 90 p 6

[Text] Kohima, 25 Sep (PTI)—Mr Khodao Yanthan, a British national and senior executive member of the Naga National Council (NNC), has been elected the president of the Council, replacing Ms Adino Phizo, who was the acting president after her father's death, party sources here said.

Mr Khodao, a colleague of late Phizo, returned to Nagaland from London three months ago after 35 years. He was elected by an all-tribal represented-conference at Wokha district recently.

After his election, Mr Khodao, who is here on an Indian visa, said his organisation would not give up its separation demand.

The conference was attended by more than 5,000 delegates.

#### **Communal Riots in Uttar Pradesh Town Described**

91AS0148A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
7 Oct 90 p 2

[Text] Colonelganj (U.P.), 6 Oct—An eerie silence envelops the Gonda district's subdivisional town of

Colonelganj which witnessed one of the worst communal riots in the State on 30 September. The number of killed is still a matter for conjecture but the scale on which the houses have been burnt and property destroyed does not leave any one in doubt about the intensity of the mob frenzy during the riots.

This correspondent, who talked to affected people in the curfew-bound areas was given specific names of a large number of people, especially children, who are missing since 30 September when they went to see the Durga Puja procession. For the first 24 hours the administration did not allow any one from outside, not even the journalists in Gonda, to assess the situation. It is alleged police secretly disposed of most of the bodies during the period to give a moderate picture of the casualties.

Sealing off of the town after the first riots, sparked rumours, which resulted in organised attacks by members of the other community in rural areas of Colonelganj subdivision. The orgy continued for the next two days and 17 villages in the Colonelganj Development Block alone were raided by rioters.

#### **Ghastly Scene**

It is easy to assess an impact of the tragedy in rural areas as there is no curfew there. The scene is ghastly with rows of houses charred and walls razed. Bhatpura, about 7 km from Colonelganj was hit by riots on 2 October. A frenzied crowd numbering several hundred, attacked the houses of a community around 2 pm. They set fire to a place of worship and all the houses of the community in a row. But the fire engulfed a number of houses of the rioters also.

Similar is the story at other villages, including Teliyana, Palhapur and Kanjemau. Crowds attacked people with sharpened weapons and sticks, burnt houses and threw children into wells.

#### **Exaggerated Reports**

The block pramukh of Colonelganj, Mr Chandra Deo Pathak says the exaggerated reports of attack on a religious procession at Colonelganj on 30 September fueled communal passions to such an extent that people went berserk. In some cases eyewitnesses from Colonelganj itself reached the villages giving their own accounts of the riots in the town.

#### **Age-Old Understanding**

Not that the age-old understanding between the communities had vanished even during the worst moments of passion. The pradhan of Palhapur, Mr Nangu Singh himself received injuries while trying to protect the members of the other community from rioters at the Teliyana hamlet. The rioters threatened that they would kill him if he did not stop intervening.

Mr Nur Mohammed who lost his brother and son in the riots on 2 October at Teliyana confirms that the village

Thakur had risked his life to protect the minority community, mostly poor people of the teli (oilmen) caste. Six persons were killed at the village and three women among the injured were in a serious condition. Mr Mohammed took shelter in the nearby maize fields after being attacked with a spear.

The pradhan of Kurwa Gaon, Mr Mata Prasad Singh, also gave shelter to nearly 100 persons of the minority community during the riots for one whole night, risking a possible attack on the village itself.

#### **Higher Toll Not Ruled Out**

The District Magistrate, Mr Nitro Lal Gupta, who was given the charge of the district, following the transfer of his predecessor in the wake of riots, while sticking to the claim that 36 persons were killed and 82 injured in the riots, does not rule out the possibility of higher casualties. He is unable to account for the large number of people still missing. Many people of the minority community had left their villages fearing attacks and might have taken shelter with friends and relatives, the administration feels. However, one finds it difficult to account for a large number missing in Colonelganj town itself. As it is a very small place, it should normally not take days to return, after the administration had made announcements that people hiding could come out and go home.

Walls at Colonelganj as elsewhere in U.P. are full of slogans of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad pronouncing its determination to build the Rama temple at Ayodhya. However, one also comes across another set of slogans, which say "Muslim atankbad banega, U.P. ab Punjab banega" (Muslim extremism would convert U.P. into Punjab) which provides an intriguing twist to the series of incidents.

#### **Passions Still High**

Despite the curfew passions are still surcharged especially because of reports of missing people. Reports also say that bodies are still lying in houses but people are unable to dispose of them because of the continuous curfew.

Tension is reported to be building up in nearby towns, including the district town of Gonda. There is also talk of police excesses, especially at the instance of the local Janata Dal MP [member of Parliament] whom leaders of the majority community blame most for the incidents. Right now the administration appears to be busy making arrangements for VIP visits instead of bring normality.

#### **Congress-I Returnees Say PRC Wants Rajiv Follow-Up Visit**

91AS0136A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*  
in English 12 Sep 90 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, 11 Sep—A Congress delegation that returned from Beijing said here today, that the Chinese

leadership wanted follow-up action on Mr Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China and an early settlement of the long pending border dispute in an atmosphere of peace and cooperation.

The delegation led by Mr Balram Jakhar, AICC [All India Congress Committee-I] general secretary, comprised Mr Madhavsinh Solanki, Mr K.R. Narayanan, Mr P. Chidambaram, Mr Ramesh Bhandari, Mr Mohammed Shafi Qureshi, Mr R.L. Bhatia and Mr Satpal Mittal.

Among the Chinese leaders they met were Mr Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Communist Party of China, Vice-Premier Wu Xieun, Mr Zhu Liang, head of the International Liaison Department and member of the central committee, Mr Ziang Kuang Hua, and others.

The Indian delegation also visited special economic zones and special development zones. According to Mr Jakhar, Mr Zhu Liang observed that Mr Gandhi's visit in 1988 turned a "new page" in Sino-Indian relations.

The Chinese leaders were also happy that the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, was continuing of the same policy.

#### **Papers Report on Visit of Seychelles President Rene**

##### **24 Sep Talks**

91AS0142A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
25 Sep 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 24 Sep (PTI, UNI)—India and Seychelles today expressed serious concern over the Gulf crisis leading to greater militarisation of the Indian Ocean and called for redoubling efforts to turn the Ocean into a zone of peace.

The Gulf situation figured prominently during the 90-minute talks the Seychelles President, Mr France Albert Rene, had with the President, Mr R. Venkataraman, and the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, and the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Hari Kishore Singh.

The Gulf developments also found mention in the speeches of the two Presidents at a banquet hosted by Mr Venkataraman in honour of Mr Rene who arrived here this morning on a three-day official visit.

At a half-hour meeting with Mr Rene, Mr Venkataraman said the Gulf crisis had a severe impact on the country's foreign exchange reserves since a substantial portion of crude oil and petroleum products was being imported.

An official spokesman said India had agreed to depute 10 experts to Seychelles and receive 20 trainees from that country under the technical and economic programme. This was aimed at making a significant contribution to human resource development in Seychelles.

The two sides also agreed to increase bilateral exchanges in the cultural field and in public health, sports and youth affairs.

He said India and Seychelles had also committed themselves to encouraging joint ventures in tourism and hotel industry and in expanding their economic and trade relations.

During Mr Rene's discussions with the Prime Minister and the Minister of State for External Affairs the Gulf situation was discussed and how this impinged on the security.

##### **25 Sep Banquet**

91AS0142B Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*  
in English 26 Sep 90 p 18

[Text] New Delhi, 25 Sep—The President of Seychelles, Mr France Albert Rene, and the president, Mr R. Venkataraman, have underscored the need for intensifying efforts to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

Speaking at a banquet yesterday held in honour of Mr Rene, Mr Venkataraman expressed concern at the Gulf crisis which, he said, had "caused greater militarisation" in the Indian Ocean region.

Mr Venkataraman, who noted that the "security situation in the immediate neighbourhood has worsened considerably," emphasised that the Gulf crisis required a "political, non-military solution."

He pointed out that India had registered its opposition to the use of force in inter-state relations and called for prompt withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, "whose sovereignty must be restored."

He also referred to the human suffering caused by the events in the Gulf and the enormous task of repatriation undertaken by New Delhi at a heavy cost.

The president regretted that while "good progress" had been made by India in improving relations with the neighbouring countries, especially Nepal, "Pakistan has not accepted the hand of friendship and co-operation" extended by it.

"There is clear evidence of Pakistani support for the abetment of the terrorist and secessionist elements in Punjab and Kashmir. Despite this, we are continuing our efforts to dissuade Pakistan from interference in India's internal affairs," he stated.

Mr Venkataraman expressed concern at the plight of developing countries, "with no relief in sight from the burden of external debts." They were also facing tough tariff and trade barriers. Their problems deserved immediate attention, he added.

The President also referred to the paucity of resources faced by the developing countries in preserving the environment. He suggested the establishment of some mechanism whereby a global fund could be set up for



this purpose. The developed nations should contribute to it "in proportion to their consumption of the earth's resources."

In his reply, Mr Rene said that though the past two years had witnessed some momentous changes in many regions, notably eastern Europe and Southern Africa, leading to some "encouraging signs," the recent developments in the Gulf "serve to remind us of the fragility of world peace and of the dangers of complacency."

All nations, big and small, had to further the cause of peace and disarmament. "We should redouble our efforts at the regional level to ensure the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, in conformity with the 1971 declaration adopted by the UN and supported by all states of the region."

Mr Rene noted that "the economic division between the prosperous north and the impoverished south is being accentuated." This called for increased co-operation among the countries of the south. He thanked India for the generous assistance it had extended to Seychelles and referred in particular to the recent line of credit extended by the Exim Bank of India.

Earlier, Mr Rene had discussions with the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, and the minister of state for external affairs, Mr Hari Kishore Singh. They exchanged views on, among other things, the Gulf crisis and issues relating to bilateral co-operation.

Both sides agreed that the situation in Fiji was a matter of concern not only for the region but for the defenders of human rights everywhere.

It was decided to extend a government-to-government credit of Rs [rupees] 2.5 crores to Seychelles for various projects.

#### **Kashmir Corps Commander Briefs Correspondents**

91AS0141A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 21 Sep 90 p 15

[Article by Yogendra Bali]

[Text] Srinagar, 20 Sep—It is nobody's case that the security forces and the civil administration in Jammu and Kashmir has already succeeded in rooting out the militants and intruders from across the border from Pakistan.

But the corps commander, Lt Gen Mohammad Ahmad Zaki, responsible for the defence of the region along the nearly 820-kilometre long line of control along the Indo-Pak border and to help root out militants from within the valley, says with considerable confidence, "We are well equipped and determined not to allow any violation of the line of control."

Briefing a group of visiting defence correspondents, the general held back no information and answered

searching questions freely and frankly to build the cautious confidence that with the apprehension of about 985 militant suspects in the rear areas and 633 close to the line of control till 13 September and killing of as many as 229 in encounters close to the line of control and 13 in the rear areas, the security forces had now better inflowing intelligence, had identified the major routes of ingress and infiltration of the militants and growing support from the local population who were getting slowly disenchanted from the various militant groups—nearly 100-odd including the major ones like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Forces (JKLF), the Hizbe-Mujahideen and the Islamic Students' League.

A large number of those who were found deeply involved in militant operations backed by Pakistani intelligence services, had yielded valuable intelligence during their detailed interrogations at the joint interrogation centres (JICs).

This had resulted in the seizure of the largest-ever caches of weapons and ammunition of Chinese, Soviet, Czech, Japanese and even Dara Khail manufactured weapons and equipment generally used by the Afghan Mujahideen. But what was more revealing was the fact that quite a section of the seized arms and ammunition had the markings of the Pakistani ordinance factories.

When the sector commander, Maj Gen Pranab Dutt, showed the collection of seized arms which filled a large-sized hall, one was amazed with the equipment and ammunition including AK-47 and AK-74 rifles, rocket launchers, anti-personnel mines, rocket projectile launchers, anti-tank mines, electronic detonators, pistols, revolvers, light machine guns of various types, grenades, booster charge rockets, live bombs, explosive packets, gun cotton and gelatine sticks, exploder dynamos, remote detonating devices, VHF radio sets, mine detonators, mine prodders and cyanide capsules which have not been used so far.

The point was that such a supply was impossible without the active organisational support by the Pakistani military intelligence service, the ISI.

The gains of the now well-organised counter intelligence operations against the militants and their Pakistani patrons were spelt out by the chief of staff of the corps, Maj Gen N.S. Lakhare and more so by the division commander, Maj Gen K.L. D'Souza and his brigade commanders who were performing the dual role of facing the Pakistanis along the hottest section of the line of control covering about 255 kilometers, along the Shamaahari ranges and facing Haji Pir and the Pir Panjal ranges where troops on both sides of the line of control faced each other from their well identified advance posts and carried out regular patrolling on their side, within 10 to 15 kilometers on either side.

During an hour-long helicopter sortie on the Indian side in the Uri sector, the visiting defence correspondents flew over Inchar Lake, Wular Lake, Razdhan Pass,

Pharkhan Cali, N.C. Pass, Tutnari Cali, N. Pass, Uri, Rustam, Cheena, Gulmarg, Sepur and Baramulah.

The rough triangle encompasses areas like Sopore, Kupwara, Trahgam, Handwara, Naugam and Baramullah where the security forces have stepped up their operations through encounters, and ambushes search against the militants with considerable success. From this sortie, one also got a feel of the directional situation of posts and launching pads provided by the Pakistani troops to the militants from areas in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir (POK) like Kel, Dudhinal, Jura, Kauseri, Chakothi, Bagh and Haji Pir.

During a visit by road to Rustam one of the most important advance posts in the Uri sector, one got a clear view of the deployment and even a feel of their sporadic gunfire, from their posts along the Pir Panjal ranges. It was explained by the brigade commander like Brig Kanwaljit Singh and Brigadier V.L. Gunikar that the modus operandi of induction of militants was that groups of 12 to 15 were brought to Pakistani advance posts, kept there for some time and then efforts were made to push them into Indian territory whenever the opportunity came.

But these efforts had been consistently foiled now by a three-tier system of encounter, ambush and search with as many as 555 having been held in the few months and as many as 530 yielding information which was operationally extremely valuable and provided an insight and information into motivational, recruitment and training parameters of the insurgents and infiltrators from Pak-occupied areas. Many of the apprehended militants confessed that they were sucked into the militancy network through the lure of money or sheer coercion and blackmail.

Lt Gen Zaki, known for his reticence, broke his silence for the first time to underline that documents and propaganda literature seized from the captured militants indicated that their brief from their masters was to assassinate prominent public figures and civil servants, commit arson and create violent incidents in which the innocent population could be involved willy nilly and then to launch a propaganda and disinformation campaign through word of mouth and threaten the local media to publish reports to create disaffection among the people and malign the security forces. Maj Gen D'Souza and his officers showed documents and some video films of actual operations and interrogation of militants.

Officers during briefings, and in private conversation, shared some of the valuable information about the network of the militant organisations and their objectives, activities and areas of operation.

The 100-odd militant groups, divided into eight main conglomerations had two main groupings, the JKLF led by its self-styled commander-in-chief Javed Ahmed Mir alias Javed Ajmed Nalka and the militant organisation

under the Jamiat-i-Islami Kashmir faction of Sayed Geelani with Ghulam Mohammad Sopori as its president.

### Communists, Socialists on Support to Government

91AS0140A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English  
19 Sep 90 p 9

[Text] Patna, 18 Sep—The CPI [Communist Party of India] general secretary, Mr Indrajit Gupta, today ruled out the possibility of his party extending support to the Congress(I) in the formation of a coalition Government in the Centre if such a situation arose, report PTI and UNI.

Talking to reporters here, after a two-day meeting of the CPI State Council, Mr Gupta said chances of mid-term poll were remote even if the BJP withdrew its support to the National Front Government on the Ram Janambhoomi-Babari Masjid issue.

In reply to a question, the CPI leader said the party's State council had on its agenda two most serious issues the proposed construction of Ram temple and the agitation in the wake of the implementation of the Mandal Commission report.

He said the meeting had ratified the central executive committee's decision on supporting the implementation of the Mandal Commission report.

Regarding the demand for an "economic criterion" in the reservation policy, he said this question could be reviewed after 10 years.

Mr Gupta did not favour reservation for religious minorities "at the moment" and replying to a question in this connection: "We should not toe the line which the British Government had adopted during the pre-Independence era."

He, however, supported the proposal of providing some percentage of reservation for the economically weaker sections among the upper castes.

Our Delhi Office adds: The Revolutionary Socialist Party has described the political and the economic situation in the country as "very grim." However, after a meeting of its central committee in Delhi it dispelled any apprehension of the withdrawal of "support from the outside" to the National Front Government by the Left parties.

Speaking after the meeting, Mr Trideb Choudhury, general secretary, stated that "it was the verdict of the people at the last polls to keep the Congress(I) out of power, the question of our support to the Congress(I) (as is being speculated) does not arise."

In a resolution adopted after the meeting it was stated that "the economic situation in the country is worse than

the political situation." A member described it as "almost without a silver lining anywhere on the horizon."

The member pointed out that there was discord within the Janata Dal and "no one knows who is where." An important section, he said, is with the Congress(I). He added that the Prime Minister's recent statements "clearly state what was being suspected."

The members stated that "notwithstanding the support to the National Front Government, a serious dialogue should be initiated with the National Front to ensure that all the negative aspects of its role are negated."

It was stated at the Press conference in New Delhi that "the situation was bad during the Congress(I) regime and this Government has not reversed any trend, in fact it has contributed to the further worsening of the situation."

### Chief Justice of India Dies in London

91AS0144A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
26 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] London, 25 Sep (PTI, UNI)—The Chief Justice of India, Mr Sabyasachi Mukharji died in a hospital here this morning following a massive heart attack, while awaiting an operation after collapsing at Heathrow Airport last Thursday. He was 63.

Mr Mukharji's body will be flown to India at 2200 hours (IST) tomorrow by an Air India plane.

His wife, Ratna Mukharji who has been brought here will be accompanying the body.

The Chief Justice arrived here last week on his way back from Washington, where he had gone to attend the conference of appellate judges. He collapsed at the airport and was rushed to the Royal Free Hospital.

Justice Mukharji, who succeeded Justice E.S. Venkataramiah as the Chief Justice was to retire on 1 June 1992.

Courts to remain closed: The Delhi High Court and all courts subordinate to it will remain closed tomorrow as a mark of respect to the memory of Mr Mukharji.

### Correspondent Reports Indian Efforts in Iraq

91AS0137A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
28 Sep 90 p 8

[Article by F.J. Khargamvala]

[Text] Manama (Bahrain), 27 Sep—In conducting its post-invasion Gulf policy, India has been very indulgent towards Baghdad, despite several instances of breach of trust and harassment of its diplomats, the details of which New Delhi continues to conceal from the public.

The impression being given of Iraq going out of its way to help India is unfounded. Very largely it is the embassy in Baghdad and a Joint Secretary of the External Affairs Ministry, Mr Rattan Sehgal, shuttling between Amman, Baghdad and Kuwait, who have done sterling work under obstructionist circumstances.

### Denied Permission

In the latest instance, the Indian Ambassador in Baghdad, Mr K.N. Bakshi was denied permission by Iraqi authorities to go to Kuwait to oversee arrangements for the distribution of food from the relief ship, "M.V. Vishwa Siddhi." However, permission or no permission, the ambassador decided to go. An Asian official who is now in Baghdad said Mr Bakshi landed up in Basra and "went and sat on the head of the Governor of Basra who finally relented and let him go to Kuwait." This is a very dangerous thing to do in Iraq as people who do not obey regulations have a habit of getting involved in nasty traffic accidents, as the wife of a crippled Soviet Tass news agency correspondent and the widow of the man who replaced him will testify.

### Ship Kept Waiting

The Iraqis kept the "Vishwa Siddhi" waiting in an inspection zone for two days before it was inspected prior to berthing in Umm Qasr on Wednesday night. This made it impossible for Indian officials to hire trucks to unload a hundred tons a day to move the supplies from Umm Qasr to Kuwait. All this time, until its hand was forced, New Delhi inexplicably did not correct PTI reports from Kochi on Monday that the "Vishwa Siddhi" had berthed. Much earlier, only after the Press revealed it did New Delhi admit that Iraq had gone back on assurances to Mr Gujral about a smooth evacuation for Indians.

Incidentally as of Thursday morning the trucks were still not available. "Every single trucking company has been mobilised by the Iraqis to bring back the loot from Kuwait," said the Asian official adding that "it is impossible to drive on that road, it is one endless line of trucks bound north full of goods, mattresses, pillows, I even saw bulbs." It seems that the "Vishwa Siddhi" will be in Iraq longer than the anticipated 10 days.

### Glossing Over Failings

Unquestionably India can be proud of its record so far in evacuating about 75,000 people and for the diplomatic handling of the food issue at the UN. But it appears that New Delhi is making a conscious attempt either to put a gloss over its failings in tying up details and by its indulgence also seeking to warp Indian public opinion on Iraq by making the latter look cooperative.

Some officials may argue that India has kept cool in a war of nerves. Perhaps, but instead of dotting the "I's and crossing the T's" South Block has done it the other way. What follows now is a mindless lapse: 'India Perspectives,' a monthly published by the External

Affairs Ministry in its August issue carries an item "India, Iraq for strengthening NAM [Nonaligned Movement]." It says India and Iraq have called for giving a new thrust to the NAM. "This emerged during the official level talks in Baghdad" between Mr I.K. Gujral and his Iraqi counterpart. At least 1,000 copies of this issue have been distributed routinely as usual in the Gulf this week addressed to opinion-makers, institutions, the Press and senior Government officials.

#### Utter Insensitivity

Ordinarily the despatch of such issues received from Delhi is a normal post office job by embassies. Despite some criticism there is also no need of being apologetic about India's stand on the crisis but to distribute an issue containing such an item in the Gulf at this time smacks of utter insensitivity toward the target audience. New Delhi should have either omitted this item in copies sent to the Gulf or not sent them at all.

Earlier statements too suggest an effort to be apologetic of Iraq. What this indulgence and apology will get India is unknown. New Delhi may be trying to believe that Iraq's treatment of Indian and Asian diplomats is more refined than that of western officials. This delusion is not working in Baghdad, Iraqis just do not deal on priority with the meek or silent [sentence as published]. The move of the Iraqis to remove the Kuwaiti dinar from circulation is an extremely hard blow to those tens of thousands of Indians who have their money in Kuwait banks.

#### Analyst Discusses Problems in Janata Dal

91AS0139A Madras *THE HINDU* in English  
5 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, 4 Oct—Parliament's approval of the Constitution Amendment, for extension of President's rule in Punjab, removes an immediate cause of worry to the Government, but the factional wrangles in the Janata Dal are far from resolved. Their potential for trouble is great at a time when the credibility of the ruling set-up has received heavy knocks.

The simultaneity of the two developments—the initial failure of the Government to muster the requisite majority for the Constitution Amendment Bill (on Monday) and the surfacing up of the dissidence in the Janata Dal—may create the misleading impression that a way out in the first case also means solution of the second problem.

The focus will now be exclusively on the quarrels in the Janata Dal. This much is accepted by all sections of the ruling party, but they differ in their perception of the course of events in the near future and the final outcome.

That the dissidents have not given up their plans to step up their demand for the resignation of the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, is no secret. But, here again, the supporters and critics of the Prime Minister differ on whether it poses any threat to him.

According to Mr Jaipal Reddi, Janata Dal general secretary, "we are in complete command of the party" and "although we hear a lot of the whispering campaign about a signature drive (calling for Mr V.P. Singh's replacement, we have no knowledge of the much-talked-about papersheet carrying the signatures (of pro-changers)." That is the line of his other friends too. They dispute the "highly-inflated" number of the signatories of the memorandum calling for a change. Thirty? No way, not even with the inclusion of the members of the Rajya Sabha—is how they react to the claims of the dissidents.

Mr Singh's supporters say the peak of the anti-reservation agitation was chosen for the offensive against him within the party in the hope of reaping the maximum gain from a peculiar psychological climate. They count on a scaling down of the agitation in the wake of the Supreme Court's stay of the reservation decision and the consequent respite for the Government. And this, it is calculated, is bound to be reflected in the waning intensity of the dissidents' drive.

The Prime Minister's camp also draws comfort from the disposal, this evening, of the adjournment motion sponsored by the Congress(I). This is considered particularly helpful in the context of the alleged nexus between the Janata Dal dissidents and the Congress(I).

A leading member of the official group accused Mr Chandra Shekhar—one of the two top leaders, the former Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Devi Lal being the other, whose supporters constitute the bulk of dissidents—of being in continuous touch with the Congress(I), but said they have decided not to make it an issue.

The claims and the assessment of the dissidents are just the opposite. They would not reveal the tally of those who had signed the memorandum (though one of them mentions the figure 30, perhaps inclusive of Rajya Sabha members).

They have taken this position either because they are waiting for an impressive tally or because, to use the words of Mr Yashwant Sinha, member of the Janata Dal's Political Affairs Committee, they are "not engaged in the game of numbers." Their idea, it is pointed out, is to generate moral pressure against the Prime Minister, in view of his "failure" on all fronts.

Numbers could be misleading at times, so goes this argument. Numbers could not save Mr Om Prakash Chautala (who had to leave the post of Chief Minister in Haryana) and the lack of numbers did not come in the way of Mr V.P. Singh scoring political points, at the time

of quitting the Congress(I) against the then Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi. The next two or three days will show who is right.

### Correspondent on BJP Study Camp Results

91AS0138A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 18 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Anil Sharma]

[Text] Bhopal, 17 Sep—At the BJP's [Bharatiya Janata Party] three-day study camp held here two topics dominated the proceedings—the party's disenchantment with the National Front (NF) government at the Centre and the construction of the Ram Janambhoomi temple.

BJP MLAs [members of Legislative Assembly] and MPs [members of Parliament] have been told to ensure that the Ram Janambhoomi temple construction programme and the "rathayatra" proposed by the party president, Mr L.K. Advani, are roaring successes. They also have to prepare to contest mid-term elections possibly without any electoral alliances.

When the camp began, Mr Advani virtually ridiculed Press reports that the Ram Janambhoomi issue and mid-term elections would dominate. Indeed, not only Mr Advani but all other BJP leaders as well said that the camp would be devoted to academic issues only.

Nevertheless, except for Mr Advani's inaugural address, where he avoided any reference to the Ram Janambhoomi issue, all other encounters between BJP leaders and the Press were dominated by the Ram temple's construction and mid-term elections. BJP leaders clearly indicated that they were totally disenchanted with Mr V.P. Singh as Prime Minister. The only thing that is preventing them from toppling the NF government is fear of public reaction against any such move.

The BJP may perhaps rejoice over the fall of the NF government but it would not like to be accused of being the cause. "We shall not be the cause of the NF government's collapse," said Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee.

This can be a result of the acceptance of the fact that the party has little room for manipulation in the present political setup. It has to perforce support a minority government with which it is totally disenchanted, but it cannot afford to bring it down, although it is well able to do so.

The BJP leaders believe that the ball is in Mr Singh's court and it is for him to decide whether he wants to risk a confrontation with them. They all feel that Mr Singh has been violating the spirit of the understanding that was the basis of the support of the BJP.

### No Choice

On the Ram Janambhoomi issue the BJP has no choice but to go the whole hog. "It should be appreciated by the people that we made a very strong and sincere effort to

go ahead with the temple construction programme," said a senior BJP leader. The BJP group that is supporting an aggressive approach on the temple issue advocates that there are two advantages in this strategy.

They have argued within the party that the BJP was able to stage a comeback in the elections only after it adopted a strong pro-Hindu stand. Any dilution on this has always been counter-productive. Thus with Mr Singh trying to win the backward castes among the Hindus, the BJP has no choice but to cater to the upper caste Hindus.

They have also said that so far it is Mr Singh who has been setting the political agenda for the parties and they have been responding to it. With this issue coming to the fore, it will be for the BJP to take the initiative. They argue that from a defensive position, they would move to a stronger one.

BJP leaders are wary about their chances in the eventuality of a mid-term poll. Publicly, they may seem confident but they are aware of their shortcomings. They also realise that they have emerged stronger in Parliament and the state assemblies because of the electoral alliances and the situation at the time of the elections.

The study group headed by the party's vice-president, Mr Sunder Singh Bhandari, has taken all these things into consideration. At the study camp too, Mr Bhandari's session was very much appreciated by the MPs and MLAs for the candid approach and an awareness of the ground realities.

It is not that the party is unaware of the pitfalls, but it has to go ahead with the course it has charted for itself. "Politics is like a market-place where the fortunes fluctuate for various traders. Sometimes the steel trader makes it good and sometimes it is the cloth merchant who reaps a fortune. But then whether they lose or gain they always remain in the trade. The same thing holds good for political parties," commented a BJP leader.

### Anthropological Survey Study of Backward Classes

91AS0135A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 1 Oct 90 p 3

[Text] New Delhi, 30 Sep (PTI)—As the row over the number of backward communities listed by the Mandal commission continues, a just-concluded study by the Anthropological Survey of India [ASI] has identified 1051 backward classes in the country.

(The Mandal commission has listed more than 3,000 communities as socially and educationally backward.)

The objective of the project, launched in 1985, was of course different from that of the Mandal commission. It was to generate brief descriptive anthropological profiles of all communities of India, the impact of change and development process on them and the linkage that bring them together.

The study, free from political overtones, is expected to enrich knowledge on the sociological pattern of the country.

Explaining the necessity of such a project, the director general of ASI, Mr K. S. Singh, told newsmen in an interview that there existed a large information gap about a very large number of communities of India, or the information that was there was scanty and needed to be updated.

The project was also in accordance with the objective of ASI which has been pursuing bio-cultural researches among different population groups since its inception 45 years ago, Mr Singh said. The ASI's objective had been redefined in the policy resolution adopted in 1985 which committed it to the survey of "the human surface of India" he said.

The ASI has been able to identify, locate and write on 4,384 communities, including scheduled castes, 443, scheduled tribes, 426, backward classes, 1,051 and other communities.

"We have been able to prepare probably the most comprehensive lists of communities with all their ramifications such as subgroups, divisions, clans, lineages, surnames and titles," Mr Singh said.

The ASI is releasing its data called "People of India" tomorrow for scrutiny and further discussion. As the data is still being analysed it will not be appropriate to mention any findings conclusively, he said.

However, a few trends in the analysis of the data could be shared tentatively, Mr Singh said.

—The study reveals the strength and continuity of region identities which go back to the pre-historic times, in terms of morphological and genetic characteristics of populations, language and literature, material culture, food habits, rituals, folklore, local forms of religion, fairs and festivals etc. These regional identities are primarily secular, according to the study.

The communities, no matter how ranked they are, share the regional space and ethos. This explains why about 80-90 percent of the communities of India are within the boundaries of Indian states and union territories, which were reorganised on the basis of language. These are thus linguistic-cultural and social identities, largely homogeneous.

Only about 10 percent of communities are spread over more than one state or adjoining area of states. They consist of traders, merchants, artisans, minorities and so on.

There are few communities which do not consider themselves migrants. Every community recalls its migration in its folklore and history, set off by famines, wars, political and sheer necessity.

The whole of India is a kahetra, and an Indian is a migrant par excellence. The immigrants accepted regional ethos. Their role in promoting the development of regional languages and literature, building economy is well known, the study emphasises.

## IRAN

### Future Fishing Accord With Seychelles Discussed

91AF0171Z Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION  
in English 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Text] Seychelles and Iran are looking into the possibility of cooperating in fishing and other fields, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister Jeremie Bonnelame said yesterday.

Already talks are under way to grant Iranian vessels licences to fish tuna in Seychelles' waters.

The minister was speaking after returning home last week from a two-week working visit to Teheran and Rome.

The visit to Iran, from 17 to 24 September, was at the invitation of the Iranian Minister for Reconstruction, Mr Foruzesh. He and Mr Bonnelame discussed the possibility of the two countries opening up co-operation between them and looked into the areas where this could occur.

Accompanied by Seychelles Fishing Authority managing director Philip Michaud, Mr Bonnelame visited commercial fisheries projects in Bushehr, southern Iran, and in the north around the Caspian Sea.

The Seychellois delegation toured an aquaculture project and a boatyard in Bushehr, where different types of fishing boats are built with West German help.

They also visited Iran's Centre for Marine Research in Bushehr which has six institutes specialising in oceanography, marine biology, fishing technology, fish and other seafood products, stock assessment and statistics, aquaculture and fish farming.

Mr Bonnelame told SEYCHELLES NATION the islands could benefit from assistance in such fields so as to further develop the country's fishing industry.

"The Iranian Government has shown great interest in obtaining licences to fish tuna in our seas and have two purse seiners ready to send here," he said.

Negotiations were already under way to grant Iran fishing licences, he said.

Mr Bonnelame also met with his counterpart, the Iranian Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development, Dr Kalantari, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Ali Akbar Velayati, together with his first vice minister.

A meeting with the Iranian Vice-President Habibi, was cancelled due to an official visit to Teheran by Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad.

### **Commentary Alleges Khalkhali, Duzdüzani Lack Piety**

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[Text] The respected theologians of the Council of Guardians quite admirably carried out the mission entrusted to them by the leadership of the Assembly of Experts. They were obligated to investigate and study the scientific qualification and piety of the candidates for the Assembly of Experts and announce their opinion accordingly. For this reason, the Council of Guardians set up a precise oral and written text for those individuals whose extent of theological knowledge was not proven to the said council. Therefore, based on these tests the theological and scientific qualifications of the candidates were duly ascertained.

Some of the individuals who had been invited to take the examination or sit in for the test did not do so, thus the Council of Guardians did not announce their names, while it did announce the names of other candidates who were duly confirmed. From among the individuals who had been invited to take the test but did not decide to participate, or some who did take the test but did not pass it, were a few members of the theological faculty of Qom and some members of the Tehran Combatant Clerics (the original group) [Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran]. Thus, this very fact renders futile the hollow claims of some clamorous and loud-mouthed individuals who had accused the Council of Guardians and the Assembly of Experts as partial or prejudiced.

Similarly, the Council of Guardians reached a consensus that some of the candidates were not renowned for their piety. Considering yesterday's pre-agenda speech of Mr. Khalkhali, Qom's representative at the Islamic Consultative Assembly, one would think that this gentleman is also one of those individuals as well.

Mr. Khalkhali, why do you expect the Council of Guardians judge you as a pious individual while you lack the very quality? We do not want to talk about your court dossiers and your 70 million toman house! But if one only refers to your letters and statements made during the era of Bani-Sadr—which are all reflected in the periodicals of the day—and other talks and speeches made by you in the Islamic Consultative Majles and other similar gatherings, unfortunately one would come to the conclusion that you are not renowned for your "piety." There is no need to go to the archives for witness, your very speech of yesterday is a good document for this claim. On the one hand you confess that a few weeks ago you had the very good fortune to be given an audience by the great leader of the nation, while on the other hand you claim that they do not let the supreme jurisconsult know some of the issues? What should the people believe: Your claim of innocence or the tail of the stolen cock showing through your shirt? Isn't it a fact

that the Council of Guardians has the blessing of the Imam [Khomeyni] and isn't it similarly true that it is confirmed by the great leader of the country as well? Then if creation of an atmosphere detrimental to the Council of Guardians is not deemed as opposition to the rule of theocracy, what is it? Do you think that people still consider you as pious while committing such indignant behaviour towards the rule of the supreme jurisconsult? Should the Majles representatives still remain silent in your presence? Should the inhabitants of Qom remain silent for all your insolence? Doesn't our judicial system have a duty versus your impudence and irreverence? It is not a bad idea for you to review your statements and repent while you can, otherwise you should know that God will harshly punish the oppressor.

Yesterday Mr. Duzdüzani, the Tehran representative, read a statement—as had been promised by Mr. Khalkhali—half-finished and asked other representatives to put their signatures on his circular. Where does Mr. Duzdüzani think he is going? Doesn't he want to take advantage of his past experience? Now he has risen in defiance, inciting the representatives against the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts, and all which is revered in the system and tries to collect some signatures! Instead of inviting the people to openly participate in the elections of the Assembly of Experts he tries to make them more suspicious of this holy system and thus keep them away from casting their votes by saying this is called "appointments" and not "elections."

Mr. Duzdüzani, is this your perception of the holy system of the Islamic Republic, which is the only hope of the Islamic world and the oppressed people and the greatest inheritance of the great imam! One is afraid that you might destroy all the achievements of the revolution and the high ideals of the imam of the nation and in its place install a version of reactionary Americanized Islam!

Is now the time that reactionary Americanized Islam is going to rule, while the great leader of the country and other responsible authorities plus the people remain silent, except you who know what is going on and become a bit annoyed? Isn't this action of yours similar to the instigations and your rubble-raising against the Guard Corps during the war, when his excellency the imam said that you not interfere, but you answered: "Are you saying we should shut up?"

Mr. Duzdüzani, do you think that a few individuals, whose average qualification does not meet the requirements for the candidacy of the Assembly of Experts, are followers of the path of the imam and the rest are reactionary and pro-American?

Are the majority of the great jurists of the present Assembly of Experts and 109 great scholars whose candidacy for the Assembly of Experts have been confirmed, mere reactionaries? Alas for your opinion! Alas for your kind of Islam! Alas for your dependency on rule of the jurisconsult! And alas for your destiny!